Notice: Ads help support our website operation, if you would like to turn them OFF for this visit;
The Battle of Rennell Island marked the dramatic finale of six months of brutal naval warfare around Guadalcanal, as Japanese torpedo bombers struck the last blow against American naval forces in the Solomon Islands campaign. This fierce two-day engagement would claim the heavy cruiser USS Chicago and demonstrate Japan's continued aerial prowess even as their forces evacuated from Guadalcanal.
The Battle of Rennell Island marked the dramatic finale of six months of brutal naval warfare around Guadalcanal, as Japanese torpedo bombers struck the last blow against American naval forces in the Solomon Islands campaign. This fierce two-day engagement would claim the heavy cruiser USS Chicago and demonstrate Japan's continued aerial prowess even as their forces evacuated from Guadalcanal.
By late December 1942, the strategic situation around Guadalcanal had become untenable for Japanese forces. The Japanese Navy proposed that Guadalcanal be abandoned on 12 December 1942, and despite initial opposition from Army leaders, on 31 December 1942 the Imperial General Headquarters, with approval from the Emperor, agreed to evacuate all Japanese forces from the island. The operation, codenamed Operation Ke, represented a complete reversal of Japanese strategy in the Solomon Islands.
Japanese troops on the island were losing about 50 men each day from malnutrition, disease, and Allied ground or air attacks by 7 December 1942. The decision to withdraw marked the end of Japan's offensive capabilities in the South Pacific and the beginning of their long retreat toward the home islands.
American intelligence completely misread Japanese preparations for Operation Ke. Throughout January 1943, Allied intelligence had indicated a sharp increase in enemy destroyer and transport activity at their Rabaul base and Buin (on Bougainville). Further, heavy units of the Combined Fleet - battleships and carriers - were known to be loitering just north of the Solomons. Instead of recognizing this as preparation for evacuation, Allied commanders interpreted the buildup as preparation for another major offensive to retake Henderson Field.
Admiral William "Bull" Halsey deployed substantial naval forces to counter what he believed was an impending Japanese offensive. On 29 January 1943, Halsey sent five task forces toward the southern Solomons area to cover the relief convoy and to engage any Japanese naval forces that came into range. These five task forces included two fleet carriers, two escort carriers, three battleships, 12 cruisers, and 25 destroyers.
Task Force 18 Composition:
|
Ship Type |
Ship Name |
Class |
Commander |
|
Heavy Cruiser (Flagship) |
USS Wichita (CA-45) |
Wichita-class |
Rear Admiral Robert C. Giffen |
|
Heavy Cruiser |
USS Chicago (CA-29) |
Northampton-class |
Captain Ralph O. Davis |
|
Heavy Cruiser |
USS Louisville (CA-28) |
Northampton-class |
Captain Elliott B. Nixon |
|
Light Cruiser |
USS Cleveland (CL-55) |
Cleveland-class |
Captain Andrew G. Shepard |
|
Light Cruiser |
USS Columbia (CL-56) |
Cleveland-class |
Captain William M. McGinty |
|
Light Cruiser |
USS Montpelier (CL-57) |
Cleveland-class |
Captain Harry D. Hoffman |
|
Escort Carrier |
USS Chenango (CVE-28) |
Sangamon-class |
Captain Dixwell Ketcham |
|
Escort Carrier |
USS Suwannee (CVE-27) |
Sangamon-class |
Captain Joseph J. Clark |
Destroyer Screen:
The Japanese committed significant land-based air power to support Operation Ke's preliminary air superiority campaign. 16 Mitsubishi G4M Type 1 bombers from the 705 Air Group (Misawa Kōkūtai) and 16 Mitsubishi G3M Type 96 bombers from the 701 Air Group (Mihoro Kōkūtai) took off from Rabaul carrying torpedoes.
Japanese Air Group Leaders:
"The Japanese were about to conduct their first night aircraft attack" - demonstrating their tactical innovation even in retreat.
Tactical Errors and Formations
Wary of the threat from Japanese submarines, which Allied intelligence indicated were likely in the area, Giffen arranged his cruisers and destroyers for anti-submarine defense, not expecting an air attack. This proved to be a critical tactical error, as the formation was optimized for surface threats rather than aerial attack.
Giffen had ordered his force into a formation ideal for submarine defense but unsuitable for air defense. When his radar detected aircraft 60 miles to the west, he maintained course and formation and gave no further instructions.
The radar contacts were the approaching Japanese torpedo bombers, who circled around to the south of TF 18 so that they could attack from the east, with the black backdrop of the eastern sky behind them. From this direction, the Japanese bombers were hidden by the night sky, but Giffen's ships were silhouetted against the twilight of the western horizon.
