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Experience the harrowing reality of D-Day through authentic 1st Infantry Division after action reports from June 6, 1944. These declassified military documents reveal the brutal truth behind Omaha Beach—where planned support failed, DD tanks sank immediately, and assault companies faced withering enemy fire without air cover. Witness firsthand accounts of heroism, chaos, and sacrifice that turned the tide of World War II.
Section on the left, the 5th on the right, and the 3rd to the front center, moved up a hill on the left flank. Three of an enemy MG crew were captured, one German was killed, and the remainder of the enemy withdrew to safety of surrounding hedge rows.
On the 1st objective Lt Giles, Company M joined Company K and assumed command. The 3rd Section, under Lt Silver, was given a mission of clearing a path through a minefield, and contacting, via patrol, Companies I or L. About midway across open terrain through which they were advancing they came under enemy MG and sniper fire and were pinned down.
Lts Giles, Silver, Buck and 3 riflemen advanced to the head of the company and 500 yards ahead contacted elements of Company L. The remainder joined and advanced with Company L to LE and HAMEAU where the Battalion was reorganized.
In setting up defensive positions for the night, Lt Silver and the 3rd Section established two road blocks on the main road leading into LE Gd HAMEAU; Lt Stumbaugh and the 2nd Section rounded up inhabitants of the village and placed them under guard; the 1st, 4th, and 5th Sections sent out patrols to LA VALLEE during the night but no enemy was contacted.
Company K suffered 51 casualties at the end of D-day, most of them on the beach.
Company H scheduled to land on EASY RED at H+40 minutes landed at H+57 because of time taken out to contact Navy Control boat to obtain the exact direction. At 0727 hours the craft were under enemy fire and casualties mounted. The Company landed too far to the left. Tanks on the beach to their right were not giving them support. With the tide rising, many wounded were drowned. Equipment was lost. All radios were lost or destroyed by gun fire.
Company H found the situation existing on the beach critical, set up a MG on the left and proceeded to fire on enemy pillboxes on their left flank. Heavy enemy mortar fire proved ineffective. An enemy MG on the left, scheduled to have been liquidated by the 3rd Battalion, continued to pin down Company H. Mines never ceased exploding in their vicinity which was evidence of carefully-laid time-mines.
Company H finally pushed through Exit E-1, set up mortars near ruined houses in the Company CP vicinity, approximately 800 yards from the beach and about 40 yards from COLLEVILLE-SUR-MER.
MG platoons gave direct support to rifle companies. Company H operated in the face of heavy enemy artillery, MG, and sniper fire, eliminating enemy MG nests with mortars.
Total casualties numbered 28 men of Company H.
Company M scheduled to land on FOX GREEN at H+40 minutes landed at H+50 (0730) and found the beach situation impossible to approach the beach in pre-arranged orders. Despite enemy MG, sniper, and artillery fire, Company M reached the beach with few casualties. The officers attempted to reorganize their sections on the beach which was by this time crowded with men from the Infantry, Engineers and Artillery. The 1st Section under Lt LAZO effectively engaged.
PRELUDE TO THE INVASION OF FRANCE
The big picture was the invasion of France. The British 2nd Army on the left, the American V Corps in the center and the American VII Corps on the right would land simultaneously at H-hour, D-day on the coast of France with the mission of establishing a beachhead on the continent from which further offensive operations could be developed.
The 11th Amphibious Force would provide escort, clear underwater mine fields and obstacles off shore, protect the transport area, and would assist landing with gunfire, both prearranged and on call.
The 9th Air Force would support the attack by prearranged bombing missions prior to H-hour and by missions on call after H-hour.
The 1st U.S. Infantry Division (-26th CT) (plus 116th CT), reinforced, would land on Beach OMAHA at H-hour on D-day with two RCT's abreast, 116th CT on the right; 16th CT on the left; reduce the beach defense in its Zone of Action and proceed with all possible speed to D-day Phase Line, seize and secure it prior to two hours before dark on D-Day; cover the landing of the remainder of V Corps landing on Beach OMAHA, and be prepared to participate in the extension of the beachhead to the South and Southwest.
The general plan of artillery support would be the 7th FA Battalion supporting advance of 2nd and 1st Battalions, 16th Infantry and would be prepared to fire in the sector of the 3rd Battalion.
The 62nd Armored FA Battalion S/P, initially in direct support of the 3rd Battalion, would be prepared to reinforce the fires of the 7th FA Battalion.
The 62nd Armored FA Battalion S/F would take position in boat lanes about 800 yards in rear of leading wave; it would commence firing at about H-30, and fire at H-5 to targets on high ground.
Forward observers were to land with assault companies and obtain suitable observation to fulfill their missions. The 7th FA Battalion would be in the vicinity of the 16th Infantry CP.
The tentative naval gunfire support of the initial assault and the subsequent advance inland of the 1st US Infantry Division would consist of the protection of shipping from enemy aircraft, surface forces and submarines, and the support by bombardment of the initial assault. During the approach to the beaches the Navy would furnish area fire on and in rear of beaches; direct fire on the strong points and beach defense; and after landing would fire on flanks and rear areas.
Tentative number of Naval support strength would be the battleship ARKANSAS, three cruisers, the BELLONA, BLACK PRINCE and GLASGOW; ten destroyers (8 fleet type, 2 Hunt type); and fire support craft consisting of 5 LCG(L); 9 LCT(R); 16 LCT(HE); 2 LCT(CB); and 9 LCT(5).
General naval target designation would be guided by the Lambert Grid.
Smoke signals of colors would be designated later, to be used to lift naval gun fire in case of radio failure. Its meaning "cease firing, gunfire falling too close to friendly troops."
The 9th US Air Force, according to the air support plan, would give continuous cover over beaches and shipping, escort for airborne forces, bombers, fighter-bombers, reconnaissance aircraft, smoke-laying aircraft; delay of enemy reserves, and close support for landings. Tentative plan was for the night heavy bomber force to operate between H-5 hours and H-110 minutes on Battery No. 1, POINTE DU HOC (638639), with medium bomber force between H-80 and H-40 on the same battery and also on No. 5, MAISY (533918). Day heavy bomber force; H-25 to H-hour on strong points commanding beach. Tentative targets (537926), (648916), (666909), and (688895). Day medium bomber force; H-25 to H-hour beach lanes in wire and minefield. Tentative location (649916), (677901), (688895), and (681898), (665907). Day fighter-bomber force; H-25 to H-hour on strong points commanding beaches. Tentative targets: (653912), (664908), (667906), and (678897).
In one of the final phases pre-landing of the assault waves, 2 LCT(R) would take position in boat lanes and deliver fire approximately H-3 minutes on assigned targets (strong points) when leading wave is approximately 500 yards from shore. As soon as the rockets have been fired, the crafts would clear boat lanes. Six would reload and stand by. Assignments and targets would be:
3 craft on COLLEVILLE, on line between 702891 and 685095; 1 craft on area at 678896; 2 craft on LES MOULINS on line between 672901 and 662907; 2 craft on VIERVILLE SUR MER on line between 657910 and 645918; 1 craft on area at 637928.
The prime beach and underwater obstacles that would confront us: German steel hedgehogs, about 5 feet in height. German steel tetrahedra, about 5 feet in height. Upright anti-vehicle obstacles topped with Teller mines. Belgian "Element C" obstacles, height 7'7" - width 8'5". Anti-personnel mines.
