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Combat Interviews D-Day Ranger Battalions

COMBAT INTERVIEWS

2nd and 5th RANGER BATTALIONS Normandy Landings 6 - 8 June 1944

The correction made brought Col Rudder's column back toward Pointe du Hoe, but now on a course roughly paralleling the cliffs and only a few hundred yards out. They thus came under small arms, machine gun and antiaircraft fire from the German strongpoints scattered along the cliffs east of the Point. Despite very good visibility, enemy fire seemed to be poorly directed, and was scattered. 300 yards from landing one of the DUKWs was hit and sunk by 20mm fire (presumably from the AA position, just east of the Point, which was to cause trouble all morning) 5 of the 9 men aboard were casualties, some hit while in the water.* Only one *(Statement of John Ahern, Pfc, Hq Co) man was hit in the other craft.

The change in course, and resulting delay, had a direct effect on the plan of attack. Since the column was now coming in from the east instead of the north, D Company's craft would not be able to swing out of the column as planned and reach the western side of the Point simultaneously with touchdown of the companies attacking the eastern side. Therefore, to effect a synchronized attack, the 9 assault craft deployed and came in all together on the eastern side.

One final result of the delay was apparent as they neared the goal. It had been over 30 minutes since naval fire had lifted, the enemy on the point had been given time to recover from its effects. As the LCA's neared the point, they received scattered small arms and automatic fire from its positions, and could observe men moving on the cliffs edge. Artillery fire, from the gun emplacements or elsewhere, had not however been met.

The first Ranger craft touched down just after 0700, and the whole group within the next 5 minutes.* By 0705, the 5th Ranger Battalion had received word of their touchdown, in the last communication between the 2 battalions for 36 hours.

*(Consensus of views, interview of gp... from the 3 companies concerned)

Up the Cliffs: About 500 yards separated the craft nearest the tip of Pointe du Hoe from that on the eastern end of the landing front. Nine craft (followed very soon by the surviving supply boat and 3 DUKWs) (Query: Did these four craft come in almost at once? How soon?) were on this width of front, unevenly scattered, so that some were bunched and others more orless alone. In either case, the boat teams went into action as separate units, each facing its particular problem of terrain and opposition. The story of their assault on the cliff positions is necessarily the story of the 9 separate groups. In a few general respects they encountered the same situation. Enemy small arms fire from the cliff tops, particularly enfilade fire from the position just east of the landing area, caused trouble on parts of the narrow beach, but could be avoided by some groups as they reached the base of the cliff. Enemy small arms fire and grenades from directly above the beached craft was only encountered in certain areas. Such opposition was handicapped by the fact that naval fire had blasted large sections away from the top of the cliff, cratering the edge and rendering observation from that point more difficult. Furthermore, enemy troops attempting observed fire or throwing grenades from the edge almost necessarily exposed themselves to fire from below.

The beach itself, averaging about 25 yards * from water to cliff top, *(Query: Is this figure close enough?) had been almost everywhere cratered by bombs. This not only handicapped the landing but rendered the DUKs, with their extension ladders, useless. They were no where able to cross the sand and reach a position close enough to the cliffs to use their ladders.

Immediately after touchdown there occurred an incident which has not yet been clarified and cannot be properly evaluated. The Destroyer "Satterlee" claims that "as the Rangers landed, they found themselves pinned under cliffs and were being rapidly cut to pieces by enemy fire". The destroyer was ordered "to close the point and take cliff tops under main battery and machine gun fire. This was done. Fire control was excellent, and the Rangers were enabled to establish a foothold on top. 40mm machine gun fire was very effective against troops driven from trenches by 5 inch guns".* In several respects, (From report of Commander W. J. Marshall, acting CO of gun fire support destroyers, dated June 23. He was on the Satterlee, at the western end of his group) this account is impossible to reconcile with overwhelming evidence from the Rangers. As the later account will show, the Rangers were not stopped at the cliff base for any appreciable time, and the first elements were probably on top in less than 5 minutes. Enemy opposition was not heavy from the cliff top when they landed such as it was, it seems to have lasted until the first men reached the top. Most curious of all, in a group of more that 100 survivors of this action only 4 or 5 (including Col Rudder, Capt Bloch, and Lt Eikner) however noticed any naval fire whatever. Col Rudder was aware of fire just after touchdown. He didn't know where it came from and wasn't expecting it; it "scared the living hell" out of him. Captain Bloch saw 2 or 3 rounds hit the cliff edge just right of boat 722. (Rudder's craft, 885, was next on his right.) One or two other observers thought there might have been naval fire from smaller guns (antiaircraft) but remember no heavy shelling. The vast majority of the participants in the action were incredulous over the suggestion that any naval fire occurred at the time indicated.

