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PATROL BOMBING SQUADRON THIRTEEN
(VPB-13)
1938 - 31 December 1944
November 1944 - 30 August 1945
1 Sept. 1945 - 21 December 1945 (decomm)
Official History. 31 March 1945.
XPB2Y1 Developed - 1938
FB2Y-2 Developed - 1940
VP-13 Detachment created as part of VP-14 - March, 1940
VP-13 Commissioned - July, 1940
Mission-training and development - March, 1940 to December, 1941
Lt. Comdr. S. B. Cooke, Commanding - July, 1940 to January, 1941
Lt. Comdr. C. W. Oexle, Commanding - Jan., 1941 to Aug., 1941
Lieut. W. M. Nation, Commanding - August, 1941 to March, 1943
Mission-training and search from San Diego - Dec., 1941 to January, 1943
San Diego to Pearl Harbor flights - December 9 to 24, 1941
Kaneohe Bay, Oahu Island, T.H. Detachment - January to November, 1942
FB2Y-3 Developed - June, 1942
Pearl Harbor to Sidney, Australia service - February to November, 1942
Squadron moved to Kaneohe Bay - January, 1943
Lt. Comdr. T. F. Connolly, Commanding - March, 1943 to Sept., 1944
Funafuti Detachment - November to December, 1943
Gilbert and Marshall Detachment - January to March, 1944
Wake Island Bombing Raids - February, 1944
Patrols from bases in Marshalls - February to July, 1944
Encounters with Japanese Search Planes - February to July, 1944
Dumbo missions in the Marianas - March to July, 1944
Mine-laying operations against Truk - April, 1944
Night bombing of Wotje - May, 1944
FB2Y-5 Developed - September, 1944
Reorganization of Squadron in San Diego - August to November, 1944
Saipan Operations - November and December, 1944
The "P" Boat Navy had a new addition. The "XPB2Y1" was eased into San Diego Bay from the ramp of the Consolidated Aircraft Corporation Factory early in 1938. Navy men watched it take to the air. After suitable demonstration it was accepted for flight tests and trials, and found to be a satisfactory airplane. Contracts were drawn and Consolidated started production. The dream of a huge 66,000 pound, four-engined flying boat that could bomb, land on the water, and rescue downed fliers, fly long range patrols over the ocean, carry freight and personnel to the outlying island bases, and could be armed to defend itself in combat became a reality.
Two years later, in 1940, the first PB2Y-2 made its appearance. It was the product of all of the experiments and tests that the XPB2Y-1 had undergone and Navy men were confident that it would be an important part of the air arm of the fleet. The planes were tested and found successful. The Navy accepted delivery and the primary job then to be done was to train pilots and crews for this new type aircraft.
For this purpose the VP-13 detachment was created. Temporarily attached to VP-14, it was based at the Naval Air Station, San Diego, California. From a small beginning the squadron grew and began to take over its work. The XPB2Y1 began making training flights from San Diego Bay by March of 1940.
Early in July all members of the VP 13 Detachment, thirty officers and 150 men, assembled outside Building 45 at Naval Air Station, San Diego, Calif., and formed for their commissioning ceremony. Lieutenant Commander S. B. Cooke, USN, read the commissioning letter and outlined their mission. "Our job," he told his men, "is to test and accept for the Navy, the PB2Y-2 airplanes delivered under contract by the Consolidated Aircraft Corporation. We will keep the planes in flying condition, train pilots and crews to fly them, and men to maintain the Navy's new 'flying boats.'"
At the time of its commissioning Patrol Squadron Thirteen had four planes in its custody--bureau numbers 1635 to 1638. Only carefully picked pilots flew these craft. Their names have been and are still identified with large Navy patrol craft. Some of them now command squadrons, a few have completed tours of duty in the war zones and have returned to training and administrative duty.
All of them were lieutenants and lieutenants, junior grade when they flew the XPB2Y-1. Here are some of the names: Commander Ward T. Shields, Commander B. F. McLeod, Commander W. M. Nation, Commander S. M. Pickering, Lieut. Commander V. M. Counts, Lieut. Commander J. R. McCants, and Lieut. Commander C. L. Pearson.
Under Lieut. Commander Cooke the squadron continued its primary mission, outlined at the commissioning ceremony. The pilots and men of VP-13 worked closely with the engineering department and the Bureau of Aeronautics Representative, then "Inspector of Naval Aircraft", at the Consolidated plant. It was an effective partnership. The men who flew the plane and the men who built it ironed out the wrinkles, suggested modifications, tested new developments in flight and in the laboratory; then rebuilt and improved their results.
The first year ended with a good record of availability, the completion of a thorough flight syllabus, and a substantial number of pilots and men familiar with the PB2Y.
Early in January of 1941, Commander Cooke was designated to head an investigating committee in Corpus Christi, Texas. On the return trip, the plane in which he was a passenger crashed into the summit of Mother Grundy Mountain, near San Diego, and all of the occupants were killed.
The loss of their "Skipper" was a blow to the officers and men of VP 13 but their job had to go on. Lieutenant W. M. Nation temporarily assumed command and was later relieved by Lieut. Commander C. W. Oexle.
Training flights and intense ground instruction continued. Tests of all kinds were made and in March of 1941 one of the planes were flown to the East Coast for rough water tests, which proved successful and instructive.
In August, 1941, Lieut. Commander Oexle was relieved of command of the squadron by Lieutenant W. M. Nation. Training continued and a series of extensive tests were undertaken. One of these tests, in which one PB2Y-2 was refueled in mid-air from another, was of particular interest. The experiment was tried because the Navy felt that longer range might be achieved if the plane took off with a good load of gasoline and then more was added when it was airborne and could carry the extra weight. The conclusions were accurate, the refueling was possible but the time it took to accomplish the task and the risk involved were considered to outweigh the advantages gained.
In the first six days of December, 1941, operations continued as usual. More training flights, new crews to learn the ways of the PB2Y. On Sunday, December 7th, the schedule was a brief one. Only three planes were attached to the squadron. At about 10:30 that morning the phone watch in the duty office was reading a magazine and listening to the radio, the program was interrupted for an important news flash, and VP 13 came of age.
The usually silent telephone burned with business. All members of the squadron were on the seaplane ramp before noon. Two planes were readied for takeoff, guns were checked, all hands were busy belting machinegun ammunition, aviation fuel flowed into the tanks and at 1300 a two-plane patrol took off and headed out to sea.
That night and part of the next day men of all rates wired bomb dropping circuits and fitted the PB2Ys with bomb racks while representatives of all the squadrons based at the air station divided the patrol sectors to be flown.
Assignments of patrol sectors had just been made when the Navy Department ordered one of the PB2Y's made available for an important mission. The destination was Pearl Harbor but the passengers were unknown until a man in a grey hat stepped out of a long black car. Plane handling crews snapped to attention when they saw the Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox. They were going to Pearl Harbor. They were taking Frank Knox to see what the enemy had done to the United States Navy. The trip was made in record time and they were back in San Diego by December 12th.
More passenger trips to Pearl Harbor followed. On the 13th one plane went out and came back on the 15th. Among passengers on the return trip were seventeen wives and many young children of men and officers stationed at Pearl Harbor.
On December 15 two planes were ordered to prepare for flight to Pearl Harbor and to report on arrival to Patrol Wing Two for temporary duty as the Flag Detachment of VP-13.
On December 24th Lieut. McLeod and Ensign Ross C. Barney in the first airplane climbed to 1,000 feet and headed west, and Admiral E. J. King and Admiral C. W. Nimitz settled down for the long trip over the water to Hawaii. The next morning the second plane headed west. Lieut. Commander Pickering sat in the pilot's seat and Rear Admiral McCain and Vice Admiral Halsey were passengers.
VP-13 was split but the job was the same. Flying out of Kaneohe Bay on Oahu Island after transfer from Patrol Wing One to Patrol Wing Two, the Flag Detachment of two planes flew daily patrols. The unit was called the "first strike group" and their mission boiled down to this: "To seek and destroy the enemy."
The patrols were flown almost to Midway, then north, and back to Hawaii, a total of 1,900 miles.