The Signal Communication Plan for the advance CP was: CT 16 to hand carry 2 SCR 284's, one for use in Regimental Command Net, one for use in Division Command Net. The Advance CP would install telephone line inland from amphibious Engineer Battalion CP. This line, W-110 wire, would be left physically in the hands of a signalman from the Engineer Battalion. The line would be maintained by relay repairments until the Division CP could install a direct line to the Regimental CP. The Advance CP would hand-carry 3 SCR 609's, one for use in the Regimental Command Net, one for use in the Division Command Net, and one for spare. The advance CP would be accompanied by small signal detachment from the Amphibious Engineer Battalion which would set up a Battalion switchboard, connect infantry regiment telephone lines, and immediately start laying lateral lines to adjacent engineer battalion and lines to its companies.
The rear CP CT 16 would operate 2 SCR 609's, one in the Regimental R/T Command Net, and one in the Division R/T Command Net. It would operate 1 SCR 300 in the Regimental Command Net. The set would be in operation, received, tuned in and ready to transmit from the time the assault wave reached the beach. Operation would then be continuous whether the radio was on the move or not.
Every unit of the Battalions and Special Units would hand carry ashore all its essential communication equipment. No equipment needed initially on shore would be left loaded on vehicles. This applied to Amphibious Engineer Battalion, Engineer Battalion and Infantry Regimental switchboards, radios, telephones, wire, message center, cipher devices, reel units, etc.
For the 16th Infantry, the Regimental Communication Platoon would lay W-110 wire line inland from the CP of the 37th Amphibious Engineer Shore Battalion to the 16th Infantry CP.
The 3rd BLT of the 16th CT would hand carry all W-130 wire and telephones authorized in the TE ashore. In addition, they would hand carry a minimum of 4½ miles of W-110 wire to be used to lay line inland from the Amphibious Engineer Shore Company CP.
The 2nd BLT of the 16th CT would hand carry all W-130 wire and telephones authorized in the TE ashore. The 1st BLT would do likewise. Both, like the 3rd BLT would lay line inland from the Amphibious Engineer Shore Company.
The Regimental Communication Officer of the 16th CT would coordinate all communications between and with units attached to the 16th Infantry for tactical employment.
For visual communication blinker and flag signals would be used to identify beaches and for boat control by joint assault signal companies.
Troops of the 16th CT included:
Hq & Hq Co, 16th Infantry; A-T Co, 16th Infantry; Serv Co, 16th Infantry; Med Det, 16th Infantry (Less Bn Med Section); Air Support Party; Det, 1st Sig Company; PW Team; Language Interp Team; CIC Det and NSFCP; 1st Engr Bn (Less Co A & B and 1 platoon of Co C); 37th Engineer Bn (Less Companies AB and C); 4 Surgical Teams; 3 Auxiliary Surgical Teams; 2 Prov AAA AW(S/F); 1 Platoon, 606th QM Company (Gr); Det, 320th Barrage Ballon Bn (VLA); 197th AAA Bn AW(S/F); 7th Field Artillery Bn; 62nd Armd Field Artillery Bn Tankdozers; 741st Tank Bn (DD) (Less Company B and C); Company A, 1st Med Bn; Press Photographer and News Correspondent; Det L, 165th Sig Photo Company; Liaison Party, 231st Brigade, 50th Northumbrian Division; Liaison Party, 1st U S Infantry Division; Engineer Special Task Force; Civil Affairs, and Det, 5th ESB; 20th Engineer Bn (Less Company A).
The general plan was for the 16th CT, (Reinforced) to land on Beach OMAHA, at Fox Green and Easy Red, at H-hour, D-day with the 2nd and 3rd BLT's abreast; the 4th BLT to the right, the 1st BLT in reserve. Objective of the 16th CT would be to reduce the beach defenses in the Regimental Zone of Action and move with all possible speed to secure and occupy objectives; to gain and maintain contact with the 116th CT on the right and the British 50th Division on the left; to cover the landing of the remainder of the 1st US Infantry Division; to patrol to HUPPAIN, TOUR EN BESSIN, and TREVIERES; and to be prepared to continue the attack to the D+1 Phase Line on the morning of D+1.
The 1st Battalion Landing Team of the 16th CT consisted of:
1st Battalion, 16th Infantry; Battalion Service Section, 16th Infantry; Battalion Medical Section, 16th Infantry; Company A, 1 Platoon, 20th Engineer (C) Battalion; Company C, 37th Engineer (C) Battalion; 5th Engineer Shore Brigade; 1 Platoon, Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion; Cannon Company, 16th Infantry; Naval Shore Fire Control Party.
The 2nd Battalion Landing Team of the 16th CT consisted of:
2nd Battalion, 16th Infantry; Battalion Service Section, 16th Infantry; Battalion Medical Section, 16th Infantry; Company B, 37th Engineer (C) Battalion; 5th Engineer Shore Brigade; Company A, 81st Chemical Weapons Battalion (Motorized); Company B, 741st Tank Battalion (DD); Company A, 1st Engineer (C) Battalion (Less 1 Platoon); Naval Shore Fire Control Party.
The 3rd Battalion Landing Team of the 16th CT consisted of:
3rd Battalion, 16th Infantry; Battalion Service Section, 16th Infantry; Battalion Medical Section, 16th Infantry; Company A, 37th Engineer (C) Battalion; 5th Engineer Shore Brigade; Company C, 81st Chemical Weapons Battalion (Motorized); Company C, 741st Tank Battalion (DD); Company A, 20th Engineer (C) Battalion (Less 1 Platoon); Naval Shore Fire Control Party.
The massive preparation for invasion thundered into a solid pattern. Each of the three Battalion Landing Teams had a definite objective, and each objective would be hotly defended.
The plan for the 2nd BLT of the 16th CT was to land on Beach OMAHA, Easy Red, at H hour on D day and to reduce the beach defenses in its Zone of Action; capture COLLEVILLE-SUR-MER, seize and hold assigned objectives; dig in and establish all around defensive positions and be prepared to augment the defense by use of DD Tanks and elements of the Engineer Special Brigade moving into well-prepared positions between company strong points; be prepared to repel enemy counterattacks; cover landing of remainder of 1st U. S. Infantry Division and maintain contact with the 116th CT on the right and with the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry on the south when they move into position, and with the 3rd Battalion, 16th Infantry on the left; establish road blocks as indicated and to patrol to TREVIERES; be prepared to continue the attack to the D+1 Phase Line on the Regimental Order.
The plan for the 3rd BLT of the 16th CT was to land on Beach OMAHA, Fox Green, at H hour on D day and reduce beach defenses in its Zone of Action, turn east and reduce beach defenses between Eastern Limit of Beach OMAHA, Fox Green, and the 1st U. S. Infantry Division boundary; to capture LE GRANDE HAMEAU, LA VALLEE and STE HONORINE-DES-PERTES and to seize and hold the objectives as indicated; to dig in and establish all around defensive positions; be prepared to repel enemy counterattacks; to neutralize and be prepared on orders from Headquarters to assist in the capture of PONT-EN-BESSIN with the battalion reinforced; gain and maintain contact with the British 50th Division on the left, the 26th CT on the South, and the 16th Battalion, 16th Infantry on the right; to establish road blocks; to patrol to HUPPAIN and TOUR-EN-BESSIN; to be prepared to continue the attack.