TO THE OBJECTIVES

In their records of D-Day, most of the assault troops who came in to the Omaha beaches have registered their surprise and disappointment over the state of the terrain: it showed no results of bombardment. On Pointe du Hoe, the 2nd Rangers had no such reaction to face. As they came off the ropes, the found themselves in an area literally torn to pieces by bombs and heavy naval shells. Many expected landmarks had disappeared; craters and mounds of dirt were everywhere, obscuring the remnants of paths and trenches. For months, from maps and photographs, the Rangers had studied these few acres, and now they found themselves in danger of losing their way as soon as they advanced from the cliff edge into the chaos of holes and debris. Contact within groups of any size was almost impossible to maintain.*

*(Query: Is this a fair general picture? It is based on the general impression given at the interviews, but I don't want to overdo it)

This condition of the terrain was not, however, the main cause for the "confused" nature of the action that followed, characterized by infiltration of many and separate groups of Rangers through all parts of the enemy defenses on the Point. This was the result of the prearranged tactics of the Ranger Force, which emphasized movement with the greatest speed and by small groups. As the first few men reached the top, they moved off toward their objectives without waiting for the rest of their boat team, waiting to form an organized section or platoon, or attempting contact with neighboring assault parties. Men later up the ropes or ladders followed suit. Over a period of 20 to 30 minutes these parties (there must have been at least 20 of them) were forming at the cliff edge and fanning out in all directions. It is as impossible to trace their movement in exact order or timing as it must have been for the Germans in the shattered defenses to follow the lines of the attack and organize to meet it.

Yet in essence the attack had a definite plan and order. As first objectives, each platoon in each company had a definite, limited part of the enemy defense system to reach and deal with. Every man knew what his mission was, and where to go. The result was at first an action without clear pattern in detail, but with clearly defined results. And after the first quarter, a general pattern becomes visible, conforming roughly to plan, as the scattered groups join up with others on the same mission and proceed toward further objectives.

The first and prime objectives of all companies were the gun emplacements and the OP near the top of the Point. Company E had the OP and no. 3 position's D Company, the western 3 guns (4, 5, 6); and F Co. guns no. 1 and 2, and the antiaircraft position close by on the edge of the cliff. After the positions were occupied and the guns put out of action, the plan provided for assembly at a phase line just south of the fortified area. From this area, D, F, and most of E would strike straight toward the coastal highway about 1,000 yards inland, cross it, and set up a defensive position blocking the main enemy communication line between Grandcamp-Vierville and Vierville. One platoon of E Co* would remain on the Point with

*(Query: Which platoon, or was it neither? Plat E 722 said they have had this mission, but they did not carry it out?) the Headquarters group and establish a perimeter guard of the fortified area.

*(Query: Was this the only force supposed to stay, or was the Point force also to include some men from D or F Company?)

Not surprisingly, there were deviations in detail from this plan. A few of D and F Company's men were held up in the Point area and did not join the movement inland. Two boatloads of E Company became involved in an unforeseen action on the eastern flank, and spent the day in that area. Here and there, small groups failed to reach the assembly area in time to join their platoons to move inland, or were kept on the point for other missions. However, in the large, the action worked out as planned despite all the difficulties encountered. The plan was based on confidence in the ability of very small groups to work more or less independently toward main objectives, and this confidence was rewarded.