In San Diego the squadron was doing similar work flying patrols; long hours with no contacts.
Fourteen and fifteen hour patrols were monotonous but that monotony was broken occasionally for the Hawaii detachment by trips to the Pacific Islands controlled by the United States. Twice in February, 1942 there were trips to Sydney, Australia. Supplies, war materials, drugs, medical equipment, and important men with vital work to do rode together in the plane. Trips to Auckland, Tanga Tanga, Noumea, Suva, Canton Island, Australia, Palmyra, and many other islands were made with ease and without the loss of planes, men, or cargo. The area they traveled formed an immense fan across the ocean south and west from Pearl Harbor.
Constant service was telling on the planes, however, and they had to be flown back to San Diego for repairs and overhaul, but they were needed badly in what was then the forward area. The maintenance work was given high priority and in a few weeks they were back in service, flying over the Pacific again.
In June of 1942 patrol planes located a Japanese task force heading toward Midway Island. Two of the squadron's planes took off from Hawaii, an hour or so after the sighting was made, ferrying eight one thousand pound bombs. They landed at Midway, unloaded their cargo and returned during the night with patients from the hospital who were evacuated to make room for battle casualties. Three subsequent trips were made.
The service to Australia was expanded and a maintenance crew of eleven men was flown to Sydney to establish a repair unit. This branch of Patrol Squadron Thirteen was located at the Quantas Empire Airways seadrome on Rose Bay, an inlet off of Sydney Harbor. Four PB2Y's were in constant service flying 12 round trips a month from Kaneohe Bay to Rose Bay, a little over four thousand miles each way. During the ten months this Trans-Pacific air service was in operation, the squadron lost no planes and no men. In November of 1942 the Australian detachment flew back to San Diego, their work completed; the first regular Trans-Pacific freight and passenger service from the United States to Australia had been established. VP 13 planes had pioneered the route that is now followed by the Naval Air Transport Service. They had supplied the few carriers left afloat with vital materials and spare parts; the things they badly needed to prevent the Japanese from advancing further into the South Pacific at a most critical time in the war.
Meantime, back in the United States, the squadron was continuing its training and development work on the four engine patrol bomber. In June of 1942 the third modification of the PB2Y came out of the factory. Bureau Number 7044, the second of 200 of this model scheduled for production was delivered to the squadron. VP 13 pilots put it through its paces and gave it all conceivable tests.
In all the hours that were chalked up during the intense test and training period there was only one accident. It was in December, 1942, just a few weeks before the squadron was scheduled to leave for Hawaii. Lieut. W. O. Carlson, Lieut. J. E. Brenner, Ensign J. D. Simmons, and a crew of 12 men crashed when making a practice landing at Salton Sea near San Diego. The exact cause of the crash was undetermined.
In late January of 1943 VP 13, still under Commander Nation, with Lieut. Commander T. F. Connolly, USN, as executive officer, moved to Kaneohe Bay. Training days were over and operational days had arrived. The squadron was together for the first time since shortly after war was declared. It consisted of twelve airplanes, 36 pilots, and 264 men.
In early February 1943, VP 13 reported for duty to Commander, Fleet Air Wing TWO and was assigned the mission of anti-task force and anti-submarine patrols operating 12 PB2Y-3 airplanes from Kaneohe Bay as a base. From then until January of 1944 an average of three 700 mile patrols were flown daily, each with an average duration of 12 hours.
In March 1943 Commander Nation was relieved in command by his executive officer, Lt. Comdr. Connolly.
In March too, one-third of the squadron personnel were detached and ordered to VP-15 for duty. This necessitated a re-organization of the squadron during which Lt. G. R. McDermott, USNR, was named executive officer.
Lt. Comdr. Connolly then scheduled a rigid training syllabus and the squadron simultaneously trained and flew operational missions.
At this time the squadron had only six (6) Patrol Plane Commanders: Lt. Comdr. Connolly, Lt. Roger A. Wolf, Lt. Barney, Lt.(jg) Robert O'Donnell, Lt.(jg) John P. Wheatley, Lt.(jg) John R. Fowler.
Lt.(jg) O'Donnell and crew were killed in the latter part of March while flying a special Dumbo mission from Johnston Island.
Besides flying patrols and undergoing intensive and extensive training, numerous special cargo flights were flown to Johnston, Midway, Canton, Palmyra, and Samoa; and special passenger flights were flown to the South Pacific.
The month of December was devoted to the returning of old planes to San Diego and the testing and ferrying of new planes. At the same time routine patrols from Hawaii were continued.
A four plane detachment left Kaneohe Bay on 18 November 1943 to operate from Funafuti in the Ellice Islands. Lieut. Barney was officer-in-charge, and his Patrol Plane Commanders were Lt.(jg) C. M. Smith, Lt.(jg) Wheatley, and Lt.(jg) O. T. Knight.
The detachment was based ashore at Funafuti and its original mission was to act as an evacuation unit for those wounded in the forthcoming invasion of the Gilberts. Lieut. Barney, flying the first allied plane to land there, evacuated 35 men from Makin Island. This was the only hospital trip flown as the detachment was ordered to make special flights for the purpose of transporting tactical commanders and vital equipment to Tarawa, Makin, and Apamama.
The first VP 13 plane landed at Tarawa on D-plus-2 day. No seaplane facilities were available. Each plane carried its own buoy.
The detachment returned to Kaneohe Bay on 6 December 1943.
GILBERT - MARSHALL DETACHMENT - 26 January to 7 March 1944.
On 26 January 1944 a four plane detachment was sent to Tarawa. Lt.(jg) Fowler was officer-in-charge and his Patrol Plane Commanders were: Lt.(jg) Knight, Lt.(jg) L. W. Swett, Lt.(jg) E. R. Horrell.
The ground crew was supervised by Carpenter W. L. Hayden.
The detachment was based aboard the U.S.S. CURTIS at Tarawa, and was directly under Commander Forward Area.
The mission of this detachment was to evacuate casualties and to carry mail, cargo, and personnel between the various Marshall and Gilbert Islands. One northbound and one southbound flight was made each day.
Approximately 13,000 pounds of pay load was carried by each plane on each flight. The rough water and lack of beaching facilities made it necessary to operate with less than maximum weight.
By March, 1944 strips were available at key points for land planes. R4D's, therefore, relieved VP 13's Coronados. On 7 March the detachment returned to Kaneohe Bay.
From 30 January until 9 February 1944 Patrol Squadron Thirteen, based at Midway Island, carried out four heavy bombing raids on Wake Island. It is felt that these raids are worth discussing in some detail in this history because they represented the first time that a formation of heavy seaplanes had been used by the U. S. Navy in a concentrated bombing attack against enemy objectives at extreme long range. Through the successful planning and execution of this operation a heavy blow against the enemy was struck while supporting our invasion troops in the Marshall Islands, and much worthwhile knowledge was gained as to the feasibility of employing squadrons of heavy seaplanes in long range advance base operations.
Early in January, 1944, Rear Admiral John D. Price, USN, Commander, Fleet Air Wing Two, was assigned the task of supporting landing operations in the Marshalls by neutralizing the airfields and surrounding installations on Wake Island. While planes of Fleet Air Wing Two were employed in various phases of the Marshall operation Admiral Price assumed the neutralization of Wake to be of such primary importance that he personally planned many of the details of the Wake attack and accompanied the bombers on two of the raids.
During the year the squadron had been based at Kaneohe Bay Admiral Price had consistently remained interested in the development of the Coronado as a bombing plane and felt that this mission provided an opportunity to utilize the potentialities of the aircraft. Comdr. Connolly and Lieut. Wolf, squadron gunnery officer, shared Admiral Price's confidence in the success of the mission and together planned many of the details of the mission before the rest of the squadron was informed.
About 10 January training was begun for the raids, although at that time, few of the pilots knew the exact purpose of the training. Numerous formation bombing flights, low altitude bombing runs, and high speed glide bombing runs were made, both day and night, by all pilots who were to participate in the raids. At the same time experimental cruising control flights, heavy load takeoffs and night landings, and three-engine operations were conducted. All ordnance, radar, and emergency equipment was thoroughly flight tested in each of the new planes recently ferried from San Diego by pilots of the squadron.