The plan for the 1st BLT of the 16th CT, initially in reserve, was to land on Beach OMAHA, Easy Red, and pass through the 2nd BLT of the 16th CT as rapidly as possible, capture FORMIGNY and SURRAIN and seize and establish all around defensive positions; to be prepared to repel enemy counterattacks; to be prepared to cover the valley leading to BAYEUX with fire; to gain and maintain contact with the 116th CT on the right, the 18th CT on the left when they move into position, and the 2nd Battalion, 16th Infantry; to secure bridges south and southwest of TREVIERES where minimum personnel would be used and bridges would be prepared for demolition; to establish road blocks; to patrol the BAYEAUX-STE LO Road and to be prepared to continue the attack.
The 2nd BLT's Reconnaissance and Observation missions were to reconnoiter beach exit roads along the RUGET River to ST LAURENT and report prepared defenses, condition of roads, minefields and road works; to reconnoiter the ST LAURENT-FORMIGNY-TREVIERS road to the high ground north of TREVIERES and report the strength and location of enemy troops encountered, prepared enemy defenses, minefields, road blocks and other obstacles; to reconnoiter COLLEVILLE and the ridge south of COLLEVILLE, report the strength and location of enemy units encountered, prepared enemy defenses along the ETREHAM-RUSSY, BELLE-FONTAINE-MOSLES and SURRAIN-COLLEVILLE Roads. After the seizure of objectives on the high ground north of the AURE River, reconnoiter the MOSLES-BEAUMONT Road and the ridge north of BEAUMONT and report the strength and locations of enemy units encountered, prepared enemy defenses, minefields, enemy movements south of the TORTONNE river, and to establish an OP in the vicinity of (702863).
The 3rd BLT's Reconnaissance and Observation missions were to reconnoiter beach exit roads to CABOURG and COLLEVILLE and to report prepared enemy defenses, condition of roads, minefields, and road blocks; to reconnoiter the villages of CABOURG, LE GRANDE HAMEAU and STE HONORINE, and to report demolitions preventing traffic circulation in this area; to reconnoiter the ground west of HUPPAIN and CABOURG and report movements along the BAYEUX-PONT-EN-BESSIN, VAUCRILLES-ETREHAM and BAYEUX-MOSLES Roads; to reconnoiter the area where the AURE River flows underground southeast of MT CAUVIN and report whether it is suitable for vehicle or tank crossing; to reconnoiter the MOSLES-TOUR-EN-BESSIN-VAUCELLES Road, report condition of bridge over the DROME at VAUCELLES, and enemy movements over the BAYEUX-VAUCELLES Road; to establish a Battalion OP in the vicinity of (736860) with the principal mission of observing to east and northeast.
The 1st BLT's Reconnaissance and Observation missions were to reconnoiter TREVIERES and the crossing over the AURE River in the vicinity of L'ETARD and TREVIERES and the TREVIERES-RUBERCY and TREVIERES-BRICQUEVILLE Roads; to report conditions of bridges, possible fords for vehicles, demolitions, enemy positions in the vicinity of TREVIERES and the first contact with the enemy south of the AURE River.
The I & R Platoon was to have one six-man patrol move directly to the vicinity of MT CAUVIN (735853) and establish an OP and report all enemy installations and movements observed enroute to and after establishing the OP. This was to be in the 3rd Battalion area.
Another six-man patrol was to move directly to the vicinity of (637856) and establish an OP and report all enemy installations and movements observed enroute to and after establishing the OP. This was to be in the 1st Battalion area.
The most favorable observation from the attacker's standpoint would be found on MT CAUVIN and on the high ground to the north of TREVIERES, for these two vantage points would give good observation of the main routes of approach which would have to be used by the defending forces when they would launch their counterattacks.
The Military Aspects of the Terrain showed that the sea approaches to the ASSAULT BEACH would be clear, containing no obstacles to navigation; that there were exposed anchorages in depths of 36 feet, 3/4 mile offshore from any point along the coast. High ground at GRANDCAMP-LES-BAINS and STE HONORINE-DES-PERTES commanded this anchorage.
The gradient from the back of Beach OMAHA (Assault Beach 639894 to 638890) to the high water level varied between 1/10 - 1/20. From the high water line to the low water line the gradient varied between 1/55 and 1/70; it was generally flattened out seaward from the low water mark. The beach was of firm sand below HWL and of coarse shingles above this line to the back of the beach. Beach roadway expedients would be necessary above HWL.
The beach was 7,900 yards long; runnels existed sporadically never more than 2½ feet deep, promising difficulty at certain stages of the tide at various points on the beach. The landing of LCTs and smaller crafts could begin 5 hours before HW and continue to about 5 hours after HW. LSTs would have to be dried out for unloading as gradients would not permit crafts to approach shore close enough for vehicular wading. The distance from the back of the beach to HW averaged 25 yards. The eastern portion of the beach was backed by a low grassy bank 4 to 6 feet high, slope 1:4. The remaining portion of the beach had a rough stone seawall 6 to 12 feet high, slope 1:1 to 1:2. It was possible that at HW with an onshore wind, the sea wall might be awash.
The cliffs between VIERVILLE and POINTE-DE-LA-PERCEE were not scaleable without apparatus, thus the portion of the beach was reduced to 5,000 yards.
Since the beach was slightly concave, the heights on either end commanded its entire length, and considerable sections would be subjected to observed fire from the high ground immediately to the rear.
Observation would favor the defender. Fields of fire for the attacker would be poor in the early stages of the advance for weapons of all types. The only cover and concealment on the beach would be provided by the seawall, the groynes and the cliffs.
The exits of the 16th CT would be E3, a ten-foot tarmac road running from the back of the beach to COLLEVILLE and E1 leading to ST LAURENT. The exits were narrow, winding, but adequate. About 100 yards of roadway would be necessary over the dune sand between the beach and the road. Exit F1 was a sandy track, not more than 6 feet wide, leading from the beach over rising ground to join a rough road, 8 feet wide, leading to COLLEVILLE.
Once off the beach, observation and fields of fire would be limited because of the earth hedges and trees which lined the borders of the numerous small cultivated fields. The roads in the area, generally sunken and lined with thick, substantial, hedges, interspersed with rows of trees standing 15 to 20 feet high, would limit fields of fire. Small arms and machine guns would be limited to short ranges.
The cliffs overlooking the beach must be cleared of the enemy for the assault troops would be subjected to observed fire from both flanks.
The rapid rise and fall of the tide and the strong tidal current will make it difficult for the enemy to maintain underwater obstacles on Beach OMAHA. The width of the beach at low tide would present difficulties in the sighting of underwater obstacles preventing landing at various stages of the tide. The shingle strip along Beach OMAHA would be a possible obstacle to movement of M/T and tanks. The concave shape of the beach would permit grazing fire by flat trajectory weapons sited anywhere along the beach or on the flat strip directly to the rear.
The ENEMY to be encountered in the assault was the 716th Infantry Division (no combat experience) with headquarters at CAEN, with 30% of personnel reported to be Poles and not more than 50% Germans. Their equipment included British, French and Polish weapons. The division was composed of the 726th Infantry Regiment, holding the coast from the mouth of the DOUVE to LONGUES; and the 726th Infantry Regiment, holding the coast from ARROMANCHES to the ORNE. There was an indication that a third Infantry Regiment might have been added, location unknown to date, composed of Georgians under German officers and NCOs. The possible third regiment of the 716th Infantry Division might have elements in the BAYEUX-ISIGNY area. The Division's artillery was the 656th Regiment, probably composed of 3 battalions. A few Russians in German uniforms were reported at TREVIERES and FORMIGNY. At CARENTAN, according to reports, was the headquarters of an Infantry Regiment which might be part of the 243rd Infantry Division, reported at LA HAYE DU PUITS. Also at CARENTAN was reported the German Naval Battalion and a battery of two 280 mm railway guns, range 40,000 yards.