The First Phase: As the first Ranger elements left the cliff edge and started for their objectives, they met no opposition except at the OP. Most of the Rangers saw no enemy, and encountered only light sporadic fire from the western flank. The ground was so torn up by the bombardment that it was difficult in some cases to find and identify the gun positions. As one party after another reached its allotted position, the same discovery was made. The open emplacements were thoroughly wrecked, the casemates were damaged,* and the guns were *(Query: Is this correct? To what extent?) missing. They had evidently been removed from the Point before the period of major bombardment. The advance groups moved on inland toward the next phase of their assignment.

The first men up from LCA 861 found themselves on the tip of the point, about 20 feet north of the massive and undamaged concrete OP. As Sgt Combs and Pfc Roberts crawled from the edge of the cliff into a trench 5 feet nearer the OP, enemy small arms and automatic weapons fire was coming from slits in the position. They threw 4 grenades at the slits, 3 getting in. The machine gun fire stopped, but Combs was wounded in the head by small arms fire. Lt Lapres, Sgt Yardley, Bell, and Gunther joined up in the trench. Yardley had brought a bazooka. His first round hit the edge of the embrasure; the second went in. The group immediately moved around the position without drawing fire, leaving Yardley to watch the embrasure. On the other side, they found Corporal V. Aguzzi in a shell hole, guarding the main entrance on that approach. They left him there and went on toward gun position 4 and points inland.

Aguzzi, with Lt Leaggins and S/Sgt Cleaves, had come up from LCA 862, northeast of the OP. They were joined by T/5 Thompson and Pfc Bellows. This first party saw a German beside the OP throwing grenades over the cliff from a trench, and decided to go after him (though the OP was not part of their job). Bellows crawled over toward No. 3 gun position to cover the others. They grenaded the enemy, and drove him into the OP, then moved after him. Aguzzi got into a shell hole from which he could watch the main entrance while the other three tried to get past the OP on the eastern side. Cleaves was wounded by a mine--the only casualty from this cause during the whole action. Thompson got close enough to hear the enemy radio working inside, looked for the aerial, and shot it off the top of the OP. After throwing a grenade in the entrance, Thompson and Lt Leaggins pulled back and went on their inland mission. Aguzzi stayed to watch the entrance, and a few minutes later was joined by the group which had been fighting on the other side of the OP. Neither party had been aware of the other, though their attacks must have been almost simultaneous. 1 day. A German machine gun was set up close by him, and both he and Wadsworth saw patrols pass by. That night Main crept out, hurled a grenade near the machine gun, and lit out for the Point, without drawing enemy fire.

The 14 or 15 men of D Company lay quiet all day under their concealment of vines and briars. No Germans came near their position, and only small numbers of enemy were seen during the day. Artillery fire, from naval guns, was the main cause of worry; from time to time it came close enough to "bounce the men around in their holes", but there were no losses.

Late in the day, hopes were raised and then dashed. Four U.S. tanks came down the highway past the D Company hedgerow and on toward Grandcamp. But no infantry followed, and in a short while the tanks came back and went on east. Enemy artillery fire on the tanks fell in and around D Company's hedgerow. With the tanks gone, Germans reappeared in the field and set up machine gun positions. Discouraged, the isolated Rangers settled in for another night.

*(Query: Will Lt Eikner be so good as to summarize his evidence on this point? I seem to remember--but failed to take it down--his saying that an explosion above him almost buried some men in his party?)

It seems possible, out of this conflicting evidence, to make only a few tentative conclusions: 1) That there was naval fire, just after touchdown; 2) That heavy shells struck in one area near the cliff top (by 885 and 722); 3) That elsewhere the fire went overhead and was unnoticed by the assaulting groups; 4) That the fire may have helped clear the cliff top of enemy at the moment of assault, but that its effects are problematical. In any event, the destroyer's intervention does not seem to have been a major factor in the success of the escalade. The fire can hardly have lasted more that 2 or 3 minutes, else it would have hampered the climbing parties on their arrival at the top.

The story of the boat teams will be given in order from right to left (west to east).*

*(This is roughly the order of landing, but only roughly. It is impossible to determine the exact order in which boats landed, but F Co, on the western flank, were last in the column as it approached)

861:

As LCA 861 came in about 25 yards from the cliff base, 3 or 4 enemy could be seen standing on the cliff edge and shooting down. While the first Rangers were disembarking, those in the rear of craft took the enemy under fire and drove them out of sight. At the instant of touchdown the rear pair of rockets were fired; then the other two pairs. All fell short of the cliff tops, perhaps because of the distance but also because of wet ropes. In some cases not more than half the rope's length was lifted out of the box.