On the morning of 22 January, Comdr. Connolly called together all members of the twelve flight crews who had been selected to make the raids, and in addition, the six flight crews of Patrol Squadron 102 who were to make up the total complement of eighteen crews. Crews were informed only that they were standing by for a long range bombing mission against a Jap-held base, that they should be prepared to leave at any time after 24 January to be gone for approximately two weeks. At this conference plans were completed for a practice bombing raid on East Island in French Frigate Shoals to be carried out that night. Planes were loaded with gasoline to simulate the heavy load conditions of the actual raid, although only miniature practice bombs were carried. It was planned that the first section of nine planes would proceed to and bomb the target from extreme low altitude with delayed action bomb-fuzes, while the second section of nine planes would climb to medium bombing altitude enroute and hit the target one hour after the first section.
The practice flight was completely successful except that adverse weather conditions at French Frigate Shoals made close formation flying hazardous. One plane was forced to return to base because of engine failure over the target and was able to make the 600 mile return trip on three engines without jettisoning any equipment. Numerous lessons were learned from this practice flight such as the necessity of remaining in close formation to maintain contact after dark, the use of flares over the target to blind enemy gunners, and the need for a better plan of withdrawal from the target area. The entire flight was run according to rigid cruise control charts with all engines in full manual lean, and overall fuel consumption was lower than expected.
The following morning a meeting was held of all Patrol Plane Commanders, and difficulties encountered on the practice flight were thrashed out. The pilots were informed at this time that their target was to be Wake Island. Last minute pre-flight checks were made, bombs were loaded, and on the morning of 25 January, the first nine planes left for Midway, followed by the second nine two days later.
The flight to Midway was uneventful, made in loose formation. All the planes were moored at buoys laid inside the then uncompleted submarine basin, with the exception of four planes which had to be moored in the open lagoon. The mooring area for fourteen seaplanes was extremely cramped, allowing scarcely a swinging radius for each plane at its buoy. The high winds and squalls prevalent at Midway in the winter complicated this situation and consistently fine seamanship was necessary to prevent taxiing accidents.
At Midway further plans were made to co-ordinate communications and air-sea rescue facilities. It was determined that the target area would be limited to the airfield and revetments on Peacock Point, the surrounding maintenance facilities, and fuel and oil storage dumps on the southwestern tip of Wake Island itself.
A lifeguard submarine, the U.S.S. TANG, was on station thirty miles on a pre-determined bearing east of the target. A PT boat was to be stationed at Kure Island, a small reef approximately 100 miles west of Midway. Another picket boat was dispatched on course westward.
All Patrol Plane Commanders were carefully briefed in daily meetings as to conditions in the seadrome, exact targets, rescue facilities, tactics, and foul weather doctrine, emergency communications procedure, etc. Planes were gassed to their maximum capacity of approximately 3500 gallons. The bomb load was set at four 500 pound general purpose bombs and four 100 pound fragmentation bombs for each plane; those of the first nine-plane section to be armed with 6-8 second delayed action fuses. A crew of 11 men per plane was carried, sufficient only to man battle stations.
The planes were equipped, incidentally, with self-sealing fuel cells for the inboard tanks only; the outboard tanks and the internally placed hull tank were equipped only with carbon dioxide purging systems and were otherwise completely vulnerable to enemy fire.
On 29 January, it was decided that the attack would be launched the following night. That afternoon all pilots and aircrewmen were briefed by Admiral Price himself. Since Midway had previously been used as a staging base for several light bombing and reconnaissance raids on Wake Island, the squadron benefited from the experience of many officers involved in those flights. It was felt that losses had been heavy and results relatively unsatisfactory on previous raids due to inaccurate navigation and breaking of radio silence which alerted Jap defenses.
Weather forecasts from submarines in the area continued favorable and take-off time was set for 1500 on the thirtieth. This was the first taste of combat experience for almost every man in the flight and the nervous tension was heightened by warnings to leave all personal papers and identification at Midway, and by repeated survival advice.
At exactly the scheduled moment the engines of the first plane turned up, the buoy was cast off, and the plane taxied out of the submarine basin, closely followed by seven other planes of the first section. The most unfortunate accident of the entire operation happened at this time. One of the planes "lost" two engines as the pilot was maneuvering into position to pass through the narrow entrance to the submarine basin. The plane struck the breakwater with the left wing. As the impact occurred other pilots of the section could see the wingtip float torn completely off as the heavy plane grounded on the beach.
Eight planes of the group proceeded in line to the takeoff area, formed close "V" formations of three planes each, and the first three plane section took off. A strong twenty knot wind was shipping four foot waves across the lagoon but all eight of the heavily-overloaded 70,000 pound planes were airborne in formation within five minutes of the initial takeoff. Comdr. Connolly led his formation in a sweep across the island to afford a pinpoint departure for the navigator and the pilots settled down into a loose formation of three plane "V's" for the 1050 mile trip to Wake. An hour later the high altitude section took off, lead by Lieut. Wolf, with Admiral Price in the copilot's seat.
Surface winds held as predicted and approximately eight hours after takeoff Comdr. Connolly's plane made radar contact with the U.S.S. TANG on station. Navigation of the flight had been perfect, battle stations were manned, and a run was immediately started on the target at rated power with 180 knots airspeed at approximately 200 feet altitude. Since only the lead plane was using radar in order to avoid interference on the scope, the shadow of each cumulus cloud looked like Wake Island to pilots straining to maintain a tight formation in order to avoid bomb blasts. Suddenly the reef surrounding the island flashed under the planes. As the cry of "bomb's away" echoed through the interphones, gunners in all turrets strafed buildings, revetments, and gun emplacements streaking by only a few feet under the planes. As the first bombs burst eight seconds after the drop, Jap automatic weapons and light anti-aircraft opened up in a savage crossfire. Apparently alerted too late, Jap gunners failed to score a single hit, although our air gunners punctured a large fuel tank which immediately burst into flame visible to the second section approaching the island almost 100 miles out.
Our planes remained at low altitude, barely clearing radio and water towers. They passed on a southwest course across the Peacock Point runway area, swept over the lagoon strafing the dredge at anchor there, and continued strafing fuel dumps located on the tip of Wake Island adjacent to the boat channel.
When the planes reduced power and swung out to sea all planes had been accounted for except that of Lieut.(jg) Robert W. Whiteley. Finally he was found to be orbiting off shore (having momentarily lost the formation on its target run), calmly requesting permission to attack alone. Whiteley made his pass and once again the Jap fire was heavy but late, and for twenty seconds the island was ablaze with bomb bursts, 50 calibre fire, and anti-aircraft; then all was quiet except for the rapidly expanding fire from the gutted fuel tank and several smaller fires smouldering near the airfield.
Hardly had these planes withdrawn when Lieut. Wolf's section, guided by the fires and a vertical searchlight from the TANG, hit the island from an altitude of 8,000 feet. There was no cloud cover and bombing results were excellent. Anti-aircraft directed at this section was of moderate intensity but fell short of the bombers' altitude, for the most part. All the planes except one had de-synchronized their propellers before entering the bombing run and the fact that this plane drew the heaviest fire suggests that Jap heavy anti-aircraft guns were directed by sound-detecting devices.
Returning crews were interrogated as to the accuracy of bomb drops, position of gun emplacements, weather, etc., and were read Admiral Nimitz's congratulatory despatch.
Two days later orders were received to stand by for a second raid. Maintenance men began at once to replace hull tanks burst by the pressure of expanding carbon dioxide, to repair hull damage caused by rough water heavy load takeoffs, and to check all engines. Only limited beaching facilities were available, but by untiring effort, all planes with any discrepancies were beached.
Others were checked on the water and loaded with gas and bombs. Since no more delayed action bomb fuses were available, all planes planned to bomb from medium altitude, although the low altitude night approach had been proved extremely successful. Meanwhile a replacement airplane had arrived from Kaneohe for the one damaged on the breakwater. 4 February was set as the date for the second raid.