Mobile units in the CHERBOURG-COUTANCES area were believed to be elements of SCHNELLE BRIGADE 30. This mobile brigade was a brigade staff formed to control a number of SCHNELLE ABTERLUNGEN (mobile battalions) belonging to GHQ pool. It was reported that SCHNELLE BRIGADE 30 had its headquarters at COUTANCES: that it controlled 3 battalions, the 517th Mobile Battalion at ST LO, a battalion at COUTANCES and another one at CERENCES. It was reported that each mobile battalion contained bicyclists, motorcyclists, self-propelled anti-tank guns, armored reconnaissance vehicles and possibly cavalry.
The defense of northern France between the LOIRE and the FRANCO-BELGIAN frontier was based on a firm coastal defense by static coastal divisions supported by a Counterattack force of armored, motorized, and infantry divisions. The principle of the defense apparently didn't envisage that the coastal defense divisions operating outside their own areas in the initial phases of the invasion. The armored, motorized or infantry divisions in the counterattacks may be expected, however, to strike against Allied assault units with maximum speed and force.
The mobile counterattack divisions, in NW France, that might be committed as divisions in the assault area were: the SS Panzer Division HITLER JUGEND; the 21st Panzer Division; the 12th Panzer Division; the 352nd Infantry Division; The SS Panzer Gren Division GOETZ VON BERLICHINGEN; the 273rd Panzer Tr Division; the SS Panzer Division DAS REICH; and the 3rd Parachute Division.
It was estimated that the enemy had enough aircraft available to make 1500 sorties over the entire NEPTUNE area on D day, 150 of which could be fighter bomber missions against the beaches, 100 of which could be long-range bomber missions against the beaches, and 250 of which could be long-range bomber missions against shipping. The balance could be fighter cover or sweeps.
Known enemy defenses were reinforced infantry positions guarding exits from the beaches. Strongpoints consisted of pillboxes, concrete personnel shelters and ordinary field emplacements. Some tank turrets mounted on concrete structures have been reported. In addition to heavy weapons such as AT guns and machine guns and mortars, many strongpoints contained light guns, AT rifles and AA guns, mounted either in open emplacements or in concrete casements. Older type pillboxes, personnel shelters and casements were 3 feet thick, the newer type six feet, six inches thick. Anti-tank ditches had been constructed across most of the important beach exits. Nearly all strongpoints were extensively wired and mined.
Enemy capabilities: They might defend the assault beach with a battalion of the 726th Infantry Regiment. They might use counter-attacking elements of company size from the 726th Infantry Regiment. The enemy might be strongly supported by air attack, artillery and rocket weapons. At any time after the beach crust of defenses had been breached, the enemy might counterattack with battalion size forces - a battalion from TREVIERS north against the 16th RCT and a battalion from BAYEUX west against the 16th RCT. A battalion of tanks and possibly a battalion of PGs from the 12th Panzer Division might be used to counterattack the 16th RCT from BAYEUX before noon on D day.
At any time after noon of D day, the enemy might counterattack in the TREVIERS-ETREHAM area with one regiment from the 352nd Infantry Division. During the night of D day to D+1, the enemy might use elements of one regiment from the 352nd Infantry Division to infiltrate the 16th CT's position in the TREVIERS-ETREHAM area. During the night of D day to D+1 the enemy might drop parachute troops anywhere within the beachhead to disorganize the area preparatory to a dawn counterattack.
Although night infiltrations in strength were not normal German tactics, the situation that might exist on the night following D day would be highly suitable for such tactics. There would be available elements of the 352 Infantry Division which could infiltrate in the general TREVIERES-ETREHAM area.
The enemy morale, it was reported, was not good. Their equipment was generally second rate. Of the civil population, the Normans had a political record of autonomism to strong authority. At present their dislikes were directed against the Germans and Vichy. Thousands of Normans from CALVADOS had been evacuated by the Germans in anticipation of invasion. Workers were forced to go to Germany. Civilian residents in the vicinity of Beach OMAHA were reported to have been removed. It is believed that a great majority of the population would do its best to impede German resistance in case of invasion.
In conclusion, the 16th CT was to be supported by air and sea fire. At H-5 minutes, the DD tanks were to provide cover for assault troops. Air and sea fire, in addition to tank and rocket guns, were to wipe out known enemy strongpoints overlooking the assault beach. Latest G2 was that the enemy might defend Beach OMAHA using approximately a battalion of the 726th Infantry Regiment. Governing itself cautiously, the 16th CT expected opposition not only from one battalion, but from the 726th Infantry Regiment.
This was the landing diagram for the invasion of Normandy by the 16th CT:
FOX GREEN EASY RED H-5 Min 16 DD tanks Co C, 741st Tank Bn 16 DD tanks Co B, 741st Tank Bn H hour Co A, 741st Tank Bn w/Tank Dozers Co A, 741st Tank Bn w/Tank dozers H+1 Min Co I and Co L, 16th Inf Co F and Co E, 16th Inf H+3 Min Spec Engr Task Force Spec Engr Task Force H+30 Min Co K, One Prov AAA (AW) Btry Co G, One Prov AAA (AW) Btry H+40 Min Co M, 16th Inf Co H, 16th Inf H+50 Min Co C, 81st CML WPNS Bn Adv CP, 16th CT; Co A, 81st CML WPNS H+50 Min Bull Dozers, Half-tracks, Misc Units Bull Dozers, Half-tracks, Misc units H+45 Min Co A, 37th Engr Bn; 5th ESB Det, V Corps, Co B, 37th Engr Bn H+70 Min Co C and Co L, 16th Inf H+90 Min Hq Red,1st Bn,16th Inf;Co E,16th Inf; H+90 Min 1st Engr Co D, 16th Inf and Misc units H+90 Min 62nd FA Bn CP, 16th CT H+95 Min 1st and 2nd Bns, 16th Inf; Btrys A, H+105 Min Hq 3rd Bn, 16th Inf B and C, 7th FA Bn Cn Co, 16th Inf; 1st Sig Co; Adv CP, H+110 Min 1st US Inf Div Hq, Btrys A and B, 197th AAA Bn; AT H+120 Min Co B, 20th Engr Bn; Btrys C Co,16th Inf; 1st Engr Bn; AT Co, 1st and D 197th AAA Bn
FOX GREEN
H+260 Min (On call after) DUKWs loaded with ammunition H+300 Min Army Supplies H+720 Min 2nd Tide Rhino Ferry H+880 Min 2nd Tide Rhino Ferry
The rear CP, 16th CT boarded the AKA 7 (USS CHASE) on 1 June 1944. The advance CP, 16th CT boarded the AKA # 2 (USS HENRICO). On 5 June 1944, the USS CHASE and USS HENRICO weighed anchor at approximately 1800 hours and set sail for France in convoy. Final briefing of the situation was given to the enlisted men aboard the ships. Pamphlets were distributed to the men containing the following message: "You are about to embark upon a Great Crusade, toward which we have striven these many months. The eyes of the world are upon you..." Signed: General EISENHOWER.