As the Rangers came off on the cratered beach, grenades were rolled down and thrown from above. These were the "potato-masher" type, with heavy concussion but small fragmentation, and caused only 2 casualties. The hand rockets were carried ashore and the first, fired 15 yards away from the cliff, went up and caught. Pfc Henry V. Roberts started up the quarter-inch * handline, bracing his feet against (Query: Is this correct size?) the muddy slope of the cliff, here about at an 80% angle. When he was about 25 feet up, the rope was cut or slipped and Roberts slithered down. The second rocket was fired, caught, and Roberts went up again. This time he made the top in what he estimated as 30 to 40 seconds, and pulled into a small craterniche in the edge of the cliff. As he did so the rope was cut, and Roberts tied it to a picket. This (Query: wire picket?) promptly pulled out and the rope fell off the cliff. At the base, below Roberts, a 20 foot mound of clay knocked off the cliff by the bombardment enable men to get within 15 feet of the top and throw him a rope. This time he lay across it and five men, including Lt Lapres came up. No enemy was seen by Roberts during this period, and he was not brought under fire. Little more than 5 minutes had elapsed since the landing, as this first party from 861 left the edge of the cliff and started toward their objective, the enemy OP.

At some point, just after the first men got up, a heavy explosion above those left at the bottom showered them with debris, which almost buried Corporal Paul L. Medeiros. Nobody knows what it was--whether a destroyer's fire (that idea did not occur to these men) or detonation of a German naval shell that hung over the top of the cliff. One or two of these were found intact afterward, and the Rangers believed that they had been placed at intervals above the whole landing area. They were very heavy shells (200mm or larger) suspended over the edge with a pull type firing device attached with a very short time fuse.* If there had been many such shells set, naval fire had knocked (Statement of Lt Reanoy) them out along most of the cliff. The 861 party was the only assault group that may have encountered their use. The explosion had no *(According to the story told by friendly French civilians later, these shells had been hung not merely at Pointe du Hoe but along the cliffs to the east and west. Their purpose was not to prevent escalade (regarded as impossible in most areas) but to discourage lateral passage along the narrow beach to the few points where climbing was possible. Only information from enemy sources will decide this question, and determine how many were originally in position in the area attacked.) effect on 861's climbers. Medeiros and four other men came up quickly, found Robert's party already gone and out of sight, and moved away from the edge toward the same objective.*

*(This accounts for most of the E Company men on the craft, which had 8 NSFCP personnel and 15 headquarters men)

862:

The next of E Company's craft, carrying 15 Rangers and 7 NSFCP personnel, landed about 100 yards to the left and had no trouble in disembarking. The forward pair of rockets were fired at once, followed by the other pairs together. One plain rope and two toggle ropes reached the top, but one of the toggle ropes pulled out. Two men were wounded by grenades rolled over the cliff, and two were casualties (one killed) from machine gun fire that enfiladed the beach from the cliff top to the west of the landing area. E Company's men, furthest west, were the most exposed to this fire.

Corporal V. Aguzzi, Lt Leaggins, and S/Sgt Cleaves went up the two ropes close to each other, fell into a shell hole just beyond the edge, and paused while two other men came up. Following Ranger SOP, the five then moved off without waiting for the rest of their party, who came up the cliff a few minutes later.

863:

This craft carried 15 men of E Company, Col Rudder, and 6 headquarters personnel including Lt. J. M. Eikner, Communications officer. Actually this was the first craft to touch down. Enemy were seen on the cliff's edge as they came in. When Sgt Boggette shot one enemy off the edge with his BAR, the others disappeared. This party disembarked into shell holes next deep with water, and hard to climb out of because of slick clay sides. Those men on the right flank received some grenades, but there were no casualties.