The second raid was run in two formations of nine planes each, at thirty minute intervals, led by Lt. Comdr. Connolly and Lieut. Wolf, again accompanied by Admiral Price. Weather held as predicted and the flights were relatively uneventful.
Bombing altitude was varied from 7,000 to 11,000 feet, all engines were desynchronized, evasive tactics were used throughout the bombing runs, and as a result anti-aircraft fire was sporadic and inaccurate. Cloud cover over the target was negligible and bombing accuracy was as high as 90 percent.
Once again targets were concentrated in the airfield sector of the island. On this raid an aerial photographer, with the aid of flash bombs carried in the last plane in the formation, snapped a graphic picture of the target showing both bombs in flight and bomb craters in and near the runway and dispersal areas, and damage inflicted on the first raid. This picture was widely circulated in newspapers as the first picture of a night bombing attack in the Pacific area.
Shortly after leaving Wake a Japanese twin-engine bomber was sighted. Although the Jap passed close to several of our planes, he did not come within gun range at any time.
Once again the squadron found orders to stand by for another attack from Midway. Maintenance problems were fewer this time because of improved takeoff conditions and lack of damage to hull tanks. In three days nine planes were again available, but unfavorable weather over the target caused a postponement of the raid. At noon on 8 February, although weather conditions were still doubtful, it was considered feasible to send out nine planes that afternoon in an effort to prevent air attacks on our landing forces in the Marshalls.
At 1600, 8 February, nine planes took off for Wake. Takeoff conditions were undesirable with six foot waves running so close together that it was almost impossible to gain enough speed on the water to remain airborne. Several hours out, Comdr. Connolly had an engine failure necessitating return to base. Weather conditions grew worse as the planes neared the target. The eight planes climbed to 11,000 feet when 100 miles from Wake and eventually as high as 14,000 feet but were unable to clear the cumulus tops, the largest of which were building up directly over Peacock Point. Several of the planes elected to drop in the clear on barracks and gun emplacements on the Northern tip of Wake Island. One plane scored a direct hit on the Jap BOQ. Other planes of the section, bombing through the clouds by means of a radar bombing approach perfected by Lieut. Wolf, were able to place half of their bombs in the immediate target area. Not a single Jap gun replied to the bombardment.
The experience of Lieut.(jg) Wheatley and his crew forms a dramatic sequel to this raid. As they entered their bombing run, the number one propeller oversped. Simultaneously the number two engine froze. Wheatley regained control of number one, feathered number two propeller, and completed his bombing run. Four of his bombs were seen to strike in the plane dispersal area. Prior to this raid, pilots had been informed that our forces had secured Roi Island in Kwajalein Atoll and that it might be used as an emergency landing area. Wheatley headed for Roi on three engines and at 0500 on 9 February made a successful night landing in a strange seadrome crowded with ships, and lighted only with the plane's landing lights. By blinker the pilots finally secured permission to moor to a stern line from a merchant ship in the lagoon. Next morning the crew gassed the plane from eighteen fifty gallon drums borrowed from the Marines on Roi. Three unsuccessful three-engine takeoffs were attempted, breaking three bell frames in the tail. Finally word filtered through to Roi that American forces had captured Majuro. Enough gasoline was dumped to lighten the plane and a successful three-engine takeoff was made. From Majuro Wheatley proceeded to Tarawa, beached his plane on Marston mats, changed the engine, and joined the VP 13 detachment carrying mail and freight in the Marshalls. On 3 March Wheatley and his crew returned to Kaneohe, having been without money, clothes, mail, or even means of identification for nearly a month.
Nine planes led by Lieut. Wolf took off in the late afternoon of 9 February for the fourth raid. Two of the planes were forced to return to base due to engine failure, but the remaining seven planes found weather conditions over the target ideal. Bombing runs were made from 8,000 feet by each plane individually so as to increase bombing accuracy. Anti-aircraft was light and inaccurate.
On the afternoon of 10 February officers and men of Midway Islands were hosts to VP 13 at a barbecue held in one of the hangars. Later in the month at Kaneohe squadron officers and their guests were entertained at a dance in their honor by Admiral Price and his staff of Fleet Air Wing Two.
By 12 February the entire squadron with the exception of the plane damaged on the breakwater, which was later repaired, landed at Kaneohe.
Eighteen Coronados in a period of ten days had made four completely overwater night bombing raids of 2,100 miles each against a heavily defended enemy target, dropped sixty tons of bombs on or near the Wake Island airfield in fifty sorties without injury to personnel or serious damage to aircraft. For his planning and actual leadership of the missions Admiral Price was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross as were Lt. Comdr. Connolly and Lieut. Wolf for their skill in executing the attacks. All officers and men who had participated in the flights were awarded the Air Medal for valorous conduct throughout an extremely hazardous operation.
Following the raids on Wake Island the squadron was ordered to the Marshall Islands to assume anti-task force, anti-submarine, and anti-aircraft patrols. The first planes arrived at Kwajalein 26 February and two days later were sent to Eniwetok to patrol two 600 mile sectors. On 6 March the squadron was assigned three 900 mile sectors which were subsequently reduced to 800 miles.
The advanced echelon was based aboard the U.S.S. CHINCOTEAGUE. Parry Island, which was to become the seaplane base, was not usable until late March.
On the eighth of March, the squadron, having the majority of its planes at Eniwetok, was assigned new search sectors consisting of three 800 mile 90 degree areas covering an arc from 255 degrees to 282 degrees. These were the longest search sectors flown by PB2Y-3 aircraft at that time.
No contacts were made with enemy task units during these searches. Also, as there were no land areas included in these sectors, no reconnaissance work was carried out. However, enemy planes were seen on many of these flights. Some of these planes were believed by the position of the contact to be enemy search planes and others were apparently planes enroute between the enemy bases of Saipan and Truk. The enemy search planes were of the Betty type and those seen near Truk included Emily and Mavis seaplanes and one formation of three Zeke type fighters.
Three contacts were made in these sectors with enemy submarines. As this area was then in a sanctuary for friendly submarines the order was for searching aircraft to report but not to attack any submarine encountered. Two contacts with submarines believed to be enemy were made and reported but not attacked. A third contact was made near Truk by the plane commanded by Lt.(jg) D. C. Frentz. This plane passed over an enemy submarine at 800 feet and identified it as enemy without possibility of error, and then attacked as it submerged.
Because of the extreme distance from Eniwetok and the closeness of the enemy base of Truk the area was left very soon after the attack and the submarine damage unobserved other than for a large oil slick noted near the point of detonation. No further contact with this submarine was made.
On the first of April new sectors were assigned whereby the squadron was split into two groups. One group continued to run patrols from Eniwetok and another conducted patrols from Ebeye Island in Kwajalein Atoll. Ebeye Island was the location of the PATSU 2-6 which had been assigned to provide maintenance for Patrol Squadron Thirteen planes.
Three sectors were flown from Kwajalein Atoll and two from Eniwetok. Those from Kwajalein consisted of three 500 mile thirty degree areas covering an arc from 210 degrees to 300 degrees. These patrols were all negative except for two sightings of ships in Lele harbor on the island of Kusaie. The patrols included the enemy held land areas of Pingelap, Kusaie, and Ujelang. The islands of Mokil, Ujae, and Lae were also in these sectors but were occupied only by natives.
The only man killed by enemy action on the tour of duty was Summers, F.P., AOM2c. While on the daily reconnaissance of Kusaie in the plane commanded by Lt.(jg) Fowler he received a shrapnel wound of which he died three days later. Fowler's plane was unable to carry out the investigation of Lele harbor from high altitude, as was the usual practice, because of the low ceiling. Therefore Lt.(jg) Fowler elected to approach in the clouds and dive into the harbor and quickly pull back into the clouds. In this action he received a hit by a 20 MM anti-aircraft gun in the leading edge of the starboard wing. Shrapnel from this hit riddled the plane but Summers was the only man hit.
Also while on this daily investigation the only other damage to any VPB 13 plane by enemy action was received. The plane commanded by Lt.(jg) Wheatley was hit in the starboard aileron by a 20 MM shell. He returned to base without further trouble.