H hour was 0630 hours. D day was 6 June 1944.
THE INVASION
At H-6 hours the minesweepers ploughed through the channel, guided by beach markers laid out by midget submarines.
At H-4 hours, the convoy reached Transport Area, 21000 yards from Beach OMAHA and dropped anchor.
At H-1 hour 16 DD tanks from Company C, 741st Tank Battalion and 16 DD tanks from Company B, 741st Tank Battalion, 6000 yards from Beach OMAHA, proceeded toward FOX GREEN and EASY RED as prearranged, and touched down at H-5 minutes to take suitable firing positions close to the high water line. 26 of the 32 DD tanks sunk, some the instant they submerged, because the sea was rough. Of the 6 DD tanks that reached the floating stage, several were knocked out by enemy AT and artillery fire after firing a few rounds. The 6 DD tanks that reached the beach were landed dry by an LCT.
At H-30 minutes, the USS TEXAS and the USS ARKANSAS, 18000 yards from Beach OMAHA, fired 10"13" and 8"5" guns on targets, 14" Air Spot, 105 AP, 35% BD.
At H-20 minutes to H-3 minutes the cruiser F.S. GEORGE LEYGUES, 9000 yards from beach OMAHA, fired 6"15" on Rock Maison on enemy target of AA Gun, 4 concrete shelters, 2 pillboxes, 5 MGs at 678897/70 in vicinity of ST LAURENT SUR MER.
At H-25 to H-hour, heavy day bombers of the 9th Air Force bombed enemy strongpoints at 678897/0 and 678905/0 (vicinity of COLLEVILLE-SUR-MER) consisting of 3 casements, 3 concrete shelters, 5 MGs, 1 AT gun, 3 pillboxes; 4 nests, both in the vicinity of ST LAURENT and COLLEVILLE-SUR-MER.
The 17 LCTs scheduled to land on Beach OMAHA at H-hour to assist the infantry in the attack were reduced to 9 LCTs that reached the beach. Original plan for these tanks was: The 741st Tank Battalion (Company A) with Tank Dozers, was to execute direct high explosive demolition fire on enemy targets. Nine of the 9 LCTs were lost at sea.
The 2nd BLT was to land on Beach OMAHA, EASY RED with Companies E and F abreast; Company D on the left flank in reserve; Company H in support. At H-10 hours Companies E and F aboard APA #2, the USS HENRICO, were called to debarkation stations and at H-8 hours teams were lowered to LCVP's, continuing to rendezvous until after Naval bombardment a few enemy planes dropped long-buster planes over these LCVP's. The assault companies cleared the last boats. Siding craft and tank ships were hit in front as well as support boats.
One mile off shore, the LCVP passed several sea tanks about in the rough sea, supported in life belts and in DUKW's. It was first believed these men, immersed to necks in the water, were obstacles attached but before long they were recognized as DD tank men. These tanks had been sunk or swamped.
Between 10 and 15 minutes off shore the LCVPs' personnel observed the rocket ships opening up with thousands of rockets. According to plan, these three rocket ships were to take positions in boat lanes and deliver fire at approximately H-3 minutes on enemy strongpoint targets between 702891 and 685095 in the vicinity of COLLEVILLE when the leading wave was 500 yards from shore. They fired off schedule.
At 500 to 600 yards offshore, the LCVPs subjected to concentrated enemy artillery, AT and small arms fire, continued through a thick barrage of mortar, automatic-weapon fire. Company E & F, scheduled to land (Company E right and Company F left of Beach EASY RED) between 679895 half of Beach EASY RED), (Company F left of original landing point near the 3rd BLT sector). The men were subjected to MG and AT fire as they waded toward shore. An LCVP received a direct hit from an AT gun, burst into flames, and exploded. There were no men aboard.
Three enemy strongpoints, (672900) (679895) (678900), which were to have been bombed, shelled, and wiped out by the Air Force, Navy rocket guns, were in action. There were no DD tanks to cover the advance of the assault troops companies. There were no bomb craters on the beach for the men to find cover in from enemy fire.
Intense fire concentrated on the group; several men struck underwater mines and were blown out of the sea; others continued to climb over the obstacle-covered exposed beach to slowly work up the shell at the high water mark to obtain momentary cover. Beach obstacles were numerous. There were hedgehogs, tetrahedrons, Element C, log ramps, curved rails and stakes.
A hasty firing line was built up along the pile of shale. Company E discovered most of their weapons were jammed with sand. Personnel stripped, cleaned weapons and enemy guns were brought under small arms fire. Despite the fact that enemy MGs and snipers cut down anyone attempting to return to the water to drag wounded up to the lee of the shale, many men pulled casualties out of the water and were wounded. A few succeeded in face of point-blank enemy fire.
With the majority of weapons still jammed, all radio communication gone, an attempt was made to reorganize scattered remnants of Company E for attack on enemy strongpoint 688895, to cover the front but only ten men could be found. To reorganize in some strength a lateral movement along the beach was started; men were picked up at scattered intervals and led toward Company E's originally scheduled landing point between 679895 and 688895.
Here the men were pinned down by enemy fire. A 7 yard beachhead was established. By this time the beachhead was blocked by the crowding of reinforcements onto the 7 yard penetration. Shoulder to shoulder men lay prone on the pebbles, stones and shale; some of the personnel on the beach laid in a prone position with bodies half immersed in the water. Landing craft deposited more troops onto the 7 yard beachhead. The third wave assault infantry pinned down on the beach. The fifth wave found the first wave assault personnel, remained under constant enemy machine gun, mortar, AT, MG, and sniper fire. Casualties mounted with each succeeding wave.
Company E found that the first platoon, Company E, had broken through just east of Exit E-1, vicinity of 676900, making initial breakthrough from the beach. Personnel on EASY RED was attempting to clear inland by this route which was swept by enemy MG, AT, mortar, and artillery fire. Mines were thickly sown throughout this area. Enemy MGs covered this path which led past the ruins of a house.
Working their way to the top of the high ground overlooking the beach, the 1st platoon, led by Lt Spaulding, under covering fire of a platoon from Company G, 16th Infantry, proceeded west to secure the strongpoint at 678897 consisting of AA Gun, 4 Concrete shelters, 5 MG's, pillbox by pillbox to wipe out the strongpoint covering the east side of Exit E-1. Extremely stubborn resistance was encountered in this strongpoint with its maze of underground shelter trenches and dugouts. A close exchange of hand grenades ensued and small arms fire until the 1st Platoon cornered approximately 20 Germans and an officer who, overpowered, surrendered.
Remnants of Company E pushed on without communications of any kind and approximately 1000 yards south of E-1 partially reorganized.
Of the 183 men that landed, 100 were dead, wounded or missing.
Patrols were pushed out to the front until the 1st Battalion took over the job of reducing it. Orders from Battalion via runner, for Company E to move east toward COLLEVILLE-SUR-MER, were immediately carried through. The Company moved east, then south along road towards town. Enemy snipers were active, but the company continued. Heavy enemy artillery fire registered on the company, but suffered no casualties. Upon Battalion order, the company of 50 troops in strength, swept the woods and fields west of COLLEVILLE Road and proceeded to the COLLEVILLE-ST LAURENT Road. The Company advanced without serious opposition but the small Headquarters groups, following the deployed company, was repeatedly pinned down by MG and sniper fire. It was evident that the enemy fired only on small groups.
