38th Infantry | Unit History | 2nd Division | 1944

Annual History-38th Inf Regt 2d Inf Div 1944

Campaigns: (1) The regiment participated in the Normandy campaign from 7 June 1944 to 24 July 1944. The purpose of the campaign was the liberation of France. Authority: War Department General Order No. 80 dated 5 October 1944. (2) The regiment participated in the campaign Northern France from 25 July 1944 to 14 September 1944 with the purpose of driving the Germans from France. Authority: War Department General Order No. 80 dated 5 October 1944. (3) The regiment participated in the campaign of Germany from 15 September 1944 to a date to be announced. The purpose was the complete defeat of the German Armies. Authority: War Department General Order No. 80 dated 5 October 1944.

Battles: (1) Trevieres Offensive 7-10 June 1944. (a) Advance reconnaissance units reported the town of Trevieres unoccupied on 7 June 1944. However, one battalion of German paratroopers were rushed to Trevieres by motor and bicycle on 8 June, arriving only 24 hours before the 38th Infantry reached the town. The Germans realized the importance of the town as the hub of all roads in the sector of the Normandy beach. Holding Trevieres could seriously hamper the expansion of the beach-head until additional German troops could be moved into the sector for a counterattack. Realizing the value of holding it the German defenders organized a hasty but effective defense in and near Trevieres. The approaches were covered with flat trajectory AT guns and the sole bridge leading into the town from the north was blown, preventing any vehicular traffic from the north. The enemy organized into strong points in the old stone buildings and camouflaged snipers caused numerous casualties upon the untried infantry troops. Ninety two prisoners were captured in mopping up the town. (b) Enemy information apparently was not very reliable. The Germans were generally taken by surprise at our landing in the St Laurent-sur-mer sector. Once learning of the landing in force, however, reinforcements were prevented from being moved up by continuous air superiority and artillery bombardment. Civilians seemed indifferent to the presence of American troops. The Germans had treated them well and several had married French women. One French woman sniper was killed in the sector. Terrain was rolling, marked with hedgerows, second class roads, and small villages with scattered farmhouses. (c) The 38th Infantry as part of the 2d Infantry Division was ordered to take Trevieres on the morning of 9 June 1944. Battalions moved south from their assembly area one mile north of Formigny at 1200, 9 June without prior reconnaissance. The mission at the time was to pass through Trevieres and secure the Bois du Molay to the south. Battalions moved initially in column but upon reaching resistance on the high ground north of the town the 3rd Battalion was ordered to cross the l'Aure River on the west of Trevieres, bypassing the town. The 2d Battalion was ordered to attack from the north and the 1st Battalion was held in division reserve. Encountering heavy mortar and small arms fire leading toward the l'Aure River, the 3d Battalion charged across the open approaches, waded the shoulder deep river and succeeded in securing the high ground on the other side against stiff resistance. The 2d Battalion became pinned down on the northern edge of the town by heavy small arms fire. Colonel Walter A. Elliott, regimental commander personally instilled the initiative into the attacking elements and riflemen pushed through the town on the afternoon of 9 June. One platoon of Company F successfully pressed through Trevieres and enemy resistance ceased at 1245 on 10 June 1944. The regiment attacked the town without vehicles, crew served weapons, radios and other communications equipment. One radio per battalion reached the battalion commanders during the height of the battle. Members of weapons platoons fought as riflemen armed only with pistols, carbines, and grenades. Buildings were captured in many instances at the point of the bayonet or by grenades. At the start of the action one platoon of Co A 81st Chemical Battalion, and one platoon of Co B 741st Tank Battalion were attached to the regiment. The 38th Field Artillery Battalion fired supporting fires limited by the supply of ammunition. Fully expecting all organic transportation ashore before the regiment was committed, all supporting weapons and extra ammunition were on vehicles. Only ammunition and rations carried on individuals was available at the start of the action. The 3d Battalion S-4 hauled ammunition from the beach by two wheeled cart. The Regimental S-4 commandeered two 2½ ton trucks for resupply purposes. Grenades, a critical item, were carried by hand into the town after attempting to send them into the town by tanks failed. Evacuation of wounded was by litter squads for over 1000 yards. At the beachhead Corps ambulances hauled wounded direct to the beach area from aid stations since organic medical units had not arrived, no organized evacuation system was set up. (2) Cerisy Offensive 11-19 June 1944. (a) After the capture of Trevieres the Germans fought a stubborn delaying action, utilizing a minimum of troops with maximum fire power. Approximately every other member of the 3d Paratroop Division was armed with an automatic pistol ("burp gun"), and they were organized into small combat groups utilizing fire and movement. The Germans did not use mines in any quantity in the regimental sector, and mortar and artillery ammunition was scarce. During the entire period the enemy proved very adept at delaying actions, being able to break contact and withdraw once our troops had developed the situation. No prisoners were captured during the period. (b) The enemy apparently knew very little of our plans. They had practically no aircraft, either observation nor attack. The enemy habitually occupied high commanding ground. The terrain was sectioned by hedgerows affording the maximum amount of cover and concealment to defenders. The enemy could effectively defend wide fronts by moving strong points from one location to another to meet attacks in any sector. (c) The 38th Infantry as part of the 2d Infantry Division supported by the 38th Field Bn, one platoon of the 741st Tank Bn and one platoon of the 81st Chemical Bn continued the advance to the south with the general mission of expanding the beach-head in the V Corps sector. The 1st Bn passed through the 2d Bn after the capture of Trevieres and the 1st and 3d Bns advanced abreast to the vicinity of Cerisy la Foret. The 1st Bn cleared the Bois du Molay of slight resistance and received orders to seize and organize positions south of Foret de Cerisy around the town against a possible expected German counterattack. Contact was gained by the battalion near Cantilly and the 1st Bn moved against stiff resistance, securing its objective just before dark. The mission of the regiment on 13 June 1944 was to capture that portion of the St Lo-Berigny road in our sector. The regiment advanced with the 2d Bn on the right, 3d Bn on the left. The 1st Bn had been attached to the 23rd Infantry and moved toward St. Georges de Elle. The 2d and 3d Bns advanced against very stiff resistance and the 3d Bn was stopped in the vicinity of La Vielle. The two Bns made plans for a coordinated attack and on the 15th had the mission of taking Hill 192. Company "L" reached the crest of Hill 192 on 16 June but was forced to withdraw in order to straighten our lines. The 2d Bn received heavy mortar and artillery fire and was forced to stop at La Giffardiere. (3) St. Germain de Elle - St. George de Elle - Le Pare Defensive 20 June 1944 to 10 July 1944. (a) Taking advantage of our extended lines and a lull in the offensive the enemy organized a strong defensive position on the northern slope of Hill 192. The defenders were almost entirely members of the 3d Paratroop Division and were in approximately two battalion strength. Making full use of the commanding ground and high hedgerows the Germans dug down and under the hedgerows, making small firing apertures on the forward side. A large percentage of automatic weapons enabled them to deliver heavy automatic fire to pin down personnel. The enemy fired mortars and artillery of a harassing nature - usually on draws or wooded areas. Our troops soon learned these tendencies and avoided obvious mortar targets. The enemy was not disposed in great depth nor did the Germans attempt counterattacks. Their only offensive action was patrol activity and this was limited due to the proximity of the lines. Three prisoners were captured during the period. (b) The 38th Infantry as part of the 2d Infantry Division took up a defensive position on the northern slope of Hill 192 near Le Pare, France, after our advance stopped. Positions were prepared utilizing hedgerows for cover, and digging behind. Limited patrolling continued throughout the period and the enemy lines were located almost exactly, supporting artillery fired on known and suspected targets. One