In the sector which included the island of Pingelap there was no opposition by the enemy. Daily the patrol planes bombed the weather station as a practice target. The island of Mokil in this sector was believed to be inhabited only by natives who were not molested.
The two patrols from Eniwetok at this time were to the northwest and included no land areas. No sightings of enemy ships or submarines were made on these searches, but enemy search planes were encountered.
During this period four reconnaissance flights were made from Eniwetok to Wake Island. There were no contacts with enemy ships or planes on these flights but they did establish the fact that the Japanese on the island were repairing and rebuilding the dock areas.
About the first of May the sectors were again changed. They were to include three from Eniwetok and two from Kwajalein. Those from Eniwetok included two to the northwest and one to the southwest. Those to the northwest were flown without contacts of any type. But the one to the southwest included the Oroluk Lagoon. Here the plane commanded by Lt.(jg) Fowler encountered a small Japanese ship. He first bombed it from 5,000 feet and got no hits. He then descended and strafed it until fires were seen in both the bow and stern of the vessel. While strafing, the plexiglass in the bow turret broke and flying pieces hit and broke the pilot's windshield necessitating immediate return to base.
A special flight from Eniwetok was flown by Lt.(jg) Hemingway on April 30, 1944. He flew to a rendezvous point with a large task force south of Truk to drop late photographs of Ponape, it's next objective. While enroute to the task force he encountered a Japanese torpedo plane, type "Kate." It attempted to follow the Coronado but was soon lost. Lt.(jg) Hemingway then proceeded to the rendezvous and carried out his mission. On the return flight from Truk he was attacked unsuccessfully by four "Kates."
The two patrols from Kwajalein were the same as those previously flown over Kusaie and Pingelap, but excluding the one passing over Ujelang. No further contacts were made in these sectors.
On May 30th a 48-hour continuous anti-submarine patrol was flown around the island of Kusaie. Acting upon intelligence information, the lookout was maintained by three destroyers and eight planes of this squadron, each plane being on station for six hours. The anticipated submarine was not seen but information subsequently was received that it might attempt to reach the island June seventh. Therefore, operating with one destroyer, another thirty-hour coverage was made by the PB2Y-3's, but this anti-submarine patrol also produced no contact.
Late in May the sectors flown from Kwajalein were changed to the north and northwest. These sectors produced no contacts with the enemy. They did, however, include daily investigations of Bikini, Rongelap, Rongelik, and Ailininae Atolls. At this time, too, the squadron was assigned a daily reconnaissance of Wake Island.
These were the last patrols flown by Patrol Squadron Thirteen. The first plane of the relief squadron, VP 102, arrived on June 22, 1944. As they arrived planes from VP 13 left Kwajalein for Kaneohe. The last plane left Kwajalein June 27, 1944.
(a) Parry Island
CASU 34 was the service unit at Parry.
The ramp during this squadron's tour of duty was completely inadequate for the launching and beaching of seaplanes. Planes were beached only for checks, and, during the first 3½ months all planes were sent to Ebeye Island for 60 and 120 hour checks. By June an apron of packed coral was available at Parry.
Fueling, for the most part, was from the tenders, it being impractical to fuel on or from the beach because of the steep grading and limited fueling facilities. However, whenever a plane was on the beach it was fueled to a limited degree and topped off from the tender or from the 3,000 gallon bowser boat.
The average daily fuel consumption of VP 13 planes was 10-12,000 gallons.
(b) Ebeye Island
At Ebeye the situation was similar except Ebeye was a better developed and superior seaplane operating base in so far as facilities were concerned. The planes of this squadron were serviced by PATSU 2-6.
This squadron lived aboard and operated from, at various times, the following tenders: U.S.S. CHINCOTEAGUE, U.S.S. CASCO, U.S.S. MACKINAC, and U.S.S. ONSLOW.
The camp area is located on the windward side of the island--at both Parry and Ebeye. Officers and men lived in tents, four per tent. Since the planes and crews alternated between Parry and Ebeye, tent assignments were by crews.
Steel helmets were used as wash basins. During the first few weeks the only bathing facility was the lagoon, until the brackish-water showers were available.
Recreation consisted of soft-ball, swimming, volley-ball, and movies.
While in the forward area as a patrol squadron the planes flew approximately four hundred and twenty patrols plus many other special missions. The average engine time upon departure from Kwajalein was 650 hours.
Between 7 March 1944 when Lieut. Wolf returned from a routine flight announcing that he had shot down a Japanese bomber, and 27 June when the squadron left the Marshalls area to return to the States, VP 13 had destroyed a total of five Japanese bombers in aerial combat, probably shot down one twin-engine fighter, damaged another bomber, and destroyed one grounded fighter. All this had been accomplished in overloaded, unwieldy seaplanes with only partial fuel cell protection, operating hundreds of miles from the nearest friendly base and within fighter range of Jap-held Truk, the Marianas, Marcus, and Wake. None of our aircraft was seriously damaged, not a man injured, and by the time the squadron was relieved, pilots had begun to stretch normal eight hour searches from Eniwetok into eleven hour flights, known as "Betty-hunts."
During the year of training and waiting in Kaneohe, Lieut. Wolf had drilled so incessantly on all types of gunnery training that it seemed inevitable he should draw first blood. On 7 March Wolf was sent on a Dumbo mission to Ponape. When the bombing raid was cancelled the Coronado turned toward Eniwetok at 6,000 feet. When 150 miles from Ponape a Japanese twin-engine bomber, a Mitsubishi 00 known as the "Betty", was sighted below the clouds on a reciprocal course. At this time the Betty was Japan's fastest, most powerful medium bomber, but Wolf seized the opportunity to capitalize on his months of constant training. He reversed course and sent a contact report. As the planes approached a large cumulus cloud, Lieut. Wolf nosed over in a steep glide and dove on the Jap's starboard quarter.
The Jap top turret gunner lived long enough to fire one burst before his turret was shattered by the Coronado bow guns. At 400 yard range the stream of tracers shifted to the cockpit, then to the port engine. Wolf was overrunning the Betty at 220 knots and commenced a series of shallow "S" turns which brought all guns to bear on the target. The enemy bomber climbed gently to starboard, smoke streaming from its port engine, then fell off into the sea. The wing shattered from the impact as the plane cartwheeled and exploded. As Lieut. Wolf circled the rising column of smoke, only one wingtip and a wheel floated to the surface. Although Lieut. Wolf made two subsequent contacts with enemy search planes, he was never again able to achieve the necessary combination of altitude advantage and surprise to make a successful attack.
On 13 March, Lieut.(jg) Robert D. Cullinane, USNR, sighted another of the Truk-based Japanese search planes. Cullinane was on an 800 mile search westward from Eniwetok and had started his return to base at 5,000 feet altitude. The Betty was below the clouds, homeward bound for Truk, 200 miles to the south. Lieut. Cullinane immediately turned toward the bomber in a diving attack, and his bow gunner opened fire, pumping the turret into position manually, firing and sighting with the other hand. Cullinane, like Wolf, used all his guns in overhead zig-zag passes at the Jap, whose engine burst into flame. The Jap pilot flipped open his overhead cockpit escape hatch and nosed over to attempt a crash landing. Meanwhile the Betty's top turret guns had poured several 7.7 slugs through the Coronado's wing, inches outboard of the unprotected fuel cells. As Cullinane swept over the gliding bomber, its pilot made a perfect crash landing on the water. Cullinane dragged the area with all guns strafing the floating Betty, noticing one man in a life jacket floating face down in the water. Two others were forced into the open when strafing attacks fired the wing under which they had been hiding. These were killed by the Coronado guns and the remaining two were engulfed in the flaming oil.
Only two days later Lieut. Cullinane on his next patrol flight cruised over the scene of the crash. Suddenly he spotted another Nip bomber under identical conditions. Anticipating another victory, Cullinane peeled off in a dive. His airspeed indicator hovered at 270 knots. As the range closed on the unsuspecting Jap, the Coronado's crew felt a jolt when the plane popped into a small cumulus cloud. The heavy plane shuddered violently while the pilots struggled to pull out of the dive. The bow turret opened fire on the Jap bomber at point-blank range. Cullinane and his co-pilot had by this time succeeded in reducing speed and together they managed to retain control of the vibrating airplane. The port aileron had been peeled completely off by the force of the dive; the starboard aileron was stripped of its fabric covering. Part of the plexiglass in the tail turret had also blown out under the terrific stress of the 300 mile an hour dive.