The rockets were fired in two series from 35 yards out. The ropes were waterlogged and none reached the top. The best two free climbers in the group tried to work up the cliff without ropes and were baulked by the clay surface, which gave way too easily and permitted knife-holds. Four 4-foot sections of the extension ladder had been brought off the boat and taken to the base of the cliff. Here a huge mound of wet clay, knocked off the top of the cliff, gave an easy slope up 30 to 35 feet from the beach level. A 50 foot length of toggle rope was attached to the bottom rung of the 16 foot ladder. From the top of the mound, a Ranger climbed the ladder and cut a foothold in the cliff face. Standing in this, he held the ladder up as far as it would go against a slight crevice in the cliff face, while another soldier climbed to the top. Here a new foothold was prepared and the process repeated. This time the ladder reached the top, where T/5 Butex was the first man over the edge.* He held the ladder on *(This follows the statement of Sgt Robert W. Lang as to the number of steps necessary. Other accounts said one pull-up of the ladder instead of two, but this hardly accounts for enough height (35 & 32 = 67)--unless the top of the cliff sloped inward for some distance?) his arms, lying flat, and a man below climbed the toggle rope, then the ladder, and relieved him. As the first men up were successively relieved, they moved out a few yards to cover the climbers, but no enemy was seen in the shell torn vicinity. Here as at other parts of the top, the bombardment had so torn up the surface that there was plenty of cover for the first arrivals on the cliff edge. In 15 minutes all the E Company men were up and ready to move inland as a group. The Hq personnel remained, for the moment, on the beach, where they found shelter from the enemy's enfilade fire. The first CP was set up here in a shallow cave. Here, Lt Eikner set up his equipment and 0725 flashed word by SCR-300 that touch down had been made. The Message was received.

*(Query: By whom? This time seems a little late for the time of landing given by Col. Rudder (0710). Is it accounted for by the fact that it took 15 minutes to set up and get communications? Or is the 0710 landing time too early? Or was the signal off each before touchdown? Lt Eikner please check f)

722:

The fourth craft carrying E Co personnel (15 plus 5 headquarters men, a Stars and Stripes photographer and a Commando officer) came in 15 to 20 yards left of 863. The landing was made at the edge of a crater, it was impossible to avoid them--and the men got off in water. There was a good deal of assorted equipment on this boat: the SCR 284, 2 pigeons, a 60mm mortar with ammunition, and some demolitions. All this was got off without loss, though it took maneuvering to avoid slipping into deep water in the shell hole. T/5 C. S. Parker helped the big radio set on a packboard; had it set up before the first climbers in the party reached the top. Their first message--that the touchdown had been made--was sent out at 0725, followed at 0730 by the code signal indicating "a few men up the cliff." Sent on both SCR 300 and SCR 284, these messages were receipted for on the later transmission, but contact was not made with the main

*( The time (0730) seems rather late in view of Col Rudder's time of touchdown--0710. How exact are the times given in Lt Eikner's report? Does this mean that Col Rudder's estimate is mistaken? Please check this time of touchdown. I am following Lt Eikner's report on this, for the present.) Ranger force. A half hour later, Lt Eikner moved the communications group over to the base of the ladder by LCA 863, and then on top to the crater where the second CP was located.

The rockets on 722 were fired just before touchdown. One rope ladder and one plain rope got up and held. (The ropes in this case were dry as the craft had no difficulty with water coming in) The enemy threw some grenades over the cliff; Pfc F. H. Peterson was hit by a small fragment but not seriously enough to stop him. The mounds and craters from the bombing gave cover from the enemy fire to the men on the craft as it came in, now hit twice more, and destined to survive.

The single rope lay in a slight crevice, while the ladder was on an overhang where it looked exposed to flanking fire and would be harder to climb. Sgt E. P. Smith tried the plain rope and found he could "walk it up" easily. As he reached the top about 3 minutes after landing, he saw 5 or 6 Germans further out on the point throwing over grenades. He made his way to a crater about 5 yards from the cliff edge as Sgt A. Robey got to the top with a BAR. Robey lay in a little depression at the edge of the cliff and fired 40 or 50 rounds, fast fire, at the grenadiers. Three of them dropped and the rest ducked into shelters. Smith and Robey saw no more grenades thrown from that area. Pfc F. H. Peterson had joined, and the three men went off on their mission without waiting for the rest of the party, who were on their way up.