combat patrol from Co F advanced into German lines for a depth of 200 yards, causing 14 casualties, destroyed two automatic weapons and returned with one minor casualty. This patrol "boxed" in the sector with artillery and mortar fire and prevented the Germans from reinforcing the sector by overhead machine gun fire. The value of detailed planning, and closely coordinated supporting fires was clearly demonstrated in this action. (4) Hill 192 Offensive 11-12 July 1944. (a) Two battalions of the 5th Regiment, 3d German Paratroop Division were firmly intrenched on Hill 192, having dug elaborate emplacements and organized the area in depth. High velocity 75mm guns were sited for antitank defenses and during the attack they were used against personnel. Enemy mortars and artillery located on the southern slope of the hill and across the St. Lo road fired upon our positions, giving the impression that our artillery was landing short. Enemy morale was high. The defenders were confident that no force could drive them from their positions. A small number of antipersonnel mines were encountered but antitank mines covered tank approaches. The enemy had very little armor on the hill since the hedgerow terrain was not conducive to movement of vehicles. Infantry was located to deliver a counterattack against any portion of the hill. Enemy air was not active because friendly forces had complete superiority, although support forces missions were not flown until late due to poor visibility. Over 400 prisoners were captured. (b) Hill 192, located approximately six miles north and east of St. Lo, France, commanded observation to the north for the enemy about half way to the beach. On the other hand it afforded observation for friendly forces to St. Jean des Baisants to the south and St. Lo to the west. The St. Lo - Berigny highway ran across the southern slope of the hill. (c) At 0530, 11 July 1944 the 38th Infantry attacked to clear Hill 192 and cut the St. Lo - Berigny highway on the south. The 2nd Bn attacked on the right slope, 1st Bn on the left with the mission of moving over the crest, and the 3d Bn followed in support. Supporting the attack were three battalions of medium artillery, three battalions of light artillery and one battalion of 240mm guns for counter-battery fire. An air support mission of 200 P47 fighters was planned but did not materialize due to poor visibility. In direct support of the regiment were two companies of medium tanks and Co A 81st Chemical Bn 4.2 mortars. The plan of the attack called for heavy preparatory fires on the forward and reverse slopes of the hill. Infantry engineer demolition squads were to blast gaps in the hedgerows allowing tanks to advance. Tanks were also equipped with dozers but had difficulty in advancing because the ground was muddy. As a result the tanks furnished only limited support to the infantry. Infantry followed a planned barrage of artillery and found many German defenders still in their dugouts, dazed by the incessant barrage. Accurate and close artillery, directed within 50 yards of advance elements in many cases allowed infantry to close on the enemy positions, suffering only moderate casualties. Late in the afternoon of 11 July 1944 Co F cut the highway and took up a defensive position facing to the south and west. The attack was resumed on 12 July 1944 and both lead battalions reached their objectives that afternoon. The 3rd Bn was not committed in the assault. Over 250 miles of wire were layed by regimental communications personnel in the battle, enabling units to maintain constant wire communication. Supply routes were cut by engineers through the hedgerows behind each battalion. Evacuation of wounded was by litter bearers to forward battalion collecting points and by 1/4 ton jeep to battalion aid stations. Wounded personnel received almost immediate attention. (5) St. Germain d'Elle - La Croix Rouge - Le Boulaire Defensive 13-25 July 1944. (a) During this period the 38th Infantry Regiment as part of the 2d Infantry Division remained in a relative stable defensive position on the southern slope of Hill 192 near Le Boulaire, France. The enemy forces were the same units opposing the regiment on the attack of Hill 192. The enemy dug in the hedgerows, apparently satisfied to hold our forces from further advance. (b) The regiment attempted no offensive action during the period except for reconnaissance patrols which accurately located the enemy positions. Each battalion was relieved and placed in regimental reserve for a short period for reorganization. The mission of the regiment during the period was to consolidate and hold the position, awaiting a build up of forces for the 1st Army breakthrough. (6) Vire Offensive 26 July 1944 to 7 August 1944. (a) During this period the regiment was opposed by elements of the 3d Paratroop Division and the 363d Infantry Division. Most of the defenders were young, battle tried but approximately 30% were foreign elements. Other small "Kampfgruppen" were encountered, fighting as strong points. Morale of the enemy was high and their defenses were extensive. For the entire engagement the enemy fought a skillful delaying action, making a stubborn defense by day and withdrawing under a screening force at night after the dispositions had been located. The Luftwaffe came out at night in small strength on bombing and strafing missions but caused no damage. The enemy used little armor in the regimental sector. The armor that was used was employed as stationary antitank defenses and moved only when threatened with capture. The enemy habitually occupied high ground or villages suitable for defense. Fires were chiefly from antitank weapons with harassing artillery and mortar fire. German mortars were most accurate when fired on observed targets. (b) The enemy apparently had little knowledge of units on other fronts and their orders seemed to be only to hold as long as possible before withdrawing. Most civilians had been evacuated but the remaining were friendly to Americans. The terrain was rolling, sectioned by hedgerows and marked by small villages. The road net was good although scattered antitank mines were encountered. (c) On 26 July 1944 the regiment launched an attack to the south as part of the general offensive of the First Army. A series of objectives were assigned the regiment with the initial objective being the high ground on the west of St. Jean des Baisants, France. Artillery ammunition was limited so only a forty minute preparation was fired and other fires placed on call. Heavy casualties were suffered on 26 and 27 July mainly because the advance was through low ground subject to enemy observation. The 102d Cavalry Group had the mission of advancing on the right of the regiment and protecting the right flank. The 9th and 23rd Infantries advanced on the left. The high ground to the west of St. Jean des Baisants was taken on 28 July and the advance was continued to the south. Successive objectives were assigned to the southeast of Torigny sur Vire and on 31 July the regiment had slugged its way to a point approximately 2000 meters south of the Boulaire River. On 3 August the regiment was pinched out by the 9th and 23d Inf Regts. It was motorized and moved from a point two miles south of Torigny sur Vire to an assembly area eight miles north of Vire. The regiment resumed the attack on 4 August, taking the town of Campeaux. The advance was held up on 5 August overlooking Vire, France awaiting the 29th Division to attack Vire from the west. Contact with the enemy was lost on 6 August 1944 after a prolonged push by infantry. Troops were tired and casualties had been heavy. Replacements joined the regiment on 6 August 1944. Supplies and evacuation of wounded were carried on in normal fashion in this action. (7) Tinchebray Offensive 8-15 August 1944 (a) The regiment remained in a stabilized position from 7 August to 12 August and moved to an assembly position in rear of the 9th Infantry on 13 August. The enemy was still the same units which had opposed the regiment since 26 July 1944 and its mission was the same. Fighting now in pockets of resistance the enemy was effective in delaying our advances by taking full advantage of fire and movement. Enemy artillery and mortar fire was light and no armor was employed. (b) The regiment attacked on 13 August to the south with the mission of cutting the Tinchebray-Sourdeval road. The 2d and 3d Bns attacked abreast and the 3d Bn had the mission of taking Hill 365, a prominent terrain feature overlooking the road being utilized by the Germans in their withdrawal. Co's K and L took the hill after a fierce fight and the direction of advance was changed from the south to the east. Advancing with two battalions on the north of the Tinchebray road and one battalion on the south of the road, the regiment met only scattered resistance until the 3d Bn moved through the town of Tinchebray on 14 August and secured the high ground to the east. One strong point was encountered by the 1st Bn but this resistance was cleared by Co C in a dusk attack.