The pilot warned the crew to stand by to abandon ship and all men not on watch stationed themselves at open hatches, prepared to jump. Together Cullinane and his co-pilot hoped to maintain level flight at reduced speed by manipulating all four throttles and kicking rudder. The Coronado had a constant tendency to turn to the left but the two pilots fought the controls throughout the 400 mile trip to base. VP 13 planes in adjoining sectors homed on Cullinane's distress calls and escorted him in. Lieut. Cullinane made a perfect "hot" landing at Eniwetok with flaps and floats up at 120 knots, unable to slow to the normal landing speed because of the sluggish control reactions.
This experience stimulated the search for unwary Japs, and pilots began to climb above the scattered cumulus clouds as soon as the weight of the Coronado permitted. Only a week later, Comdr. Connolly spotted a Betty 800 miles west of Eniwetok headed for Saipan. Both planes were at 1,000 feet and sighted each other simultaneously. Jap and Navy pilot reacted characteristically. Comdr. Connolly headed for the Jap and the Jap headed for home. At maximum range the Coronado opened fire. Tracers surrounded the Betty, whose pilot jettisoned his bombs, and returned the fire from his .40 mm tail cannon. The Jap shells fell short as the Betty dove for the water and pulled away. Each time the Coronado closed in, staying outside the arc of fire from the Betty's tail cannon, Connolly's bow gunner registered a few hits. Then as the Jap turned away he gained precious distance. For twenty minutes Connolly chased the bomber at 170 knots.
The frustrations of VP 13's skipper were not over for the day, however. He headed home at 8,000 feet and when 100 miles north of Truk spotted a homing Jap bomber below him at 1,000 feet. Cloud cover was heavy and Comdr. Connolly dove his plane into the clouds in an effort to avoid detection. When he emerged at the base of the swelling cumulus build-up, there was no plane in sight. His gas supply limited by his previous chase, he searched the area thoroughly but was forced to return empty-handed.
In the same month Lieut.(jg) William S. Watson, USNR, patrolling 200 miles north of Truk, radioed an urgent report to base, "Attacked by fighters!" Outbound from Eniwetok, with gas tanks almost full, Watson sighted a Jap bomber three miles away heading toward Truk. He turned toward the Betty and was about to close when, from above the clouds, a float type Zero peeled off in a run. Watson turned into the fighter which was not aggressive in his attack, while the Betty disappeared in a cloud. From this encounter it appeared the Japs at Truk were sending out fighters to determine why Bettys didn't come back.
Throughout the month of April several sightings were made, but never did a Coronado find the odds in its favor for a successful attack. Search plans changed, however, and on 11 May, Lt.(jg) Wheatley, flying a 600 mile search toward Marcus Island, looked down upon a Jap search plane flying both low and slow. Wheatley, above the clouds, immediately turned toward the Betty and commenced his dive through heavy cumulus clouds. As he emerged the Jap was slightly to his port and half a mile away. Lieut. Wheatley closed in a gliding turn, and opened fire at long range. There was one burst from the Betty's top turret before it was silenced by Wheatley's deck guns. Coronado top and bow guns poured shells into the Betty's port engine as Wheatley chopped his throttles to avoid over-running the Jap. Within seconds he was flying formation on the Betty whose engines were streaming flame. At less than 100 yard range fire was concentrated on the fuselage of the Jap bomber and it began to disintegrate. Pieces of metal flashed by the Coronado, striking and denting the leading edge of the port wing. The Betty, by now completely enveloped in flames, dove into the water, one engine falling clear of the rest of the plane. So complete was the destruction that only two swirls remained on the calm sea to mark the crash. Four minutes after the initial contact, Lieut. Wheatley reported to base: "Scratch one Betty."
A series of contacts within the next few days revived the pilots' hopes of a kill. It was apparent that the Japs, suspecting an impending attack on the Marianas, had extended their searches. VP 13 pilots spent long extra hours patrolling at the end of the assigned sectors and a week later, Lt.(jg) Robert E. Peach, USNR, glimpsed a Betty 6,000 feet below him on a reciprocal course. Peach reversed his course as he entered the clouds and broke into the clear at 1,700 feet. The Jap bomber reappeared at five miles headed for the Marianas. The Coronado ducked back into the clouds but after three minutes it was apparent the Betty was gaining ground. Lieut. Peach jettisoned his bombs, applied full takeoff power to the engines, and nosed over to the water. Downwind from Eniwetok at 225 knots, the chase could not last long, but seventeen minutes later, protected by rain squalls, the Coronado was almost directly beneath the Jap bomber. Peach zoomed the Coronado within 300 yard range, and bow, top, and starboard waist guns concentrated fire on the Japanese pilots and engines. Gas tanks burst into flame and oil and particles of metal ground into the Coronado windshield as the Betty plunged vertically into the ocean and exploded.
The squadron's second indication that its activities had not gone unnoticed in Nipponese headquarters at Truk and the Marianas arrived in the shape of a brand-new twin-engine Jap fighter, now known as Irving but previously unreported in the Central Pacific. Lieut.(jg) Fowler spied what he assumed to be a Betty cruising several thousand feet below. Just as he dove the Coronado within range of the Jap's tail, the erstwhile "Betty" spiralled straight up 3,000 feet, rolled out in an Immelmann, and started down with wing-guns blazing. Fowler desperately twisted and skidded the sluggish PB2Y in an effort to spoil the fighter's runs. For twenty minutes as Fowler streaked for home the fighter made pass after pass and the huge plane answered back with all guns which could bear. Finally a lucky hit exploded in the Jap's port engine and he limped for Saipan, some 600 miles away, on one engine. Only then could the exhausted Coronado pilots fully realize the almost fatal results of their mistaken identification. Ironically, the co-pilot during this savage attack, Lieut.(jg) Cecil R. Robinson, USNR, was fatally injured while swimming next day by diving onto a coral-head in Eniwetok lagoon.
For almost a month no more sightings were made and then on 10 June as Task Force 58 moved toward the Marianas, Lieut.(jg) Wheatley again sighted a Betty. The Japanese search plane was only 80 miles from the task force, headed straight for it. Wheatley's initial reaction, since he had no altitude advantage, was merely to head off the search plane so that he would not spot the task force. Both planes nosed over until they were skimming the swells, the Jap so low that his slipstream left a slick visible for miles on the smooth ocean. The Betty pilot headed straight for Wake with the Coronado six miles on his tail gaining slightly at 170 knots. For forty minutes the chase continued while Wheatley closed to three miles and climbed to 1,700 feet. The Jap pilot jettisoned his bombs; so did the American.
As it became apparent to the Japs that the huge Coronado was closing for the kill, the pilot headed for Truk. Wheatley turned inside him, closing to one mile. The Coronado bow gunner fired a test burst at extreme long range and as if by signal the Japs fired top deck and a 20 mm cannon, apparently hand-fed from the side waist. The Navy gunners then held their fire until they could rake the Jap bomber at point-blank range. Meanwhile the Nip gunners managed to pierce the fuselage and rudder of the PB2Y in several places. Every gunner in the Coronado fired in the first two passes, setting both engines of the Betty aflame. Wheatley pulled away to watch as the Japanese attempted a downwind crash landing with bow guns still blazing. The plane cartwheeled on impact and exploded. As Lieut. Wheatley circled the wreckage, the inner tubes floated free of the tires and one wingtip, bearing the rising sun of Japan, sank beneath the surface of the Pacific.
On the squadron's final day of patrols from Eniwetok, Lieut.(jg) Peach destroyed a grounded Jap Zero fighter. Extending his search sector nearly to Truk, Peach had strafed a small Jap schooner in Losap lagoon. Wheeling low over Losap Island, a waist gunner noticed an enemy fighter plane, camouflaged with a covering of palm fronds and hidden in a natural revetment adjoining the wide smooth beach. Peach made repeated strafing runs on the grounded "Zeke" until the fighter was demolished.