The mortar group in this craft remained below according to plan, with the mission of setting up its weapon on the beach to support the escalade. The beach however was too exposed to enemy fire to make this easy, and getting the ammunition off the surviving supply boat took time. About a half hour after landing, the mortar crew went on top without having yet fired.

863:

The two surviving craft carrying D Company had been due to land on the west side of the point. As a result of the mistake in course, and the new angle of approach, they came in just left of E Company's craft.

LCA 865, very wet on the passage, came in at a point where the from reaching what had been the beach. The men had to swim in about 20 feet. Sgt Lowell, bringing in a box of rope and a hand projector through the water, was spun around by a hit in the side from machine-gun fire. He reached shore and kept going.

Despite the distance from the cliff, three ropes got up; one toggle and the two ladders (mounted in front). However, the grapnels heading the ladders just made the edge. The lead rope from the grapnel to ladder being 40 feet long, there were in effect 2 plain ropes and one toggle. Sgt Lowell sent his best climber on the toggle rope while he tried the lead ropes on the ladders. All ropes were on an overhang, and only the toggle rope was practicable. Seeing that the ascent would be slow, Lowell called for the extension ladders. They were mounted in a 16 foot , foot lengths (4 sections) and a 20-foot length (5 sections). Hauling the ladders up the talus at the base, the men found they would reach the top of the vertical stretch. Beyond that the cliff sloped in so much that it could be climbed without ropes. Two men had already gone up the toggle rope; the rest used the ladders and got up very quickly. Grenades had caused some annoyance until the first men up covered the rest of the party. About 12 men moved off with Sgt. Lovell from the edge.

858:

The second D Company craft had been very wet all the way in and its passengers had been busy bailing, nevertheless, it kept in formation and was only a little later than the E Company boats in touching down. The men had to debark into a crater and went over their heads in muddy water, but the only equipment put out of action was the bazooka. No grenades were met here, but machine gun fire from the cliffs to the east hit 3 men.

The rockets on this craft were fired in series, led by the plain ropes. All ropes were wet, and only one plain rope reached the top. It lay in a crevice which gave some protection from enemy fire, but the direct approach to the rope was exposed. The men worked their way around to the rope under cover of the talus at the cliff base.

Except for one man who helped the wounded over to the CP, all the party went up the rope, and found it not too hard going. They could get footholds in the cliff, and a big crater reduced the steepness of the climb near the top. Within 15 minutes all were up. As in most cases, the first few men had moved off together and the group did not operate as a unit.

857:

The three craft carrying F Company were crowded eastward by the unplanned landing of D Company next to E Company. All three came in beyond the area originally assigned them.

LCA 857 had not been much bothered either by water or enemy fire on the way in. It touched down 5 yards from dry beach, and the shorter men of the party went in over their heads in the inevitable crater. No equipment trouble resulted. Sgt William L. Petty's BAR, wet here and mudded later when Petty slipped on the climb, fired perfectly when first needed. Fire from automatic weapons came from both flanks, but no grenades were met here. Two men were wounded, but only one put out of further action.

Just before touchdown, the two forward rockets were fired, and despite dry ropes, only one got up. Lt. Robert C. Arman, commanding this party, knew the heavier ropes wouldn't reach. The other rockets, the four boxes carrying the toggle ropes and rope ladders were carried onto the beach. The coxwain of the LCA did a notable job of holding the boat in for the 10 to 15 minutes this transfer was required. When the rockets were set up for firing off the beach, the lead wire (2 to 3 feet long) for making the fire connection was missing. Sgt Crippe fired all four, in turn by touching the short connection, 3 feet from the rocket, with his "hot-box". As each rocket fired, the flashback blinded Crippe and blew sand and mud into his eyes. The other men saw him clean his eyes, shake his head, and go after the next one; "he was a hell of a looking mess". His work made it possible for the section to get up much more quickly, for Sgt Petty and 2 or 3 other climbers had attempted the plain rope and failed. It was on a straight fall, required hand-over-hand with no footholds, and the men had trouble with muddy hands on the wet ropes.