(c) Supply and evacuation was difficult in this operation since communication routes were at right angles to the line of advance for part of the period. However all wounded were removed successfully evacuated by establishing aid stations and collecting points closely behind the front lines. (8) Daoulas Peninsula Offensive 21-30 August 1944. (a) On the Daoulas Peninsula the regiment encountered an entirely new type of fighting. The enemy defended from fortified areas, pillboxes, fortified houses and trench systems. The enemy main line of defense ran in a general line thru the villages of Lesquivit and Le Fesque with the right flank on the Landerneau River and the right flank on the high ground on the south shore of the peninsula. The regiment seized Hill 154 early in the action and thus had excellent observation over the entire sector chosen by the Germans to defend. Intelligence information was secured by aggressive patrolling, PW interrogations, and information from civilians. Enemy mortar and artillery fire was moderate but flat trajectory fire continually harassed our lines. The enemy had large numbers of high velocity naval weapons originally sited for harbor defense but which were turned around for firing on ground troops. Among the 3000-4000 troops holding the peninsula many units were represented: Elements of 343rd Infantry Division, 266th Infantry Division, 813rd Ost Bn (Russian), 5th Ost Bn, 2d Para AT Bn, 48th Mine Sweeper platoon and others. With few exceptions PW's, including officers, willingly told all they knew. With accurate enemy information our artillery was directed most effectively on known locations with excellent results. Many AP mines of all types were encountered. 500 pound shells, booby trapped were discovered but caused no damage. (b) The Daoulas Peninsula is a strip of land extending southwest of the harbor of Brest. It is bordered on the right by the Landerneau River. A high ridge extends along the north half of the peninsula, the highest point of which is Hill 154. The ridge overlooks the city and harbor of Brest from the south and commands all sea approaches. The terrain is rocky, hilly, and wooded, with small villages. The town of Plougastel is located in the center of the peninsula. Leading from the town is a major highway across a large bridge to the city of Brest. The Germans blew the north span of the bridge on 24 August 1944. (c) After moving to an assembly area near Landerneau, France with the 2nd Infantry Division, the 38th Infantry was detached from the division and became the major component of Task Force "B" operating under control of VIII Corps. Other components of TFB were the 3d Bn 30th Inf, Co C 329 FA Bn, 3d Bn 330th Infantry, Btry C 323 FA Bn, Co C 2d Med Bn, Co C 2d Engr Bn and Co's B and C 703 TD Bn. The mission of the task force was to clear the Daoulas Peninsula at the same time the assault on Brest was launched, preventing the main body of the VIII Corps from receiving fire from the peninsula. The 3d Bn moved from its assembly area and had the mission of taking as much ground as possible before the Germans learned of our offensive. Encountering Hill 154 the battalion immediately deployed and attacked, taking the hill on 23 August. The defenders apparently unaware of the importance of the objective until it was too late since they counterattacked heavily after our troops had occupied the hill. Company I attacked on the right, Co L on the left and each company advanced in column of platoons. Resistance was enveloped, flanked, or surrounded and the defenders were quickly overcome with minimum of casualties to our troops. After securing the hill, the 2d Bn passed through the 3d and secured the perimeter defense around Plougastel. The 1st Bn moved on the right flank of the regiment, clearing resistance along the Landerneau River. Encountering heavy mine fields as well as heavy small arms fire, the 2d Bn had difficulty in overcoming the position but by skillful direction of artillery fires on known locations the positions were taken after two days fighting. After Plougastel was taken the 1st and 2d Bns advanced abreast, clearing the peninsula on 30 August 1944. 2633 prisoners were captured by units of the regiment on the peninsula plus approximately 250 wounded. (9) Brest Offensive 1 September - 18 September 1944. (a) The 38th RCT completed its successful campaign as part of Task Force "B" on the PLOUGASTEL-DAOULAS Peninsula south of BREST, France on 30 August and moved immediately to join the 2d Infantry Division in the attack on the city of Brest. On 1 September, 3d Bn with Co's A and B 23d Inf attached, attacked on the left of the 23d Inf to secure a line of departure for the regiment. Orders were received to move another battalion (the 1st) to assembly area for commitment on the left of the 3d. The remainder of the regiment regrouped and relaxed in the vicinity of the Regimental Command Post at St. Divy, France. On 2-3 September, 1st and 3rd Bns with Co's A and C 2d Rangers attached, attacked to secure a terrain objective 800 yards to the front. Little progress was made against stubborn resistance for a day but the objective was secured without opposition the second morning. All three battalions were placed in assembly areas to relieve units of the 9th and 23d Infantries in a new sector of action, once they re-established contact which had been lost with the enemy. The Regimental Command Post moved to Guipavas. Just prior to darkness, the 2d Bn relieved the 2d Bn 3d Infantry. Beginning with daylight, 4 September, the 2d Bn began active patrolling to endeavor to gain ground by infiltration but made no advance when the enemy was found in a line connecting a series of strong points 600 yards to the front. The battalion's front line received a heavy volume of artillery, mortar and flat trajectory fire during the day. Prior to darkness the 1st Bn relieved the 2d Bn 9th Infantry on the right of our 2d Bn. The 1st Bn 9th Inf was attached to the 38th Inf. During the 5th, 6th and 7th, the regiment continued patrolling to the front. Two Propaganda speeches, combined with massed artillery fires, to obtain surrender of enemy front line troops combined with the patrol operations to take a total of 110 prisoners during the three-day period. Preparations were made for a coordinated attack. Following a heavy artillery barrage on located enemy positions the regiment crossed the Line of Departure at 1000 hours 8 September 1944. The 2d Bn on the left reached its limited objective by 1400 through a combined penetration and flanking action. The battalion's direction of attack was changed and it moved to take the north part of Hill 90, the objective previously assigned the 23d Infantry. A strong pocket of resistance on the right front of the 23d Infantry was taken by an enveloping action by a platoon of Co F and at 1930 the 23rd Infantry began relief of our 2d Bn in position. The 1st Bn on the right and 3d Bn which had relieved 1st Bn 9th Infantry in the center on 6 September, made slow, steady progress against well organized positions around buildings. Their advance increased in late afternoon and they crossed the objective line at 1830, continuing to the next high ground before dark. The attack advanced some 2000 yards and netted more than 600 prisoners of German General Ramcke's paratroopers, supplemented by infantry, flak and naval personnel. The attack was renewed at 0900 hours 9 September. The 1st Bn moved forward rapidly against scattered strong points and took the north portion of Hill 105, last high ground east of the city of Brest, and organized with antitank and heavy machine gun attachments around former AA concrete emplacements. Co L on the left of the 3d Bn met heavy resistance from its left and was held up, taking casualties, throughout the morning. The 2d Bn, in reserve, was moved forward to take over the 3d Bn zone but at 1520 hours Co L finally knocked out the resistance and the 3d Bn continued its advance, taking its portion of Hill 105 assigned to the left rear of the 1st Bn, with Co A closing the gap. House-to-house fighting began in many sectors, both battalions having reached the built-up city area during the day. Street fighting continued on 10 September against hastily organized enemy positions facing to sweep all streets with automatic and sniper fire. Bazookas and 14 to 20 pound demolition charges were used along with attached TD's to breach walls. Progress was slow throughout the day except for a sudden breakthrough made by the 1st Bn in mid-afternoon which carried them to positions 600 yards across the old city wall. The 3d Bn took six city blocks against stiff opposition and enemy artillery and mortar fire. The regimental command post displaced from Guipavas to a former German command post in an underground shelter at Le Mot. The 1st Bn, continuing its house to house fighting gained its objective line during mid-afternoon on the 11th, but the 3d Bn ran into a strongly fortified position in the vicinity of St. Martin's Church. Although advancing within grenade range, units of both I and L Co's were unable to drive the enemy out of the vicinity. Enemy artillery, including heavy naval guns, continued to be active as it had been throughout the campaign. Fires lighted the city. There were no houses which had not suffered damage. In a comparatively quiet day on the 12th, the 1st Bn patrolled to its immediate front, and the 3d Bn took St. Martin's Church and the block beyond. During the night of 12-13 September the enemy reformed in front of the 3d Bn and an effort to move forward was met by heavy automatic and flat trajectory fire. Co I finally took a portion of one block. In the course of the action both the I Co commander and the 3d Bn S-3 who went forward to take his place, were killed. Between 1800 and 2045 the 2d Bn relieved the 3d Bn in position. The attack was resumed at 1300 on 14 September. Co B remained in position while Co C, to its left, extended its line along Marshal Foch Road west to block 479. Co F took block 479 but Co G took only 3 houses in Block 490. Co C sent a patrol of one officer and two men to the top of the city wall. With direct support of 37-inch and 40mm fire, the 2d Bn took against strong resistance, the Union Dock and Nouvel Hospital area in block 489 which had been used as a barracks and a rest home for the 9th U-Boat Flotilla. A German hospital in underground bunkers was taken over by the Regimental Surgeon, complete with its staff of 50 and approximately 240 patients, including 85 wounded Americans. By night the battalion had cleared all resistance in its sector, west of the city wall. All forward movements were halted by order and at 1800 coordinated fires of artillery, 4.2 inch and 81mm mortars were placed on the old city area. The battalions improved positions on the 15th and patrolled to the wall on the 17th and 18th while the steady artillery and mortar pounding continued. The mission on 18 September was to find and secure a breakthrough point in the old wall. The 2d Bn patrol was pinned down near the main east gate and an endeavor by the Bn S-3, under a flag of truce, to convince Hauptmann Neumann, commanding a Kampfgruppe manning the wall from a bunker under the Post Office, to surrender, failed. At 1700 a one-platoon combat patrol from Co B advanced through a draw and seized the commanding knob in 483, within the wall. Although heavy enemy fires prevented reinforcement and prevented another patrol from entering the wall to the south, this patrol held its ground against a series of fierce counterattacks. Division ordered the regiment to "hold what you've got" and be prepared to assist the 9th Infantry in a mop-up drive on the 19th from north to south against fast crumbling resistance inside the wall. As the 9th Infantry moved across our front and accomplished the surrender of all remaining enemy units east of the Penfield River at 1430, the regiment began movement to a rest and assembly area in the vicinity of St. Divy. (b) 1988 prisoners were captured during this period. (10) Schnee Eifel Defensive 4 October to 15 December 1944. (a) On 4 October 1944, the 38th Infantry relieved in position the 22d Inf Regt of the 4th Division and assumed a defensive role in the Schnee Eifel sector of the Siegfried Line. The positions occupied were identical with those occupied after the 22d Infantry advance was halted because of lack of supplies. Part of the regimental positions were through the Siegfried Line and the enemy held high ground to the east, organizing field fortifications. Elsewhere on the front the enemy occupied pillboxes of the Siegfried Line. At the beginning of the period the enemy patrolled quite vigorously into our sector. Artillery fires were of a harassing nature and caused only light casualties. In the latter part of the period artillery fire had almost ceased and patrol actions had fallen off. However, it is likely the enemy knew our front line dispositions since we had been in position for so long. (b) The civilian population had been evacuated from the front lines but occupied villages near Cannon and Service Companies. Civilians appeared indifferent to American occupation. The terrain was not well suited for defense since there were no covered routes of approach. The terrain occupied was actually the Siegfried Line but the defense faced to the east instead of the west. The German counteroffensive broke through this sector on 16 December, four days after the 38th Infantry had been relieved by the 423rd Infantry of the 106th Division. (c) The 38th Infantry occupied its assigned sector with two battalions, Antitank Company and Cannon Company since the 2d Bn had been detailed as train guards and were stationed in Paris. The 2d Bn rejoined the regiment in November and relieved each battalion in position in turn. Antitank company with one platoon of Cannon Company occupied Bleialf on the right of the regimental zone. Approximately 4000 yards to the left of Antitank Company the zone was held by the 1st Bn. The interval was covered by Regimental Headquarters and Headquarters Company.