For the destruction of Japanese heavy bombers Lieut. Wheatley was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross and a Gold Star in lieu of a second Air Medal; Lieut. Peach the Distinguished Flying Cross; Lieut. Cullinane the Gold Star in lieu of a second Air Medal; and Lieut. Wolf the Air Medal. All gunners in the four crews who had actually fired on the Japs were awarded Air Medals. Each aircrewman who had contributed to the success of the attacks by his faithful performance of duty at his battle station was awarded a letter of commendation.
In April and May of 1944 Eniwetok Atoll in the Marshall Islands had strategic importance as the most forward United States base in the Central Pacific. Liberator bombers, both Navy and Army, were launched from there to pound the Japanese defenses in the Marianas, some 1,100 miles westward, and to get important military photographs as a prelude to the invasion and seizure, which was then impending. Patrol Squadron Thirteen was called upon to fly "Dumbo" for several of the Liberator strikes.
"Dumbo" is the term for a flight whose mission is primarily rescue. Seaplanes, particularly PBY's, are generally used for the task as a landing near an enemy island or in the open sea can sometimes be effected. In addition, the Dumbo provides a vital communication link between the bombers and the base and with rescue submarines which stand by off the target island to pick up survivors in the event a plane is downed. The heavier, four-engined Coronados had rarely been assigned this rescue coverage previously, but, for the long range bombing missions from the Marshalls to the Marianas, it was thought that they would be more practical than the PBY's.
Lieut. Wolf took off from the choppy waters of Eniwetok Lagoon at daybreak on the morning of April 17 with a fuel load of 3,600 gallons. A half-hour or so earlier, ten Army and five Navy Liberator bombers had taken off from the airstrip on the southern island of the atoll, had circled the area for a formation rendezvous, and headed for Saipan. Lieut. Wolf and his crew were in the air fifteen hours; they had flown to the prescribed point (100 miles from Saipan) where they orbited to wait for word from the attacking planes. Although they kept a vigilant listening watch on the predetermined frequencies, according to their briefing instructions, no contact was received. They returned to the base to learn that, of the 15 planes, three had turned back prior to reaching the target, one had been shot down, and one had made a crash landing at sea on the return leg.
The survivors of the Army B-24 which had been ditched were sighted in three liferafts several days later by Lt. Comdr. Connolly, on a routine patrol from Eniwetok. The Air-Sea Rescue facilities were alerted and a PB2Y from VP 13, a PBY from VP 72, two PB4Y's, and a destroyer, were dispatched to the position as radioed by Lt. Comdr. Connolly. Upon arrival at the scene, the PBY made an open-sea landing. The violent swells and waves of the ocean damaged the plane so that take-off was impossible, and the rescuers had to abandon ship and take to their liferafts to join the water-weary survivors already there. The Coronado continued to circle during the night and was relieved at dawn by another VP 13 plane, at which time the destroyer appeared and took the occupants of the life rafts (now six of them lashed together) aboard. The PBY, partly submerged, was sunk by gun fire from the destroyer, while the escort planes flew an anti-submarine patrol around the activity.
On May 29, forty-eight Army, Navy, and Marine Liberators bombed and photographed Saipan and Guam. Lt.(jg) Peach and his crew were assigned to guard this strike. Lt. Peach's first destination was a point 100 miles off Guam, the island where eight Marine photographic planes and sixteen Army bombers were executing a raid. The flight completed its mission successfully and, after reporting to Peach that "all is well," departed for Manus in the Admiralty Islands. This alternate base was chosen because it was closer to Guam in air-time than the point of departure and the prevailing north-easterly winds could be utilized to better advantage. Enemy fighters pursued the planes toward Manus, but inflicted no serious damage. A PBY "Dumbo" from the South Pacific Command waited for the Liberators beyond the passageway formed by the Western Carolines on the Guam to Manus route.
According to the pre-determined plan, Peach turned his Coronado towards Saipan, where a raid was scheduled one hour after the Guam strike by another flight of eight Navy and sixteen Army planes. The navigation was perfectly synchronized between the VP 13 plane and the attack planes. Peach arrived at the rendezvous point five minutes early, and a few minutes after the appointed time, the first of the returning Liberators was sighted.
The flight leader reported that one of the planes was shot down, apparently by enemy fighters. From the chatter among the pilots over the voice frequency, Peach learned that the plane had exploded and burned as it hit the water and that enemy fighters were circling it. Knowing that an attempt at landing and rescue under these conditions would be folly, Peach relayed this ill-fated plane's position to the U.S.S. TANG, the rescue submarine in the area.
An Army B-24 radioed Peach that two of his engines had been hit and he was proceeding on the remaining two engines. He asked that the PB2Y send him "M.Q.'s" so that he could home-in on the "Dumbo" plane. Peach's plane at 800 feet keyed the "M.O.'s" for about twenty minutes and finally the wounded plane crossed over at about 15,000 feet, and headed for Eniwetok.
Meanwhile, another plane that had been hit called to report that it was on three engines. Peach turned back towards Saipan and searched for this plane without success.
The Coronado followed the B-24 which was limping back to Eniwetok on two engines. The base had been notified of the plight and had dispatched a destroyer towards Saipan, to be available in the event the plane could not maintain altitude and would have to make a forced landing at sea. The B-24 flew the entire distance of the return leg on two engines and made a night landing.
The possibility that the enemy was attempting to lure the PB2Y into a trap is suggested by the fact that Peach received a voice message from a source that gave a garbled call--the first part was legitimate but the later was from another unit--requesting assistance and bearings. The originator of the message would not authenticate, and later, it was learned that none of the Liberator pilots had used this call.
Lieut. John L. Burge, USN, and his crew flew as "Dumbo" to Pagan Island on 25 May, covering a photographic mission of Navy Liberators. Pagan, lying north of Saipan, was fortified heavily by fighter planes and a landing strip. The predicted navigational log as set up at the briefing was realized in flight to the minute. The Coronado arrived at the rendezvous point, 100 miles from Pagan, and sighted immediately the flight of Liberators returning from their mission. None of the planes was hit and all returned to base. The U.S.S. TANG, the rescue submarine, was lying off the shore of Pagan to be available in case any of the planes were downed. The "Dumbo" was uneventful, otherwise, except for the sighting of an unidentified plane, thought to be a Jap Betty.
While based at Eniwetok, VP 13 was assigned other "Dumbo" flights of shorter range. Lieut. Barney flew to Wake Island to guard a raid there, and Lieut. Wolf covered a strike at Ponape in the Carolines.
Offensive mine-laying operations against Truk were carried out by VP 13 on the nights of 17 and 18 April 1944. Five sorties of PB2Y-3 aircraft were made from Eniwetok. Of 14 mines scheduled to be planted, 12 mines were laid approximately in their intended positions and two mines were jettisoned. All aircraft returned safely and no casualties were sustained.
The following Patrol Plane Commanders participated in these operations: Lt. Comdr. Connolly, Lieut. Barney, Lt.(jg) Knight, Lt.(jg) Swett, and Lt.(jg) Fowler.
The first mission called for the laying of four Mark 10 Mod. 6 mines in the west side of North Pass, and two similar mines in Sapep Pass, to be laid by three sorties of PB2Y-3's, each carrying two mines on external wing racks. It was intended that these mines would be laid at dusk, at which time it was estimated that the designated pin-points and landmarks would be clearly visible. The general approach was to be made from the north, and the landfall was calculated to be in the neighborhood of Pis Island.
In carrying out this operation considerable difficulty was experienced with the external mine loading. The gross load at takeoff, 69,500 lbs., was the top acceptable weight for special missions. The planes were very sluggish. Navigation was excellent, but in five hours it was only possible to increase the speed to 116 knots, so that the planes arrived at the target considerably later than planned.
The weather at the target was overcast, with scattered rain squalls and no twilight or starlight to increase visibility. No difficulty was experienced in locating the barrier reef around Truk, but visibility was such that it was almost impossible to determine accurate positions from the charts. The coral showed up well when the planes were directly above it and the islands on the reef were visible, but neither islands nor coral were clearly recognizable.
