Notice: Ads help support our website operation, if you would like to turn them OFF for this visit;
On the night of November 30, 1942, eight Japanese destroyers commanded by Rear Admiral Raizo Tanaka engaged a superior American force of five cruisers and six destroyers in what became one of the most devastating defeats in U.S. naval history. The Battle of Tassafaronga demonstrated the lethal effectiveness of Japan's Type 93 "Long Lance" torpedoes and superior night-fighting tactics, fundamentally changing how the U.S. Navy would conduct operations in the waters around Guadalcanal.
Following the decisive Naval Battle of Guadalcanal on November 12-15, 1942, the Japanese had withdrawn their major sea and air strength from the Solomons and retired to lick their wounds in the security of Truk, Jaluit, and other distant bases. Efforts to supply and support their dwindling forces on Guadalcanal were limited to harassing air attacks on Henderson Field, interspersed with high-speed round trips by the "Tokyo Express," operating from Bougainville Island under cover of darkness.
By late November 1942, Japan's options to reinforce Guadalcanal were practically nonexistent, nor were Japan's options to resupply its forces already on the island much better. The runs by the "Tokyo Express" (referred to as the "Rat Transportation" system by the Japanese) could not hope to provide Japanese troops with enough food, let alone ammunition.
The Japanese High Command had devised a new supply method using floating drums half-filled with provisions that would be dropped overboard near Tassafaronga Point to be retrieved by small boats from shore. This innovation allowed destroyers to complete their mission more efficiently and escape before daylight brought American air attacks.
Japanese Forces - Destroyer Squadron 2:
American Forces - Task Force 67:
Raizo Tanaka graduated 34/118 in the 41st class at Etajima Naval Academy and progressed steadily through the ranks, coming to concentrate on torpedo warfare and most notably on the testing of the newly developed Type 93 'Long Lance' torpedoes. He was to become most adept at making full use of the awesome capabilities of the Type 93.
Tanaka was a specialist in the heavy torpedoes carried by all destroyers and cruisers of the Imperial Japanese Navy. He had earned the nickname "Tenacious Tanaka" from American forces for his stalwart opposition and successful Tokyo Express runs. His squadron had already proven itself in multiple night engagements, making them the elite destroyer force of the Japanese Navy.
Wright was promoted to rear admiral in May 1942 and commanded warship forces under William Halsey during the Guadalcanal campaign. Although Wright had commanded cruiser-destroyer groups escorting aircraft carriers, he had no experience in night surface combat. The reason for this change of command remains baffling, although Wright decided for the most part to stick with Kinkaid's battle plan.
Wright had assumed command of Task Force 67 just days before the battle, replacing Rear Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid who was abruptly transferred to the Aleutians. This last-minute change would prove critical to the battle's outcome.
At 23:06, Wright's force began to detect Tanaka's ships on radar near Cape Esperance on Guadalcanal about 23,000 yards away. Wright's destroyers rejoined the column as it continued to head towards Savo. At the same time, Tanaka's ships, which were not equipped with radar, split into two groups and prepared to shove the drums overboard.
The American force possessed significant advantages:
Despite these advantages, tactical decisions would prove decisive.
At 23:14, operators on Fletcher established firm radar contact with Takanami and the lead group of four drum-carrying destroyers. At 23:15, with the range 7,000 yards, Commander William M. Cole, commander of Wright's destroyer group and captain of Fletcher, radioed Wright for permission to fire torpedoes.
This moment became the turning point of the battle. While destroyer Fletcher had led four van destroyers into an ideal position for a radar-informed torpedo attack, Rear Admiral Carleton H. Wright, the task force commander, had delayed permission to open fire; then, when the battle thereafter went badly wrong, he second guessed his destroyers for wasting torpedoes!
Wright's four-minute delay in granting permission allowed the Japanese to detect the American formation and prepare their response.