On the left of the 1st Bn was the 3d, holding a wooded sector. The position was organized, each man digging in and establishing overhead cover. Vehicles and kitchens were emplaced and a chapel and movie house were built from logs. When the regiment *** unreadable ***

(11) Wahlerscheid Offensive 13-16 December 1944. (a) The 38th Infantry was committed through the 9th Infantry Regiment on the morning of 16 December in a column of battalions. The mission was to advance through the cross roads at Wahlerscheid and attack to the north east and secure Dreiborn. The 1st Bn followed the 2d Bn through the 9th Infantry positions and both battalions gained immediate contact. During this period the regiment was opposed by the 751st Regiment of the 326 VG Division. The enemy occupied pillboxes and earth emplacements in the Siegfried Line. Enemy positions were protected by barbed wire and extensive mine fields. All roads were heavily mined and covered with obstacles. One road had two stretches of 500 yards each covered with trees across the road. The trees were booby trapped and mined. The enemy had little armor in the sector but the infantry was well trained and well prepared for an all out defense. (b) Initially the division planned on an element of surprise in the attack. By the time the 38th Infantry attacked this element of surprise had been lost and the enemy was well aware of our intentions. The terrain was heavily wooded with few open areas and firebreaks. About 5 inches of snow covered the ground. (c) After passing through the 9th Infantry, the 1st Bn on the left and 2d Bn on the right attacked along a road to the north east from Wahlerscheid. Fighting was heavy and the enemy was well emplaced in dugouts in the woods. Enemy artillery caused considerable casualties since tree bursts were frequent. The 3d Bn had been detached to the 9th Infantry and moved forward to the vicinity of the cross roads preparatory to following the 1st and 2d Bns toward their objective. At this point word was received of the German counteroffensive and all units were instructed to hold up and organize a perimeter defense.