The planes landed at Eniwetok with 250-300 gallons of fuel remaining on board, of which 50 gallons were unavailable.
The second minefield was planned for Otta Pass in the southern portion of the atoll, and was to consist of eight Mark 26 Mod. 1 mines to be laid by two PB2Y-3 aircraft. Because of the difficulty experienced with the dusk mine-laying on the previous night, it was decided to lay these mines between moonrise and dawn, even though this involved a night takeoff from Eniwetok.
The tactics of approach involved full use of radar, and a landfall on Kuop Atoll. It is believed that all mines fell in Otta Pass, but because of the inaccuracies involved and the small mineable area, it is estimated that only 75% of the mines fell in water shallow enough to be effective against small ships.
Both planes arrived at Eniwetok with a fuel reserve in excess of 500 gallons.
In neither of the mining operations was there evidence of enemy activity; no fighters were seen, nor were searchlights or anti-aircraft fire encountered. There was no evidence of the mine-laying being observed by the enemy.
In general the tactics of approach were planned to give maximum cover from detection by enemy radar. The last hundred miles to the objective were flown at altitudes between 20 to 50 feet until within a few miles of the target, at which point the planes climbed to altitudes in excess of 200 feet.
For planning the details of this operation and for his leadership in the target area, Comdr. Connolly was awarded a Gold Star in lieu of a second Distinguished Flying Cross. Each Patrol Plane Commander was awarded an Air Medal and each crew member a letter of commendation with the authority to wear the Commendation Ribbon.
Beginning 11 May, and for eleven days thereafter, VP 13 was relieved of its regularly assigned patrols from Ebeye and was assigned the task of night bombing Jap-held Wotje.
Wotje atoll lies east of Kwajalein, less than 200 miles from Ebeye. This squadron's mission was dusk-to-dawn harassment raids. To accomplish this, three planes were used nightly, each carrying eight 500 pound bombs. The first plane left Ebeye at twilight and was relieved by the second plane after four hours; the third plane relieved the second after four hours and returned to base at dawn. One 500 pound bomb was dropped each half hour. The customary altitude was 8,000 feet. Whenever the weather permitted the bombsight was utilized, but weather conditions made it necessary to make about 40 percent of the drops by radar.
It is estimated that 80 percent of all bombs hit in the target area.
Anti-aircraft was meagre and inaccurate. Searchlights were infrequently used and were ineffective when the plane's four engines were de-synchronized.
When the squadron returned to Kaneohe Bay orders were received from Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet to proceed to San Diego and report to Commander, Fleet Air West Coast for rehabilitation and reassignment.
The first planes arrived in San Diego on 5 July and the last on 14 July.
Squadron personnel were granted 30 days leave with sixty percent of the squadron receiving orders to return to VP 13 at the expiration of the leave. The remaining forty percent were assigned to new duty.
The squadron began to reform on 15 August 1944 and its designation was changed from Patrol Squadron to Patrol Bombing Squadron Thirteen. Commander Connolly continued as commanding officer but with collateral duties as Bureau of Aeronautics Representative for the PB2Y modernization program. As Comdr. Connolly's headquarters were at Consolidated-Vultee Aircraft Corporation, Lieut. Wolf was designated acting commanding officer with Lieut. H. F. Byrd Jr., USNR., as executive officer. Lieuts. Frentz, Knight, Watson, Hemingway, Cullinane, and Peach were the Patrol Plane Commanders and training officers.
In August the squadron learned that the Bureau had ordered a new commanding officer to replace Comdr. Connolly and that Lieut. Wolf was being assigned to shore duty.
Lt. Comdr. John A. Ferguson, USN, reported to VPB 13 on 15 September. The new commanding officer, one of the original four-engine seaplane pilots, came from the Naval Test Station at Patuxent, where in the two years previous he had test-flown everything the Navy had to offer. His past experience with XPB2Y-1 and his more recent acceptance and test flights in the PB2Y-3 again gave the squadron a commanding officer with a complete theoretical and practical knowledge of PB2Y planes.
The official change of command ceremony took place on 30 September 1944.
The training was begun, and to a large extent accomplished, by retaining six (6) PB2Y-3's which had seen service in the combat area. The first of the modernized PB2Y-3's, henceforth referred to as PB2Y-5's, was not received until 16 September; the last one was delivered 15 November.
The major changes which were made in modernizing the PB2Y-3 are as follows:
A heavy load test flight to Seattle by Comdr. Connolly, Lieut. Wolf, and Lieut. Watson proved the PB2Y-5 approximately five knots faster than the PB2Y-3.
The officers in training for Patrol Plane Commanders were those who had served the squadron for 18 months as navigators and as Patrol Plane First Pilots. All had served in the war zone.
The Plane Captains were selected from those who were first mechanics during the squadron's last cruise.
The following is the pilots' training program in brief:
The above was considered the Primary Flight Training Syllabus. Concurrent with this flight training program ground school and lectures were held on the following general subjects.
Each Patrol Plane Commander was assigned a particular airplane and particular crew. Each conducted instrument calibrations - Air speed indicator, flowmeter, magnetic compass and radio compass. This system proved most successful and effective as it placed on each crew the complete responsibility for a particular plane. This in turn built a team spirit.
The first three planes of the reorganized squadron left San Diego on 16 October for Kaneohe Bay. Lieut. Watson led this section which included Lt.(jg) H. M. Cummins, USNR., and Lt.(jg) Norman Luke, USNR. This section was followed on 31 October by Lieut. J. R. Robison, USNR., and on 2 November by Lt. George P. Yonkers, USN. This detachment with Lieut. Watson as officer-in-charge, completed its training - gunnery and anti-submarine instruction - in Kaneohe Bay, in order to relieve the San Diego beaching congestion.
Prior to departure experiments were conducted on the PB2Y-5 with jet-assisted takeoffs. Lt. Comdr. Ferguson ran a series of test takeoffs ranging in weight from 52,000 to 73,000 pounds. The results of these tests were successful, but the recommendation was submitted that all weights in excess of 68,000 pounds should be jettisonable. This was a result of the removal of the fuel dump system, and the fact that 68,000 pounds gross weight was adjudged by test to be the maximum feasible for three-engine performance.
On 17 October 1944 tragedy struck in the pre-dawn fog when Lieut. Cullinane, returning from a simulated Trans-Pacific flight, crashed into the side of the southernmost Coronados Island. The plane was totally demolished with all members of the crew losing their lives. The exact cause is unknown. Services were held at the chapel on North Island, and escorts were sent home with the bodies. This crash cost the squadron the finest of pilots and crews.
Lt.(jg) W. L. Hudspeth was designated replacement PPC and the last ten planes of the squadron commenced leaving for Kaneohe Bay on 19 November with the departure of Lieut. Peach, Lt. L. C. McCormack, USNR, and Lt.(jg) Hudspeth, who were followed on 25 November by Lt.(jg) W. L. Kitchen, USNR, and Lt.(jg) D. M. Wilson, USNR, and on 26 November by Lieut. Knight. Lt. Comdr. Ferguson and Lieuts. Frentz and Hemingway departed on 29 November and Lt.(jg) R. L. McPeak, USNR, departed on 3 December.
The first planes of Patrol Bombing Squadron Thirteen landed in Tanapag Harbor, Saipan, M. I., on 20 November 1944. The route to the Marianas was: Kaneohe to Johnston to Ebeye to Saipan.
As the planes arrived, the number of flights was increased until on 13 December a daily schedule of three, 500 mile sectors were flown plus a nightly anti-submarine patrol flown from sunset to dawn to guard Saipan shipping. In December the patrols were extended to 800 miles and the sectors shifted so that one patrol covered all the minor Marianas and went north to within 500 miles of Tokyo.
A. Consolidated Aircraft Corporation.
A. 1,836 Catalinas were produced in a number of model variants.
A. 68,000 pounds.
A. V = Heavier than Air, P = Patrol, B = Bombing.
This official history of Patrol Bombing Squadron Thirteen (VPB-13) has been faithfully transcribed with html coding added for ease of reading.