The attack came in two waves:
At 19:38, 701AG attacked, hitting Chicago with two torpedoes, causing heavy damage and bringing the cruiser to a dead stop. The torpedo impacts were devastating:
Chicago's Torpedo Damage Analysis:
Despite fighter protection from USS Enterprise and the escort carriers, the crippled Chicago remained vulnerable to follow-up attacks. At 14.45 twelve 'Betties' were detected to the south of New Georgia heading for the damaged cruiser. A combat air patrol of F4Fs from VF 10 on USS Enterprise intercepted the Japanese bombers, but were only able to shoot down three of the twelve.
Anti-aircraft fire from Task Force 18 claimed seven more, but the remaining two aircraft scored two more torpedo hits on the Chicago. This time the damage was too severe to be repaired, and the Chicago had to be abandoned, sinking stern-first at 16.44.
Final Casualty Count:
Radar Systems:
Anti-Aircraft Weapons:
Fighter Aircraft:
Mitsubishi G4M1 "Betty" Medium Bombers:
Mitsubishi G3M "Nell" Medium Bombers:
The Battle of Rennell Island marked the first successful Japanese night air attack using torpedo bombers. The Japanese were about to conduct their first night aircraft attack. Thirty-one "Betty" and "Nell" bombers carrying torpedoes circled around to the east so that Giffen's ships would be silhouetted against the fading light of the western horizon.
Rear Admiral Robert C. Giffen
A 1907 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Giffen had commanded a destroyer in World War I and served in the Atlantic during the early days of World War II. Most recently, he had commanded Task Group 34.1 during the Allied invasion of North Africa. However, his lack of Pacific experience proved costly.
Critical Command Errors:
Admirals Halsey and Nimitz pilloried Giffen's performance, and the loss of the cruiser greatly embarrassed them. Chester Nimitz swore that if anyone leaked the news of the Chicago's sinking, he would have them shot.
Captain Ralph O. Davis (USS Chicago)
Captain Davis demonstrated exceptional leadership during the crisis, maintaining ship control and supervising damage control efforts for over 20 hours before the final attack.
Lieutenant Commander Joji Hagai (701st Air Group)
Two bombers were shot down by anti-aircraft fire, including Hagai's; he was killed. Hagai led the successful torpedo attack that crippled Chicago, though he paid with his life.
Lieutenant Tomoo Nakamura (705th Air Group)
Nakamura commanded the first wave attack, which although unsuccessful in scoring hits, effectively set up the follow-up strike by marking the American ships with flares.
La Vallette claimed to have shot down three aircraft using her 5-inch guns during the first night's action. During the second day's attack, two aircraft were claimed shot-down and her 20mm and 40mm guns had three aircraft approaching from the starboard section under fire, two of which passed over the ship in flames.
However, the destroyer paid a heavy price: Five torpedoes were dropped and as the ship swung left, a torpedo hit the destroyer in her forward engine room, killing 22 of her crew and causing heavy damage.
Technical Damage Assessment:
Admiral Nimitz described her as "An inspiration to all hands" and called USS La Vallette "the only American destroyer both torpedoed and mined during World War II".
Despite their tactical victory at Rennell Island, the Japanese achieved their larger strategic objective. With TF 18 forced to retreat, very few Allied naval forces were left in the immediate Guadalcanal area, allowing the Japanese to retrieve most of their remaining ground forces from Guadalcanal over three nights between 2 and 7 February 1943.
The cost to the Japanese was the destroyer Makigumo sunk, and three destroyers damaged (when they had expected to lose half) and the total loss of about 56 aircraft. The cost to the U.S. was higher; the heavy cruiser Chicago, the destroyer De Haven, and three PT-boats sunk.
The close of the Guadalcanal campaign marked the turning point of the Pacific War. From that point forward, there was no question that the initiative rested with the Allies.
The Battle of Rennell Island, while a tactical defeat for the Americans, occurred within the larger context of Allied strategic victory in the Solomon Islands.
The engagement highlighted several critical military lessons:
Tactical Lessons:
Strategic Lessons:
Veterans who participated in the Battle of Rennell Island were authorized to wear the Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal with the campaign star for "Guadalcanal: 7 August 1942–21 February 1943." The specific engagement "Rennell Island: January 29–30, 1943" became one of the officially recognized naval actions within this broader campaign.
The campaign star system recognized the sustained nature of the Solomon Islands fighting and the critical importance of naval control in the Pacific Theater. Sailors who served in Task Force 18 during this engagement earned this recognition for their service in what became the final major naval action of the Guadalcanal campaign.
American Losses:
Japanese Losses:
Once repaired, La Vallette left 6 August for Pearl Harbor, where she joined a carrier force for a strike on Marcus Island 31 August before returning to patrol duty in the Solomon Islands. She would serve throughout the Pacific War, earning 10 battle stars before being decommissioned in 1946.
Admiral Giffen continued to serve in combat commands but never reached the highest levels of Pacific Fleet leadership. The battle effectively ended his chances for major fleet command in the Pacific Theater.
Primary Sources
Secondary Sources
Additional Reading
Archival Collections