(12) Rocherath - Krinkelt Defensive 17-19 December 1944. (a) On 16 December 1944 the Germans launched a large scale counteroffensive aimed at vital supply and communication installations in the rear. The 2d Division was attacking at the time and the 38th Infantry was the most advanced element. Breaking contact and moving across the front and remaining the enemy in time to halt the flank of the 1st Army, the 38th Infantry moved from the vicinity of Wahlerscheid to Rocherath-Krinkelt, Belgium. During the offensive the regiment was attacked by 989th and 990th VG Regiments of the 277th VG Division, 12th SS (Hitler Jugend) Panzer Division with Tiger tanks from an attached OKW heavy Tank Battalion, and the 3d Pz Grenadier Division. PW's taken the night of 17 December were from elements of the 1st SS (Adolph Hitler) Pz Division. The enemy was completely prepared and equipped, morale was high and the enemy was certain that their attack in this sector could carry them to Liege. (b) 78 tanks were destroyed by the regiment in this action. Forty-six prisoners were taken, attesting for the fierceness of the action. The enemy attacked our positions with 10 planes on one occasion but caused little damage. It was evident that the enemy planned to break our defenses by attacking with tanks in superior numbers and then mopping up with infantry. Although frequently overrun and disorganized, the regiment held its ground and withdrew on order on the 19th of December upon instructions from higher headquarters. The villages of Rocherath and Krinkelt commanded a road net leading west toward Liege and north along the 1st Army front. Capture of these two villages was vital to the Germans in order to expand their salient and afford more roads for movement of armor. By successfully holding the position during the critical stages of the breakthrough, the regiment contributed immeasurably to the holding of the right flank of the 1st Army. (c) At 170715 a report was made of enemy tanks in the vicinity of the Division CP. Orders were given dispatching available tanks and TD's from our assault area to counter the threat of the enemy cutting the supply road to the rear. At 0835, 3d Bn (-1 Company) was ordered to move to hold P795250730 at all costs. Antitank Company, sent into defensive positions along the east edge of Rocherath. The regiment was advised its supply route had been cut from the southwest and Service and S-1 installations were moved to the forward CP preparatory to going into a perimeter defense if necessary. Rocherath was attacked by four German planes at 1007 but the regiment suffered no damage. A warning order was received at 1015 for the 9th and 38th Infantries to break contact with the enemy, move across the front and engage the enemy in a defensive position from Rocherath south to Krinkelt and Wirtzfeld and east toward Elsenborn. 9th Infantry was to withdraw first, followed by 38th Infantry, then most advanced positions. Co A was ordered to march at once to join the 3d Bn moving into position at Krinkelt. By 1030 warning orders had been issued to withdraw on order, 1st Bn to be followed by 2d Bn. Our units were ordered to lay all possible mines, block roads and destroy the usefulness of captured pillboxes. At 1250 Co B was attacked by an estimated enemy company which was driven off with prepared fires with heavy casualties. One enemy platoon reached the 2d Bn MLR at 1330. Small arms and mortar fire broke up the attack, inflicting an estimated 50% casualties. At this time Co L, in its new position was bombed by friendly aircraft with 14 casualties. 9th Infantry cleared its area at 1415. 1st Bn started to Rocherath at 1450. At the same time, a 5-mile enemy column was reported heading through Dreiborn, Service Company, on the north edge of Rocherath, had a hastily composed rifle force fighting alongside Antitank Company riflemen to hold the east approaches to Rocherath. 2d Engineer Bn left men with 2d Bn to build road blocks and lay hasty minefields along the route of withdrawal. Service Company and Antitank Company were in a heavy fire-fight by 1645. At this time an advance detail began to move the Regimental CP back to its former position in Rocherath. The 3d Bn reported a battalion of the 23rd Infantry disorganized and giving ground on its left flank. The 1st Bn 9th Infantry was pulled from its withdrawal route to hold the positions going to Rocherath. 2d Bn, 9th Infantry cleared by 1645. At this time an advance detail began to move the Regimental CP back to its former position in Rocherath. The 3d Bn reported a battalion of the 23rd Infantry disorganized and giving ground on its left flank. The 1st Bn 9th Infantry was pulled from its withdrawal route to hold the positions northeast of Rocherath. 2d Engineer Bn left men with 2d Bn to build road blocks and lay hasty minefields along the route of withdrawal. Service Company and Antitank Company were in a heavy fire-fight by 1645. At this time an advance detail began to move the Regimental CP back to its former position in Rocherath. The 3d Bn reported a battalion of the 23rd Infantry disorganized and giving ground on its left flank. The 1st Bn 9th Infantry was pulled from its withdrawal route to hold the positions northeast of Rocherath, 4000 yards east of which our tanks and TD's were in a fire fight with enemy armor. Withdrawing to the west, 3d Bn 99th Infantry, took up defensive positions on high ground 1000 yards NE of Rocherath; 1st Bn 395th Infantry astride the north south road 4000 yards north of Rocherath and 2d Bn 395th Infantry between the two, according to meager reports received. 1st Bn VG and Co A reached Krinkelt at 1845, the rest of the column having been delayed by heavy concentrations of artillery and nebelwerfer fire along the route. At 1900 the 2d Bn closed into new defensive positions one-half mile north of Rocherath under a heavy volume of artillery fire and MG fire. Co G was ordered to the vicinity of the Regimental CP to set up a perimeter defense, with Hq Co., against infiltration. All units were ordered to halt all stragglers from 2d and 99th Divisions and form them into composite battle groups. The regimental CP closed into Rocherath at 1930. At 2100, 17 December 1944, AT Co reported infiltration of tanks and infantry and one platoon of Co K was dispatched to reinforce the AT Co sector. Enroute this platoon was taken under point blank fire by a Tiger tank 100 yards from the Regimental CP. An enemy tank-infantry attack on Co K's position was partially repulsed at 2130. At 2145, 1st Bn reported parts of B and C Co's still trying to fight their way to assigned positions north of town where enemy tanks and infantry had penetrated the town to the Bn CP which was then under assault. The attack was broken up by bazookas and automatic weapons. Enemy infantry was moving into adjacent houses, only after casualties had been inflicted in an all-out fight. At least three enemy tanks and 250 infantry penetrated the town, controlling the east street where they walked about freely. Due to the fight at the SE edge of town, many vehicles of component and supporting units were immobilized north of town. Some were infiltrated to the rear during the night. Others were moved in a column after dawn 18 December. At 180200 the Regtl Comdr, who had assumed control of the 99th Division elements in the area, sent this message to CG, 2d Infantry Division: "My 3d Bn on right still holding steady. 1st Bn badly disorganized, no dependable force. Organizing local defenses at CP in perimeter position at 781052. Holding. Enemy holds church and gap exists on my left, infiltrated with tanks and infantry on east part of Rocherath. 395th right is at 975059. Know nothing of situation. All wire out. Traffic jammed on road. Will put it through Wirtzfeld when road clears. No knowledge of friendly units said to be on our front. My 2d and 3d Bns are in good shape. 1st Bn is of little help. AT Co well, with Co K in action quieting. Believe we can hold. 50 men of Co L 23rd now with me." Enemy activity to the east and northeast indicate a renewal of the attack at dawn 18 December and heavy supporting fires were laid on all roads and possible assembly areas. Elements of the 394th Infantry passed into our lines and continued toward Elsenborn, at 0740. By 0830 a heavy tank-infantry attack had been mounted to the east. At that time the majority of A and B Co's were still unlocated. Penetrations had been made on both flanks of K Co by 0850 three enemy tanks were engaged and knocked out by our tanks and bazookas 100 yards from the Regtl CP at 0910. Clerks and staff joined guards in a small arms fight from the CP buildings and vicinity and killed or dispersed accompanying enemy infantry. At 0925 2d Bn was instructed to build a new line behind the 1st Bn, 9th Infantry, and relieve that unit. One platoon Co L was sent to aid AT Co. Enemy tanks and infantry attacked 3d Bn but were destroyed or repelled. The remainder of Co L, including attached stragglers, was dispatched to 2d Bn, where fierce fighting, some of it hand-to-hand, still raged. One enemy tank which had penetrated to 3d Bn CP was destroyed by litter bearers. Five other tanks penetrated to 1st Bn CP where four were knocked out and the fifth withdrew. Situation quieted in the 3d Bn sector by noon and heavy fire was directed during the afternoon on enemy digging in to the southeast. Another strong tank-infantry attack was made on 2d Bn at 1300, after 1st Bn 9th Infantry had been withdrawn to an area east of town. The attack was partially disrupted at once, but built up again and by 1405 enemy tanks were flanking I and F Co was forced to pull back one hedgerow to better positions. Enemy infantry was halted by 1440 but tank infiltration continued. At 1500 Co L finally knocked out the resistance and the 3d Bn continued its advance, taking its portion of Hill 103, assigned to the left rear of the 1st Bn, with Co A closing the gap. At 1520 enemy armor, under cover of darkness, again began infiltrating into the towns, to be engaged by our tanks and TD's from hidden positions, and by bazooka teams hunting them down. During the night, additional mines were laid across approaches to the twin towns. More than 300 members of the 393rd and 394th Infantry Regiments struggled into 1st Bn lines from the southeast. It was discovered that much of the 395th Infantry, which had been reported but not contacted on our north had withdrawn toward Elsenborn and the 395th, placed under 38th control, was ordered to close back to assigned positions on our north. During the night enemy dawn attacks 19 December on the left of 3d Bn and frontally on 2d Bn were repelled. Co's A and C, 23rd Infantry, were moved from reserve positions and placed on an east-west line to the left rear of the 2d Bn. During the night, mine-laying continued throughout the day when the situation permitted. All partially destroyed enemy and friendly tanks and trucks were systematically destroyed by burning. By 1012, 3d Bn again was in close contact along its front. By 1150, two enemy tanks had passed through 2d Bn lines and our tanks and TD's engaged enemy armor attacking from the northeast and east. Another attack from the east was quickly broken up by artillery and mortar fire at 1520. No contact had yet been made with the 99th Division troops reported on the north. It was 1600 before Co L, attached to 2d Bn was able to make physical contact with 1st Bn on the right. At 1620, 18 December, Co C was released from Regimental control and moved to close 2d Bns north flank. The Regimental CP displaced to Krinkelt, 974044. At 1730, Co's A and C, 23rd Infantry, were attached to 38th Infantry and began moving from Wirtzfeld. At 1815 enemy armor, under cover of darkness, again began infiltrating into the towns, to be engaged by our tanks and TD's from hidden positions, and by bazooka teams hunting them down. During the night, additional mines had yet been made with the 99th Division troops reported on the north. It was 1600 before Co L, attached to 2d Bn was able to make physical contact with 1st Bn on the right. At 1620, 18 December, Co C was released from Regimental control and moved to close 2d Bns north flank. The Regimental CP displaced to Krinkelt, 974044. At 1730, Co's A and C, 23rd Infantry, were attached to 38th Infantry and began moving from Wirtzfeld. At 1815 enemy armor, under cover of darkness, again began infiltrating into the towns, to be engaged by our tanks and TD's from hidden positions, and by bazooka teams hunting them down. During the night, additional mines were laid across approaches to the twin towns. More than 300 members of the 393rd and 394th Infantry Regiments struggled into 1st Bn lines from the southeast. It was discovered that much of the 395th Infantry, which had been reported but not contacted on our north had withdrawn toward Elsenborn and the 395th, placed under 38th control, was ordered to close back to assigned positions on our north. During the night the TDR platoon was employed for local protection of friendly armor against enemy bazooka teams. Enemy dawn attacks 19 December on the left of 3d Bn and frontally on 2d Bn were repelled. Co's A and C, 23rd Infantry, were moved from reserve positions and placed on an east-west line to the left rear of the 2d Bn. During the day when the situation permitted, mine-laying continued throughout the day when the situation permitted. All partially destroyed enemy and friendly tanks and trucks were systematically destroyed by burning. By 1012, 3d Bn again was in close contact along its front. By 1150, two enemy tanks had passed through 2d Bn lines and continued south toward a rearroad 1,000 yards south of town. Shortly after noon our tanks and TD's engaged enemy armor attacking from the northeast and east. At 1345, the following order was received: "At 1730, withdraw to position shown on overlay. The 395th with 2d Bn 393rd, attached, will move by road we are preparing to follow. Withdrawal of these units under control Col. McKenzie. All other units under control C.O. 38th Infantry withdraw by MSR to Wirtzfeld, from there as directed by MG's. Upon arrival, units under command C.O. 23rd Inf, when units established, under control of respective Co's. One engineer platoon made road blocks, attached to 395th Inf; other platoon attached to 38th Inf, execute all demolitions as we retire. Destroy all German and American equipment starting at once. Leave no equipment that Germans can use. 9th Infantry holds line behind us. 23rd will utilize all available troops to establish new MLR. TD's under control of Major Jameson, Col. Loveless takes over all units and places them in line. At 1730 this road becomes one way going back. Vehicles other than combat essential infiltrate to Camp Elsenborn starting at once." Warning orders were issued immediately and vehicles started moving out. Complete orders were issued by Col. Boos at a meeting of Staff and Battalion and attached unit commanders at 1503. Artillery fire broke up an enemy tank attack toward 1st Bn at 1600, setting 3 of 15 tanks afire. 2d Bn began its withdrawal on schedule, despite the fact all elements were in close contact with the enemy, some of whom had infiltrated again into town starting at dusk. The Regimental CP was closed out at 1930, becoming operational in Berg, Belgium (94305). All units closed into a partially constructed defense line on high ground from vicinity 95105t to the lake at 97709 by 19:2005, having passed through heavy enemy interdictory fire on Wirtzfeld. The units were disposed: 3d Bn on the left, 2d Bn on the right, and 1st Bn in reserve, immediately behind a reserve line held by elements of 23rd Infantry. 9th Infantry passed through our new lines by 203230. (13) Elsenborn Ridge Defensive 20 December - 31 December 1944. (a) The 38th Infantry successfully broke contact on the evening of 19 December 1944 and withdrew to terrain more suitable for defense based upon Berg, Belgium. The 12th SS Panzer Division continued to oppose the regiment but it was evident that this unit did not know of our withdrawal in time to exploit the movement. Our defensive positions were occupied by darkness and the enemy apparently does not know the location of our MLR. The enemy made no attacks against the new defensive position during the period. Occasional patrols were driven off and five prisoners were captured. (b) The regiment occupied high open ground approximately 1000 yards east of Berg, Belgium. Positions were dug and constantly improved. Although the positions were visible to the enemy, they also afforded ideal fields of fire.