All four rockets fired from the sand carried up their ropes and rope ladders. Sgt Petty started up a ladder, got 30 feet, and slid all the way back on the face of cliff when the grapnel pulled out. But it gave way slowly and this broke his fall. T-5 Winsch was going up the other ladder; fire from somewhere out on the point nicked the cliff all around him. Sgt Petty went up after Winsch, feeling sure he had been hit, but found him unwounded in a shell hole at the top. He and Petty waited for two more men and then set out for their first objective, followed a little later by the balance of 857's men.

864:

This craft came in without shipping much water. As it came under enemy fire from the cliffs, the craft returned the fire from its Lewis guns and BAR's of the Rangers. Touchdown was made on the edge of a shell hole in water shoulder-high. Fire from the left was heavy inflicting 3 casualties on the beach. The rockets were fired in series of pairs, front to rear. Four got up, but all were fully exposed to the enemy fire. Moreover, men's feet were so muddy that observers judged the plain ropes would have been unusable after the first climb. The one rope ladder up was caught on boulders in the water and hung at an angle against the cliff. Several men tried the other ropes without success. Pfc Anderson got part way up by free-climbing. The group, under command of Lt Will, moved over to the left and went up on the ladders from 863, which were in a protected position.

865:

This craft, last in column, was also last to touch down. Landing on the left flank, it was 300 to 400 yards away from its position under the original plan, and considerably outside the main enemy defensive positions on the point. A marked projection in the cliff just to their left protected the craft from the enemy fire which harassed the other landing parties on that flank.

865's personnel had been forced to bail on the way in, but made a dry landing, the only ones to do so. The first pair of rockets (rope ladders) were fired 5 yards from touchdown, about 25 yards from the cliff, the other rockets just after hitting the beach. All six got up. There was no sign of hostile action on the cliff.

Here was an opportunity to use the climbing assignments just as scheduled, and men started up all the ropes and ladders. Lt R. A Wintz saw 4 men reach the top, with all quiet, and started up plain rope to see what the score was. He found (as the other men did) that the climb was very difficult and tiring. The slippery face of the cliff gave few footholds, and the wet and muddy rope was hard for hand-over-hand pulling. He was "never so tired in his life." Even the ladders were difficult. He found six men on top and started them out immediately on a mission.

Summary

The first great difficulty, of landing and getting up the cliffs, had been completely overcome. Enemy resistance had been sporadic, and on the whole ineffective except for the position to the left flank. Enfilade fire from this area caused most of the casualties, some 15 men wounded seriously enough to remain on the beach for treatment.

The equipment for escalade had met the test, only two craft failing to get at least one of the main rockets up. Where these failed, or the ropes were unusable, handprojectors and the extension ladders were brought into use. Only one boat group had to use the ropes of another party. The 3 DUKW's, stopped at the water's edge, could not assist with their mechanically operated extension ladders. One tried, but the ladder rested at an low angle short of the top, and was unbalanced by the motion of the DUKW in the surf.

The assault met some unexpected circumstances but these were not wholly adverse in their effects. The beach craters made landings wet and slower than expected, held up the DUKW's, and impeded unloading of ammunition and supplies. However, they afforded some shelter from enemy fire. The cliffs had been much knocked down by the bombardment, and this (on the whole) seems to have helped the assault. The piles of debris at the base not only gave cover from the enfilade fire, it reduced the height of the climb, particularly for use of extension ladders. At the top, the edge of the cliff was cut back by craters, further reducing the climb and giving cover for the first men arriving on the edge.

The climbing parties had gone ahead with speed, determination, and the ability to improvise to meet their particular difficulties. This was the main reason for their success, and for the fact that within 30 minutes from first touchdown, all the attacking force was topside except for wounded, headquarters personnel, and some mortar sections assigned to cover the first phase of the attack from the beach.

This was not the last group to pass the OP and come by Aguzzi's position. After the first party of 861 Rangers had moved off, 4 more men came up the ropes, delayed by an explosion at the cliff top that almost buried one of the men in debris. They joined Yardley in the trench facing the embrasure, from which enemy small arms fire again opened up. A second fire fight started on the point.