Meanwhile Company G had moved up to COLLEVILLE-SUR-MER and occupied the west half of the town followed by 2 fire fight. Company E, with an attachment of one section of Company H MG's was given a mission of building up a Battalion line by covering Company G's right flank which was exposed to enemy machine pistols. Two skeleton sections of Company E under Lt Buch took positions on Company G's right, with the enemy to the front, amongst and to the rear of the troops. Lt Buch and the men held ground, relieving enemy pressure on Company G's right, and finally established a battalion line.
Meanwhile the personnel of the other assault company, Company F, who had landed at 0640 hours on EASY RED and who had been confronted with the same enemy fire when smoke laid down by Navy and artillery had lifted enabling the enemy to observe the landing, suffered severe casualties; 6 officers and 54% of the company. After wading across 30 yards of 4½ feet of water under fire, the 4th, and 5th Sections found they had landed approximately 400 yards too far to the left in the 3rd BLT sector.
The three sections faced enemy strongpoint 693894 of 3 Pillboxes, 1 Concrete shelter, 4 MG's, and an AT Ditch (a defense scheduled to have been bombed and knocked out by day heavy bombers H-30 to H-30 hours) which was active in the 3rd BLT sector. S Sgt Strojny, with a casualty's rocket launcher, registered a direct hit into the embrasure of a pillbox which was set ablaze. S Sgt Pica, 4th Section mortar squad leader, knocked out several emplacements of this enemy defense. His ammunition expended, he led five men, with grenades and NCO's, in an assault in the enemy position, capturing approximately 15 Germans who were turned over to the 3rd Battalion. The personnel remained with the 3rd Battalion until they were able to rejoin their company the following day.
The 1st Section leader, fatally wounded, was replaced by an assistant section leader who ordered the wireman to blow up barbed wire. After a 20 yard crawl this was accomplished while exposed to enemy small arms and mortar fire. Reaching commanding ground, the section attached itself to Company G, and inland, aided in wiping out enemy snipers and isolated machine gun nests located between the beach and COLLEVILLE-SUR-MER.
Company Headquarters and the 3rd Section landed directly in front of the strongpoint assigned to Company F. Enemy strongpoint (687894) consisted of 1 AT Gun, 3 Pillboxes, 1 Medium Gun, and 1 Casemate. The 3rd Section, with all its special equipment lost due to casualties on the beach, with no support from DD tanks, resorted to only small arms fire against the enemy strongpoint without effect. At 1000 hours three M-4s appeared from the left flank and fired at the strongpoint. The strongpoint was liquidated. Company Headquarters and the 3rd Section were pinned down at the high water line until 1200 hours by snipers and MG fire.
At 1130 hours the Battalion Commander ordered Capt Finks to move all 2nd Battalion men to the right where the breakthrough had been made about 500 yards down the beach. When the Company finally assembled at Battalion Headquarters only the Company Commander, 1st Sgt and 10 Privates were present, the latter utilized as local security for the Battalion CP. While placing 3 men on the left flank the 1st Sgt was fired on and pinned down temporarily by enemy MG. One of the men managed to return to the CP to inform Capt Finks he believed the 1st Sgt was hit. The captain succeeded in getting within 75 yards of the enemy MG when he was wounded.
The night of D-day Company F had no officers. Only the 1st Sgt and 10 Privates comprised the company. Before midnight 8 more privates rejoined the company and on the afternoon of D+1 the overstrength of 2 officers and 31 Enlisted Men rejoined the company in COLLEVILLE.
At H+3 minutes the Engineer Task Force landed a few minutes behind assault elements, and were unable to make gaps through underwater obstacles to enable combat vehicles to move onto the beach; or to mark and clear all underwater obstacles and development of the beach beyond the initial zone. At later minute, H-Hour; or to prepare and mark a total of 8 lanes on EASY RED and FOX GREEN through any obstacle existing from the water line at H-Hour to the high water mark; or to extend the 8 lanes through beach obstacles, minefields, anti-tank walls or ditches and seawalls to the main beach exit roads; or to open axial roads from beach exits to transit areas to permit a rated capacity of 600 vehicles per hour on each axial road after H+3 hours; or to remove mines, clear or bypass obstacles and develop roads because of intense enemy artillery, mortar, AT, MG and rifle fire. This prevented them from blowing lanes in beach obstacles and to accomplish original objective of clearing beach for the infantry. They were disorganized when the key officers and noncons were killed and wounded. They suffered 50% casualties on the beach.
On FOX GREEN at H/1 minute when Company I and Company L were to lead the assault, Company F and Company E landed on EASY RED at the same time and casualties mounted. At 0315 hours when Company I had disembarked from HMS EMPIRE ANVIL into LCAs, Capt Richmond realizing that the craft were headed toward a beach west of PORT-EN-BESSIN, guided them back toward the correct beach (665685) as the left company of the Battalion on FOX GREEN. While enroute, boats containing Lt Puncheon with the 4th Section and Lt Cunningham with the 5th Section were swamped and sunk. Personnel were rescued by a patrol boat and delivered to another ship.
At 0700 hours Capt Richmond, still at sea under enemy fire, notified the Battalion of the situation, and asked that Company K be given Company I's mission - 1st objective being at 750880-750879 where two enemy strongpoints were in action. The first strongpoint consisted of 1 4.7 Gun, 34A Guns, 6 pillboxes; the second consisted of 5 MGs and 3 shelters.
At 0800 hours Company I approached the beach. 4 boats with the CP craft leading, neared the shore. The CP craft struck a mine, burst into flames and simultaneously received MG fire. The 1st Sections boat received MG fire, hung up on an obstacle stake but managed to withdraw. The 2nd and 3rd Sections boats both received direct artillery hits, or hit a mine, causing many casualties.
Those who managed to reach the beach set up a defensive line behind the sea wall. The company officers present were Capt Richmond, Lts Anderson, Godwin and Kemp. Rifle fire was brought to bear on all targets which could be observed. Capt Richmond organized as many men and officers he could find and managed to reach the vicinity of Company I's initial objective LE Gd HAMEAU. Elements of Companies L, K and M were with Capt Richmond. Men from Company I and other units under Lts Godwin and Kemp tried to clear the hill to their immediate front. Capt Edmonds attempted to get through (with a few elements of I and Headquarters Company) to Capt Richmond but was held up by sniper and mortar fire. At about the same time, the 1st and 4th Sections under Lts Jolly and Puncheon landed, and replacements under Lt Jackson followed shortly after. Accompanied by Lt Anderson they moved to the battalion reorganization point in the vicinity of LE Gd HAMEAU. Here, a defensive position was set up. Several PWs were taken and some enemy transportation was captured.
During the night and early morning 3 platoons of tanks from the 743rd TK BN moved into the company area and were placed by Capt Richmond and Lt Cutler. At 0800 hours on D/1, 19 men from the 1st Section, under T Sgt Woodham, rejoined the company. S Sgt Westervelt led a patrol east along the main road to CABOURG to draw fire from enemy positions but no fire was drawn. The The Battalion moved east along the road from LE Gd HAMEAU to PORT-EN-BESSIN. Lt Kemp led a combat patrol to HUPPAIN and captured 2 PWs. On the return to the company the PWs attempting to escape, were shot and killed.
Company L on Company I's right in the assault, landed in the vicinity of COLLEVILLE-SUR-MER (FOX GREEN) at approximately 0700 hours, 30 minutes late because of heavy sea and poor visibility. All naval shelling had ceased; no supporting fire was on the beach defenses; supporting tanks were also late, landing several minutes after the assault waves touched down.