g. Battles

(1) Defense in the vicinity of Berg, Belgium, 1-29 January 1945: (a) Until the night of 29-30 January the enemy occupied defensive positions in the Wirtzfeld area on a line running north from Bullingen, around the western endges of Wirtzfeld, and northwest along the high ground to the vicinity of Rocherath. Several different units occupied these positions during the period. Shifting of units was believed to have been caused by the changing situations in the Ardennes salient to the southwest. Enemy infantry in these positions were of generally low quality with no plans for offensive action, being content merely to contain the shoulder of the bulge. Numerous PW's were taken by our patrols which operated in the enemy sector without too much difficulty. The enemy, on the other hand, did not seem to be inclined toward patrol action. Defenses consisted of log-covered bunkers and individual foxholes. Positions were not considered particularly strong as evidenced by the enemy's withdrawal when attack was believed imminent. Anti-tank and anti-personnel mines were used extensively by the enemy to impede the advance of our vehicles and troops. The 48th Regiment, 12th V. G. Division which was holding the sector at the beginning of the period was relieved by elements of the 1055th Regiment, 89th Division, on 2 January. The 89th Fusilier Battalion occupied the northern part of the sector the following night. These units were replaced by the 1056th Regiment on 17 January. Elements of the 991st Regiment of the 277th Division relieved the 1056th Regiment on 21 January. Several hours before the attack on 30 January the enemy withdrew from the Wirtzfeld area under cover of darkness to positions on the perimeters of Rocherath and Krinkelt. Forty-four prisoners were captured by our patrols from 1 January to 29 January 1945. (b) The terrain was conducive to defense and the regiment occupied high ground overlooking Wirtzfeld with wide fields of fire. Visibility during the period was usually poor during the day but nights were clear and cold, many with a full moon. (c) The regiment was assigned to the 2d Infantry Division for entire month. The Regimental Command Post was located at Berg, Belgium, for the entire month. Supporting and attached to the regiment were the following: Co. C, 86th Cml. Bn., 1-5 January and 29-31 January (attached) 38th F. A. Bn., 1-31 January (support) Co. C, 2d Med. Bn., 1-31 January (support) Co. C, 2d Engr. Bn., 1-7 January and 29-31 January (support) Co. L, 2d Engr. Bn., 8-31 January (support) Co. C, 612th TD Bn., 1-5 January (support) Co. B, 801st TD Bn., 5-31 January (attached) Co. A, 644th TD Bn., 29-31 January (attached) 741st Tank Bn., (less Co. B), 29-31 January (attached) The 38th Infantry Regiment continued to hold the entire 5,000 yard 2d Infantry Division front on the northeast corner of the German penetration into Belgium. The mission of the regiment was to hold the defensive line at all costs, patrol to the front, and maintain contact with adjacent units -- elements of the 99th Infantry Division on the left and 1st Infantry Division on the right. The regiment was organized with the 3rd Battalion on the left with two companies forward and one in reserve; 2d Battalion on the right with one company on outpost and two on line; and the 1st Battalion in reserve positions. Elements of the 23rd Infantry held a reserve line in rear of the 1st Battalion. Tank destroyers, both self-propelled and towed, were in position in the regimental sector, thickening anti-tank defenses provided by 57 mm. guns. Since occupying the positions 20 December 1944 the front line was wired and mined almost throughout. Troops were dug into foxholes and dugouts with overhead cover. Patrols from the forward battalions on the night of 1-2 January and 2-3 January went more than 1,000 yards to the front without contacting an enemy line of resistance, although outposts and CP's were discovered and later taken under fire. Orders were received and plans made on 2 January for three strong combat patrols, with supporting fires and armored demonstration, to make a mock attack in conjunction with other V Corps units at 030830. Initial orders were issued at 021400 at a meeting of battalion and supporting unit commanders for the 3rd Battalion to send Patrol No. 1 to an objective north of Krinkelt and Patrol No. 2 to seize and hold Wirtzfeld. The 2nd Battalion was to move Patrol No. 3 to an objective south of Krinkelt. The mission of each patrol was to bring sufficient pressure on hostile positions to force enemy counterattacks, which would be met with prepared artillery concentrations; drive in the hostile OPLR, capture prisoners and develop hostile CPs, continuing probing attacks during the day and return after dark. Co. C, 86th Cml. Bn., was ordered to screen the Rocherath-Krinkelt area with smoke. Composition of all patrols was approximately the same: 40 men, including a light machine gun section, 60 mm. mortar squad, two bazooka teams, artillery forward observers and a litter squad. The combat parties moved forward prior to 0830, at which time division artillery placed preparatory fire on suspected enemy locations. Patrol No. 1, which had received automatic and mortar fire prior to 0830 became involved in a fire fight across a draw 1,000 yards north of Wirtzfeld and dug in at that vicinity, where it remained until withdrawn at 1500. Patrol No. 2 reached the main Rd 500 yards north of the center of Wirtzfeld, forcing withdrawal of a small outpost, and it then swung south toward the village, seeking to probe a weak spot were unsuccessful and the enemy reinforced his holding force. This group was withdrawn on division order at 1430. Patrol No. 3 killed a sentry moving out, then came into a fire fight with a previously located strong point around a crossroad 1,000 yards south of Wirtzfeld. By fire and movement, this and a nearby outpost were reduced and, on order, the patrol dug in nearby. Before being withdrawn, this patrol intercepted and dispersed three counterattacking forces of 15-20 men. The third patrol took 18 prisoners, killed 10, wounded or killed at least 20 others, and destroyed three machine guns, one radio and 20 rifles, suffering only five wounded. The first patrol had no casualties but killed eight known and fifteen possible of the enemy. The second patrol killed fifteen and wounded five, with losses of one killed and one wounded. Reconnaissance patrols the evening of 4-5 January found the enemy reoccupying and strengthening the disturbed positions. A 2d Battalion patrol on the 5th took four prisoners from an outpost on Hill 477. Acting on information from the PW's, a combat patrol at 061500 captured the eight men in that outpost and then captured their six-man relief, before returning from the carefully-planned raid without firing a shot. Information obtained of the enemy CP's and MLR was used to direct neutralization fires by organic weapons, supporting artillery and 4.2 mortars. The 1st Battalion relieved the 3rd Battalion on 6 and 7 January. 1st Battalion patrols 8-9 January to the north end of Wirtzfeld contacted no enemy, but the 2nd Battalion patrol south of the town found occupied positions. Four deserters entered the lines 10 January and gave gun and OP locations. A 1st Battalion patrol penetrated Wirtzfeld from the north, staying out 10 hours the night of 11-12 January. A 2d Battalion patrol went to positions on the southwest edge of Wirtzfeld at 130400. It reached the trail on the southwest edge of the town and was taken under fire by two machine guns and several riflemen who were definitely located and on which mortar and artillery fire was placed. The evening of 11 January the Commanding General instructed the Regimental Commander to make plans for relief by the 9th Infantry on 13 January or later, in order to rest, rehabilitate, and train personnel. Complete plans were made but the relief was cancelled on the 13th due to the expansion of the division zone of responsibility. Continued patrols found Wirtzfeld to be only held by outposts. A four-man patrol from the 2d Battalion captured three prisoners on the night of the 18th during a blinding snow storm. These PW's disclosed that a new regiment had occupied the sector on the right front of the regiment. Patrolling and front line training continued until 30 January. Orders were received on 24 January for an attack in conjunction with the First Army offensive. After detailed planning and reconnaissance the date of attack was set for 30 January with the objectives of Wirtzfeld, Rocherath and Krinkelt, the towns from which the regiment had withdrawn on 19 December 1944 after holding the vital location for three days. (2) Attack on Wirtzfeld, Rocherath, and Krinkelt, Belgium, 30-31 January 1945. (a) Elements of the 989th and 991st Regiments defended these towns and were located mainly in buildings, organized into strong points. However, positions were dug around the perimeter of Rocherath and Krinkelt and our troops encountered a large volume of small arms and automatic fire from close ranges. After entering the towns the enemy continued to fight from houses in the towns during the night of 30 January. No enemy air nor armor were employed. Prior to our attack the enemy artillery was light, consisting of harassing fires of light caliber. During the attack the Germans employed heavy scattered concentrations of 8 cm. mortar fire. 224 prisoners were captured in the two towns. Wirtzfeld had been evacuated the night before by the enemy. (b) The 1st and 2d Battalions moved forward in bright moonlight at 300100 January to assault positions. New, chest-high snowdrifts slowed the progress and the battalions deployed at 0130. The majority of the enemy had withdrawn from the north-south line through Wirtzfeld and by 0415 the 1st Battalion had secured the high ground northeast of the town. The 2d Battalion crossed the line of departure at 0430 and at 0605 it had secured the high ground east and southeast of Wirtzfeld, finding only mines and booby traps in the town. The 3rd Battalion passed through the 2d Battalion at 0830 and continued the advance to the east on the right of the 1st Battalion. When advance patrols encountered resistance in Rocherath-Krinkelt, a planned 3,200 round artillery preparation was laid on the towns. Prior to that time only observed fires were used on call. The assault was a definite element of surprise to most of the defending Germans. By 1120 both assault battalions were engaged in firefights with well-emplaced enemy along the west edge of the twin towns. Although frequently halted by mines or deep snow, parts of two medium tank companies moved with the assault battalions. At 1525 Company B captured the first two houses in Rocherath, taking three machine guns and ten prisoners, and counting fifty-five dead in the immediate vicinity. This company advanced by assault fire, losing only five wounded in taking this strong point. By 1555 the 3rd Battalion had entered Krinkelt. Fierce house to house fighting continued throughout the night. Battalions infiltrated around strongly held sections during the night and the 2d Battalion followed the 3rd Battalion through Krinkelt, fighting to occupy the northern sector of Rocherath. At dawn on 31 January battalions had established contact and organized a defense line. The 1st and 3rd Battalions began to clear the towns at first light, flushing Germans out of houses and cellars. The 2d Battalion established a line of departure for the 23rd Infantry by taking an east-west line 600 yards north of Rocherath at 1240. No special weapons were used. Communications were difficult because it was almost impossible to lay wire over the deep snow. Wire was often cut by supporting tanks and trucks were used to carry supplies. Over snow weasels were valuable in laying wire when available. Radio batteries froze when exposed for any period of time. One remedy for this trouble was to carry batteries inside clothing, using them for short periods of time only. Continued moisture on antennas also reduced efficiency of radio sets. Artillery fired normal support missions. Engineers used bull dozers and tank dozers to remove snow from roads to open supply routes. Because of a lack of over-snow vehicles the infantry could only advance as fast as the routes of supply were opened. (c) Grenades were used in defensive positions as booby traps, and in clearing houses during the attack. Small blocks of TNT were used to blast holes in the frozen ground to facilitate digging shelters.