The 5th Rangers talked it over. They had further missions on the other side of the OP, but they didn't want to leave the enemy in it free to observe the beaches and bring fire on the Headquarters group and wounded below. Medeiros and Yardley considered going down to the beach for demolitions but decided they couldn't use them on that side of the OP. They could not bring enough covering fire (so they estimated) to protect a man approaching the embrasure. It was finally decided to leave Yardley and Medeiros in position to "button-up" that side of the OP while the others went past it under protection of covering fire. Lawson and then Crewell went down the trench toward the west side of the OP. As they neared the end, fire came on them from some point which Yardley and Medeiros couldn't spot--they thought it was somewhere behind a low wall on top of the OP. Nevertheless, Creull and Lawson got past the danger point. Mackey, following, seemed to become confused and to lose his bearings. As he neared the end of the trench he pulled over to the right instead of toward the western side of the OP, and was killed by a rifle bullet.

For the remainder of D-Day and the following night, Yardley and Medeiros stayed in their trench on one side of the OP while Aguzzi guarded the inland side. Neither guard knew of the other's existence. Demolitions which could have been used on Aguzzi's side were not available to him. The OP gave no further trouble, and was cleared out on the afternoon of D+1. 2 satchel charges (40 lbs) of C-2 were thrown in the entrance by Sgt Gunther and Lt Vermeer. The concussion started a fire inside, and Aguzzi, still on guard, thought everyone must be dead. But 8 unwounded Germans came out with their hands up, and only one body was found inside. Whether this was the whole of the enemy force originally in the OP is not sure, for the OP, like most positions on the Point, was connected by underground passages, which were never fully investigated or traced.

These underground routes, connecting shelters with a maze of ruined trenches, were to cause trouble later in the morning. The first assault parties crossed the devastated fortified area without seeing any enemy (except at the OP), had to unmask themselves.

The groups that came up just a few minutes later began to get signs of enemy resistance on the western flank. Not only was there fire from the vicinity of the antiaircraft position, but sniping began in the area around position no. 6. A D Company group from LCA 858 had been assigned that area, and their story is known from only one survivor of the action that wiped them out.

When Sgt William Crug got to the top (just after Colonel Rudder came up (about 0715)), Crug was assigned to guard the OP (see sketch no.______). He and Eberle went after a sniper near position no. 4 placed, and drew machine gun fire from the antiaircraft positions on the west. Ordered to attack it, Crug and Eberle crawled further and found about 10 men, including Sgts. Spleen and Wain in cover just west of no. 6 position. (It is to be presumed that they had been seen escaped here by enemy fire as they went to their objective. Some of the other men from their boat group had gone on inland with the rest of D Company). The party was stalled there for the moment, afraid to open fire on the antiaircraft position lest they attract artillery fire, now beginning to hit near the fortified area. They started to crawl through the shell holes toward the antiaircraft emplacement, slowly for fear of minefields. A German waved a helmet on a stick to draw fire. The group didn't bite, but a Ranger coming up just behind did. Almost at once, artillery and mortar fire hit in the area. The Rangers were bunched too closely in a row of craters, and took off in all directions to spread out. Crug went back toward the no. 5 emplacement, and found himself alone on the battlefield in a few seconds. He yelled to find out where the party was, and heard Sgt Wain call "OK". Crug waited for 15 minutes. All action had ceased, and he started to crawl further back. He drew sniper fire every time he had to cross over any mound between shellholes. As he reached a trench near no. 5, he saw Sgt Spleen and 2 other men go into a connecting trench near him, and out of sight. Suddenly, fire opened up around him--automatic fire from the west and machine pistols close by. As he hugged the trench, Crug could see and hear a few Germans moving close by, but they didn't see him.

A few yards away, guns were thrown into the air from the trench where Spleen and the 2 other Rangers had last been seen. Crug kept quiet, the firing died down, and after the first few seconds he saw no one. Later, crawling out and back toward the OP he passed a pile of weapons lying on the ground near no. 5 position--2 or 3 rifles, some pistols, and 4 tommy guns. He believed they were given up and left there when the group surrendered. Crug was the only survivor and observation on the point was so limited that no one else had seen the action or any part of it. A few yards south of position no. 5,  [End Visible Text]