The 4th assault section's craft capsized shortly after debarking from transport.
The 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 5th assault sections and Company Headquarters touched down short of several rows of underwater obstacles. Personnel waded ashore under enemy fire. The section leaders reorganized under the shelter of a vertical cliff. The 4th section was still missing. Landing craft carrying the 1st section had been hit by artillery fire and 19men of the section were missing. 5 men of the 2nd section were wounded, 10 from the 3rd and 4 from Company Headquarters reducing the Company strength from the original 187 men to 123.
The assault on beach strongpoints began and Capt Armellino was seriously wounded when he repeatedly exposed himself to direct tank fire in support of his company's advance. Lt Cutler, Executive Officer assumed command.
The 2nd assault section under Lt Monteith was ordered to rush up a small draw and engage pillboxes on the left of (?) strongpoint. The 3rd section was to advance on the right of the 2nd with the 5th following. The 1st section passed around the right flank and made contact with elements of the 116th Infantry and assaulted the right strongpoint which was its original mission, and one they were unable to carry out because they had been landed several hundred yards east of it.
Under Lt Klenk the 1st section had been reduced to 12 men when the craft suffered 2 direct artillery hits. Lt Klenk and S Sgt McKinney reorganized remnants of sections under fire and moved along the beach for 200 yards to take past a strongpoint under fire. Here Lt Klenk contacted 2 lost assault sections of the 116th Infantry and combined them with his section, building up a firing line at the edge of dune line which supported advance of Company L and G. Their fire was masked by smoke from grass fire shortly thereafter and Lt Klenk moved the section back to the beach to assault the left strongpoint, elements which were still active.
Lt Klenk then sent out a scout patrol of five men from the 116th Infantry led by Pfc Likovich, Company L, to clear mine fields and barbed wire obstacles. The patrol became involved in a hand grenade exchange with Germans to their left flank. S Sgt Mansfield, Pvt's Gates and Jordan, and Pfc Hilko, joined by Lts Godwin and Kemp of Company I came to the assistance of the patrol, held their ground until a tank and 60 mm mortar fire could be brought to bear on the enemy position. A destroyer picked up fire. The group closed in on the enemy position. 15 Germans were taken, 16 wounded, and several killed.
At this point the 1st section was joined by elements of Company K under Lt Hallissey which were followed by 4 sections from the 116th Infantry. Defense positions to hold ground were set up to defend the taken ground and protect the left flank of the beach area. Defense was strengthened later in the day by arrival of Lt Inzo with a HMG platoon and a S Sgt with 20 men from Company F.
The other three sections of Company L, under Lt Cutler, advanced; Sgt Monroe emplaced his BAR squad to cover the advance; Lt Monteith enlisted, and directed the support of two tanks. Under cover of this fire and that of the 1st and 5th sections, Sgt Wells' squad worked its way through 2 minefields and 3 bands of wire. At the head of the draw the section took up hasty defensive positions, covering the advance of the 5th section and Company Headquarters.
Two open emplacements were silenced by BAR and rifle fire during the advance up the draw.
Meanwhile the 3rd section, moving up the right slope of the draw under Lt Williams, advanced through anti-personnel minefield, clearing a path for following sections. Sgt Carr blew lanes in the wire. The section received scattered small arms fire from enemy snipers and MGs which harassed but failed to slow down progress.
Reaching the first high ground Lt Williams' section took up hasty defensive positions, contacted the 2nd section, via runner, on the left. The two sections advanced, crossed a heavily-mined road, again took up defensive positions awaiting the Company Commander's orders.
Company Headquarters moved up from the beach to the first defensive position followed by the 2nd and 5th sections. 1st Sgt Waddell set up the first company CP 600 yards inland at point 82,500 NE CABOURG. At 0900 hours contact with Battalion via radio was made. Under Lt Cutler's direction, perimeter defense was set up on initial high ground. The 5th section was designated a mission to secure the right flank and patrolling to CABOURG. The 3rd section covered the left flank patrolling to LE Gd HAMEAU. The 2nd section, in reserve protecting the company rear. A HMG section under Lt Bloom and 2 BAR squads under Sgt Lopuchovsky and Sgt Monroe arrived at 1930 hours and were placed in position. The company was under constant small arms fire.
A patrol from the 5th section was sent to CABOURG, but failed to return. It consisted of Privates Mielander, Butt, and O'Dell, who were captured in CABOURG when surrounded by 52 enemy. Private Butt was wounded. Later Private Mielander talked the Germans into surrendering, then turned them over to the 2nd Battalion, 16th Infantry. A patrol from the 3rd Section under Sgt Davis was sent to cut the main road between HAMEAU-COLLEVILLE preparatory to the company attacking its first objective, encountered enemy resistance in the vicinity of HAMEAU from the town and in the fire fight one German was killed. The patrol was forced to withdraw.
Capt Richmond joined the company and reorganized the battalion.
At 1300 hours one platoon of enemy counterattacked the left flank and rear supported by light mortars and MGs. This threat was met by heavy fire from the 2nd Section, Company Headquarters and Lt Stumbaugh's section was repulsed. There were 13 enemy killed or wounded; 2 men killed, and 4 wounded from their own forces. Lt Monteith who in a large measure was responsible for effective defense was killed while exposing himself to direct effective fire against counterattacking force. T Sgt Worosbyt assumed command of the 2nd Section.
Following the return of Sgt Davis' second patrol, Capt Richmond decided to dispatch a strong combat patrol to LE Gd HAMEAU to be followed up with remainder of the combined force totalling 104 men, 84 from Company G and the remainder from Company's I, K, and M. Lt Williams volunteered, and his patrol succeeded in entering the town with his entire section. A German scout car approached the town and one man was taken prisoner, the second killed while attempting to escape. Later two German staff cars and one scout car were taken under fire by Pfc Hodge with a LMG. One prisoner was taken and two Germans escaped. Numerous military papers and maps and a complete radio set was captured with these vehicles.
Elements of Company K moved into HAMEAU following up the 3rd Section. The remainder of Company L moved into the town at 1600 hours. A patrol under Lt Martineto was sent up the main road to reconnoiter CABOURG. They encountered heavy opposition enroute and was unable to force their way into town. S Sgt Nadeau was seriously wounded in the action.
At 2110 hours the company proceeded by a small covering patrol under T Sgt Worosbyt, took up defensive positions in orchards about 600 yards NE of LE Gd HAMEAU to protect the right flank. During the night enemy infiltration was encountered and driven off. At dawn the following day (D/2) small enemy groups were mopped up behind Company L's position by the 5th Section. One officer and 4 Germans were taken prisoners. Eight German morners were killed and wounded. The 2nd Section wiped out a 3-man reconnaissance patrol. Snipers were active but were cleaned out.
At 1700 minutes two provisional (50 cal) AAA batteries landed on beach OMAHA. One provisional AAA (AW) battery landed with the 2nd BLT and one provisional AAA (AW) battery landed with the 3rd BLT. They were to provide the defense of the beaches, beach exits, and beach maintenance. Only two guns were landed, the rest of the weapons were swamped or sunk since they were too heavy to be manipulated in the early stages of the invasion under the intense artillery and MG fire.