Light tanks, fitted with pintles for one-ton trailers, were used in hauling supplies to forward positions until roads were cleared. It was found that these tanks could negotiate between four and five feet of snow and at the same time were protected from artillery and small arms fire. Blanket rolls, ammunition and hot food were carried to front line rifle companies in this manner. Wounded were evacuated by over snow weasels to collecting points located as far forward as cleared roads permitted. Forward aid stations were established in buildings and rooms heated for the treatment of wounded to prevent patients from the effects of shock.

(3) Attack on and active defense near Hellenthal, Germany, 5-22 February 1945: (a) Enemy contact was made when an attack was launched on Hellenthal on the morning of 5 February. Elements of the 277th Infantry Division which occupied the town of Hellenthal as well as high ground north of the town offered heavy resistance with small arms, artillery and mortar fire. The enemy was driven back into the town during the morning but resisted our entry with the exception of one platoon which succeeded in reaching houses in the northwest section of town. Terrain features consisting of steep banks with open creeks on the north side of town afforded the enemy excellent fields of fire from positions in houses. During the night of 5 February the enemy withdrew from the east part of the town leaving a small delaying force which was cleared out on February 6th. A total of 125 PW's were taken during the Hellenthal operation. The regiment remained in a defensive position through February 21 and was opposed during this time by elements of the 277th Division and the 1076th Security Battalion. Enemy held a line Dickerscheid-Hill 063102-Krinzengen-Bungenthal-Oberheresten. On February 20 elements of the regiment occupying the west part of Hill 585 received considerable small arms and mortar fire from an enemy outpost on the same hill. The following morning this enemy outpost consisting of eight men was captured. The enemy immediately counterattacked with a force of 35 men. The attack was repulsed with 14 more captured and 12 killed. Among those killed was a Major Duchwitz, C.O. of the 1076th Security Battalion. The enemy, with infrequent patrols, made some attempt to locate our positions but with slight success as evidenced by general inaccuracy of harassing fires. Chief obstacle encountered during our attack on Hellenthal was terrain. During the month of February, 173 prisoners were taken. All PW's were from elements of the 277th Division. (b) The town of Hellenthal is located in a valley surrounded by high ground on all sides. The town could not successfully be taken without first taking this highground, denying observation into the town itself. A small stream forming a natural tank obstacle blocked vehicular traffic from entrance from the north. (c) The following units were attached or in support for the operation: Co. C, 741st Tank Bn., 4-8 February 1945 (attached) Co. C, 741st Tank Bn., 6-21 February 1945 (attached) Co. C, 612th TD Bn., 4-7 February 1945 (attached) Co. D, 86th Cml. Bn. 4-16 February 1945 (attached and supporting) Co. C, 612 TD Bn., 8-22 February 1945 (supporting) 38th F.A. Bn., 4-21 February 1945 (supporting) Co. C, 2d Engr. Bn., 4-21 February 1945 (supporting) At 041004 the Regimental Commander was ordered to make reconnaissance and draw up plans to attack at dawn, 5 February, to capture Hellenthal, Germany, in the zone of the 1st Infantry Division and XVIII Corps. Under verbal orders, later confirmed by a letter of instructions, the regiment was given these missions: ((1)) Move by motor during darkness 4-5 February 1945 to assembly area in rear of LD. ((2)) Attack through elements of 23rd Infantry at 050330 February 1945. Secure, organize and defend objective -- Hellenthal and high ground to the south. ((3)) Gain and maintain contact with 23rd Infantry on left and 395th infantry on right. After reconnaissance, an oral order was issued at 1745. 2d Battalion was to advance, seizing high ground NE of Hellenthal, the east end of town, and high ground south and southeast of town. 3rd Battalion, on the right, was to advance down the Hellenthal road, clear the west end of town and occupy the high ground to the southwest. 1st Battalion, in reserve, was to move on order. Cannon Company displaced under cover of darkness to west of Harperscheid. Anti-tank Company organized 18 bazooka teams for movement with Co. C, 612th TD Bn. Co. C, 741st Tank Bn. was attached to 3rd Battalion for movements. 2d Battalion, on trucks, closed into a dismount area at 050045 hours and 3rd Battalion closed into that area, 1,000 yards west of Schoneseiffen at 050125 hours. 2d Battalion crossed the LD at 0300. By 0500, both battalions were 1,000 yards north of town, having made no hits in their movement through the woods in the clouded night. By 0600 the 3rd Battalion had entered houses north of the town. The 2d Battalion reached houses by 0645. Both battalions reached the north branch of the Olef River before dawn, 3rd Battalion having by-passed several 17 prisoners. After daylight enemy outposts by-passed in the night move were mopped up. By 0715 both battalions came under small arms, machine gun and mortar fire from Hellenthal and the ground south of town, and artillery fire, much of it, from behind a second line of the Siegfried defenses 1,500 yards east. This fire, intense and observed, continued to rake the north bank of the stream and the open approaches throughout the day, greatly hindering movement, supply and evacuation. Leading elements of both battalions crossed the stream in mid-morning but found their positions untenable. Efforts to move attached tanks down to the stream were frustrated by marshy ground and enemy mines. Efforts to reinforce enemy holding the town were broken up by our artillery between 1030 and 1100. By noon Company K had one platoon into the northwest corner of town where it was cut off by fire from a pillbox. A co-ordinated assault at 1430 following a 10-minute artillery preparation failed to obtain more than a toehold in Hellenthal.