At 23:16, Tanaka ordered unloading preparations halted and "All ships attack." The US cruisers opened fire and sank one destroyer. The muzzle flash exposed the US cruisers' positions. Under the command of Rear Admiral Raizō Tanaka, Japanese destroyers quickly launched Type 93 "Long Lance" torpedoes, sinking one US cruiser and heavily damaging three others.
The Japanese response was swift and devastating:
Immediate Actions:
Torpedo Impacts:
The Type 93 was a 24-inch diameter torpedo with a 1,080-pound warhead, which could range up to 22 nautical miles at 35 knots or 12 nautical miles at 50 knots, but would typically be employed between 6–11 nautical miles from the target (U.S. torpedoes were typically employed within 5 nautical miles).
Type 93 Specifications:
The Type 93, called "Long Lance" by the U.S. Navy, burned ethanol or methanol, using as its oxidizer compressed oxygen rather than compressed air. The capabilities of the Type 93 were such a well-kept secret, and so far beyond those of U.S. torpedoes, that the U.S. Navy did not appreciate the threat it faced in the Solomon Islands campaign.
The U.S. cruisers were armed with 8-inch and 6-inch guns, along with 21-inch Mark 15 torpedoes with significantly shorter range and smaller warheads than their Japanese counterparts. American destroyers carried 5-inch guns and the same Mark 15 torpedoes.
Critical Technology Gap:
USS Northampton (CA-26) - Total Loss:
Heavy Damage to Three Cruisers:
Personnel Casualties:
Minimal Casualties:
Command and Control Issues:
Strategic Misjudgments: Wright claimed that his ships must have been fired on by submarines since the observed position of Tanaka's ships "make it improbable that torpedoes with speed–distance characteristics similar to our own" could have caused such damage. The Americans would not recognize the true capabilities of their Pacific adversary's torpedoes and night tactics until well into 1943.
Superior Night Fighting:
Tanaka's account revealed the Japanese approach: "With all possible haste I issued a general order, 'Close and Attack!' Our destroyers opened fire, but numerous illuminating shells and parachute flares suddenly set off by the enemy brightened our vicinity so that it was extremely difficult to make out the formation of the enemy fleet."
As a result of Tassafaronga, the PT boats would bear the brunt of harassing further "Tokyo Express" runs. The U.S. Navy was through with committing cruisers to Iron Bottom Sound. By the time of Tassafaronga, every U.S. heavy cruiser that had fought in the waters of Guadalcanal had been sunk or badly damaged.
The defeat fundamentally changed American naval strategy in the Solomons. No longer would heavy cruisers venture into the confined waters around Guadalcanal at night.
Destroyer Tactics Revolution: In February 1943, Commander Arleigh Burke arrived in the South Pacific and studied Cole's action. His conclusions—that destroyers could be most effective if trusted to attack independently (as the excellent Japanese destroyer force under Rear Admiral Raizo Tanaka demonstrated at Tassafaronga)—became a tenet of US Navy destroyer doctrine.
Combat Information Center Development: The following June, Fletcher's XO, Lieutenant Commander Joseph C. Wylie, Jr., was ordered to Pearl Harbor where he led in the development of the first Combat Information Center (CIC) Handbook for Destroyers. Soon, well-conceived installations were being fitted in warships throughout the fleet.
Historian Samuel Eliot Morison assessed the outcome by saying: "It is a painful truth that the Battle of Tassafaronga was a sharp defeat inflicted on an alert and superior cruiser force by a partially surprised and inferior destroyer force."
Rear Admiral Samuel J. Cox, director of the Naval History and Heritage Command, considers this battle and the Battle of Savo Island to be two of the worst defeats in US naval history, behind only Pearl Harbor.
Asia-Pacific Theater Ribbon Campaign Star
Veterans who participated in the Tassafaronga engagement were authorized to wear a campaign star on their Asia-Pacific Theater ribbon, recognizing their service in this significant naval action.
Primary Sources
Secondary Sources
Additional Reading