Company G scheduled for the infantry assault wave following Company K and F at H/30 minutes to land on EASY RED. They were loaded from HMS HENRICO into assault craft at 0415 hours, rendezvouzed 500 yards off the starboard bow until 0445 hours, then proceeded toward the beach, forcing the boat teams to swim ashore minus key equipment and weapons; remainder of the company waded ashore in the face of heavy enemy fire. The number of casualties mounted.
Approximately 200 yards inland from the waterline a small shingled mound about 10 feet high enabled the company to secure a slight amount of defilade from fire raking the beach from the flanks and immediate front. Company G found a large number of troops, who had landed on D-hour, pinned down on the beach unable to advance into the bluff overlooking the beach. Company G found most units disorganized due to loss of officers and NCO's on the beach.
A hasty reorganization of assault teams was made in Company G and HMG mortars and BARs were placed in firing position. All efforts were made to help a few officers and NCO's to build up a volume of fire. A few elements of the 1st wave, by this time, had succeeded in advancing approximately 100 yards in front of this position, but were pinned down and unable to move in any direction because of enemy fire concentration.
At 0710 hours Company G infiltrated through a narrow gap between minefields flanked by the shingle mound and overlooking a cliff. Lt Stumbaugh's section, Company K, and remnants of two sections from Company F and Headquarters, were pinned down at the base of the cliff. They were told by the Company Commander of Company G that their organizations were supposed to be 500 yards to the right of this position and to the right of the position. They proceeded to move forward and slightly to the right. As Company G reached this point the sections were directed to seize high ground to the immediate front and to deploy from right to left as they cleared the crest of the hill, in addition to maintaining contact with two sections of Company K on the right.
Two enemy MG nests were destroyed and one German captured by the 5th section of Company G. With the immediate crest of the bluff secured, the remainder of the company was enabled to reach high ground and deploy in forward movement, from right to left. Sections 5,3,1 and 2, with LMG section attached to the 2nd Section. This advance was made under enemy artillery fire and enemy snipers employing machine pistols. One enemy LMG was destroyed on the left flank of the company by the 2nd Section, an enemy LMG section was wiped out and three Germans were killed 200 yards from deployment position. As the 1st Section advanced inland two more enemy were killed.
At approximately 0900 hours Company G had moved inland to a line generally from 677881 to 685885. An effort to laterally consolidate the company was impeded by enemy small arms and automatic weapons fire coming from the front and rear. Enemy mortars fell on the right flank of Section 5. The 5th and 3rd Sections engaged the enemy to clear the woods surrounding a road junction at 683883. Heavy casualties were incurred on both sides. Meanwhile the 1st, 2nd and 4th Sections were engaged on the left flank where most of the enemy fire came from the small volley at 665900. One enemy MG nest was destroyed in this vicinity by the 2nd Section.
At 1200 hours the enemy was cleared from this area and excluding a graphic mortar and artillery fire falling in the general vicinity of the position, all enemy personnel had withdrawn or had been destroyed. The 5th and 3rd Sections formed a line at 682879-685879 with a few men from Company F, 116th Infantry while Company G, 16th Infantry moved into position on the right flank and abreast of Company F, 116th Infantry, but the sections didn't remain long and withdrew back to road junction 682880.
At 1300 hours the 1st Section was dispatched to COLLEVILLE to clear the town of enemy, to seize and hold it with the 5th and 2nd Sections, protecting the company's right front in position at 683878-686880. One section of 20 cal HMGs of Company H, 16th Infantry was placed in position on the right flank of this line when the 4th Section was moved to extend the right flank to 682878. 13 men constituted the 4th Section, and the remainder had various casualties. One 30 cal HMG Section from Company H was put into position at 686883 to cover the 1st Section as it advanced into town. The remaining elements of the 2nd Section were placed in position on the left flank at 684883, they became engaged in a fire fight with the enemy around 684885, and could not render covering fire or support to the 1st Section as it advanced into town.
The 1st Section reached the outskirts of the town at 1315 hours, occupied the church and house due south of the church at 687882, where they engaged the enemy in point-blank fire. Three men of the 1st Section were immediately killed, two were wounded seriously; the buildings were occupied by elements of the section and held. A heavy counterattack developed on all sides of the entire company at this time, but was successfully repulsed with 16 enemy killed in town; four on the north of town by the 2nd Section and five by the 5th and 3rd Sections on the south, a total of 18 men. Up to this time 8 PWs were taken. This engagement necessitated consolidation of the company in an oval position as the enemy completely surrounded Company G and no front could be fixed. To contain ground that had been gained, no further effort to advance was made and Company G dug in to await the 18th Infantry to pass through and relieve the pressure.
At this time the company strength was 107 men, 6 officers, plus about 25 men from other organizations. The 2nd Battalion 18th Infantry, passed through, moving SE from the road junction at 683879, relieving pressure from this sector. Meanwhile the 4th Section and one section of MG from Company H had moved further south and became isolated in the vicinity of 680877, where they remained for the remainder of D-day and morning of 7 June. Efforts to contact this section were prevented by enemy infiltration.
At 1530 hours friendly naval fire shelled Company G's position in COLLEVILLE-SUR-MER with heavy fire, which continued to 1700 hours causing seven casualties. Efforts were made to stop this fire by firing yellow smoke flares. Contact was finally made via Battalion and the fire was lifted. On the morning of D/1 the Company Executive Officer and 27 Enlisted Men rejoined the company, having landed at a later hour on D-day. The company moved through the town, occupied it, taking 12 more prisoners, and killing 5 in an engagement at 1000 hours at 688879. Company G suffered two men wounded.
Total casualties for Company G from H-hour, D-day to 1200 hours D/1, 60 enlisted men and 3 officers.
Scheduled to land on FOX GREEN at H/30 minutes, Company K touched down at 0705 hours. All six boats made safe landing, but two were blown up by mines shortly thereafter. Enemy MGs and sniper fire swept the beach, while enemy mortar and artillery fire zeroed in on the beach inflicting heavy casualties. Company K being pinned down on the beach upon landing, riflemen took up positions behind an embankment at the high tide mark. Lt Brandt, Company Executive Officer, was wounded and later killed by the same shell that mortally wounded Capt Pruenal, the Company Commander, who was trying to reorganize the Company which was spread out over the beach. Lt Zbylut was wounded while coming in from his landing craft. Lt Robinson was killed by a sniper while directing orders for an attack.
Lt Stumbaugh and S Sgt Barbeiri reorganized the 1st and 2nd assault Sections, moved across enemy fire-swept terrain, gained first contact with the enemy, inflicted casualties, and forced enemy to withdraw. On top of the hill they joined Company L and set up a defensive position on their left flank.
Company K, the reserve company of the Battalion, having landed before one of the assault companies, was confronted with heavy enemy fire.
Hearing that the remainder of Company K had occupied the village of CABOURG, Lt Stumbaugh sent out a patrol to contact the company, but it failed to return. It consisted of Sgt Akins, Pfc Potts, and Pfc Barberick.
Lt Stumbaugh moved his section to contact 15 Germans reported in Cabourg, but enemy fire from the flank forced the section took to the cover of a hedge row. Pfc Picardi, BAR man, was wounded. Sgt Foxley, Pfc Demien, and Pfc Pruesner set up their LMG in forward position and were never seen after that time.
The 1st and 2nd Sections of Company K joined Company L in the advance to the vicinity of LE Gd HAMEAU.
Company K less the 1st and 2nd Section, under Lt Hallissey, with the 4th