Company L cleared out a factory and houses west of the town. By 1700 elements of Company E across the stream had been forced to withdraw by enemy tank-infantry action. At 1850 Company L had fought forward and contacted a platoon cut off in the town. At a meeting of regimental and battalion commanders at 1945, plans were formulated to establish a bridgehead and clear the west end of town during the night. The 3rd Battalion crossed the stream at 2100 and came up against fire from a pillbox, AT gun and infantry. These were captured by 060330 February. Engineers worked through the night, clearing a road block and minefield but were unable to construct a bridge for armor. An on-foot battalion was clearing out the south extension of town during the morning. At 1100 Company F sent a combat patrol into the part of Hellenthal extending east to clean up scattered resistance and captured 19 more enemy, bringing the PW count to 128 for the operation. East of the town, the patrol received enemy artillery fire. During the early night, 3rd Battalion occupied the east end of town. 1st Battalion occupied positions of 2d Battalion, 23rd Infantry, on the 6th and relieved them by 071330 February 1945. G, I and 2d Battalion Headquarters Company moved back to buildings in Schoneseiffen, a Company remaining in the factory area west of Hellenthal. Also on the 7th the 3rd Battalion consolidated positions in the town with Company F at the center, Company I extending to the south and Company L to the east. Engineers added a light weight bridge to the three foot bridges. A 3rd Battalion patrol, leaving at 071530, found enemy on Hill 525 overlooking the town from the southeast, and reconnoitered enemy trenches and emplacements. About 090330, a second platoon from Company I passed through the other patrol and seized the dominating hill, capturing eight PW's. At dawn they repulsed an enemy counterattack, taking another 14 prisoners. Company G relieved Company F on 9 February, attached to 1st Battalion in its defensive sector. Patrols from the 1st Battalion on the 9th and 10th went east to the Olef River to observe activity in the heavily fortified area east of Blumenthal. An enemy patrol approached Company L on the night of 10 February but retired after finding our trip flares. On the night of the 11th, Company L intercepted enemy patrols converging on the wave length of the company's 536 and used the enemy runner to place accurate mortar fire on the patrols. From the 10th to 13th small AT minefields were laid to block vital approaches to the area. At about 131400 February a platoon of enemy approached Company B and was dispersed by mortar and artillery, and a smaller group was engaged by a Company A patrol, while L Company received long range MG fire and mortar fire in an apparent futile attempt to make the regiment disclose its dispositions and defensive fires. Similar attempts were made on the 14th, 15th and 16th.

The Regimental Commander was given bryerbal instructions on 17 February to prepare for a relief by a CP of the 28th Infantry Division, and to move the 38th Infantry to bivouac area in vicinity of 9915. The wooded area was reconnoitered the 17th and construction of log cabins and mine clearance with engineer aid was begun. A billeting detail from the 112th infantry visited the regimental area 18 February. Companies F and H moved to the bivouac area 19 February. The regimental C.O. and staff, 112th Infantry, arrived 20 February and details for the relief were completed. During the 20th, supporting TD's scored 50 hits out of 57 rounds placed on houses in Dorningen after observing personnel activity there. Cannon Company did experimental firing with captured 28 cm. rockets. With the relief two-thirds completed, the C.O. 112th Infantry assumed responsibility for the sector of 38th Infantry at 2005 on 21 February. 3rd Battalion cleared the area at 2010 and 1st Battalion cleared at 2100, closing into their new assembly areas at 2200 and 2305 respectively.

(4) Attack on Gemund, Germany. (a) The month opened with 38th Infantry in reserve northeast of Hofen, Germany, concluding a program of rest, rehabilitation, orientation, small unit training and physical conditioning, and alerted for movement. At 011100 March the Regiment was attached, with its normal attachments, to Task Force "Roeder" under command of Brigadier Division Commander. Mission of the Task Force was to cross the Rohr River on a bridge to be constructed by 78th Infantry Division at Heimbach, pass through elements of the 311th Infantry which was to secure ground south of there on the Armeter Peninsula, and to continue the attack to the south, taking the Gemund stronghold of the Siegfried Line in an envelopment and securing a bridgehead in that area for 2d Infantry Division. Reconnaissance of assembly areas was made and oral instructions given to all units on the 1st. (b) Orders for the movement and attack were issued at a meeting of battalion, special unit and attached unit C.O.'s 021030. Plan of Action: 1st Battalion on the right and 2d Battalion on the left to move south on Gemund; 1st Battalion to seize high ground north and west of the town and establish contact across the Urft river with 23rd Infantry; 2d Battalion to seize high ground east of town and block to the east while 3rd Battalion passed behind to seize high ground to the southeast of Gemund and 3rd Battalion, 9th Infantry, clear Gemund proper. 1st and 2d Battalions, Cannon Company, Co. C of 2d Engineers, one platoon of tanks and attachments of TD's began movement at 081415 to assembly areas east of Schmidt, completing the truck movement by 1500. An advance command group moved to Klagenfeld, 100278, at the same time. The remainder of the TF group, including the CP, closed in at 050530, co-incidental with a truck movement of the remainder of the TF to assembly areas east of Schmidt. Movement of the TF began across the Heimbach bridge at 1030, one hour after its completion, and the entire TF had crossed by 1545. Halting briefly in the vicinity Kloster Marienwald (11282) to co-ordinate movement, 1st and 2d Battalions attacked abreast at 1430 and 1435 respectively. First contact with the enemy was made by 2d Battalion within an hour in the vicinity of Wolfgarten I (111333) where a group of enemy had dug out in and around the house. Initial resistance was light as the enemy was well aware of our intentions. The terrain was heavily wooded with few open areas and firebreaks. About 5 inches of snow covered the ground. (c) After passing through the 9th Infantry, the 1st Bn on the left and 2d Bn on the right attacked along a road to the north east from Wolfgarten. Fighting was heavy and the enemy was well emplaced in dugouts in the woods. Enemy artillery caused considerable casualties since tree bursts were frequent. The 3d Bn had been detached to the 9th Infantry and moved forward to the vicinity of the cross roads preparatory to following the 1st and 2d Bns toward their objective. At this point word was received of the German counteroffensive and all units were instructed to hold up and organize a perimeter defense.

38th Infantry 1944